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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF CoRPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
Public corPorations I are not presently required to disclose any infor-
mation regarding their donations2 to charitable organizations,3 despite the 
existence of a broad disclosure mandate established by Congress4 and made 
applicable to public corporations through the federal securities regulations 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC").5 
More particularly, the federal securities regulations do not require disclosure 
1. This Article addresses corporate charitable giving by public corporations. Although the 
issues addressed herein have relevance to minority shareholders' interests in the context of close 
corporations, the latter context is sufficiently distinct to warrant separate consideration beyond 
the scope of this work. 
2. As used herein, the terms "contribution(s)," "donation(s)," and "gift(s)" denote corpo-
rate transfers to charitable organizations having qualified for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994), when the transfer is made without 
the expectation of a direct quid pro quo. The use of the aforesaid terms is not meant to resolve 
the issues pertaining to the motivation or resultant effects of these contributions (which are the 
subject of Parts III through VI hereof). The terminological and analytic difficulty surrounding so-
called "profit-maximizing" "charitable" contributions is explicitly addressed in Part VI. 
3. Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, as amended, I.R.C. §§ 1-9722 (the "Code" or "Tax Code'). Organizations that are 
exempt from federal income taxes (on income arising in connection with their exempt purposes) 
pursuant to § 501(~)(3) of the Code are commonly referred to as "charitable organizations" and 
"charities," and are so referred to herein. In order to qualify for charitable status under 
§ 501 (c)(3)-according to the express language of the Code-such organizations must be organited 
and operated exclusively to perform one of the charitable purposes enumerated in § 501(c)(3). 
These purposes include "religiOUS, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or edu-
cational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). (Although "charitable" 
is one of the descriptive categories employed within § 501(c)(3), all the enumerated purposes 
identified above are commonly referred to in the aggregate as "charitable" purposes.) Additional 
requirements pertain to qualification under § 501(c)(3). Of particular relevance to the discussion 
in Part V, charitable organizations are prohibited by the express terms of § 501(c)(3) from partici-
pating in elections for public office and from attempting to influence legislation as a "substantial 
part" of their affairs. Id. 
4. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934,15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78U (1994) (collectively herein, the "Securities Acts"). In particular, in 
§ 14(a) Congress granted the Securities and Exchange CoInmission authority to regulate proxy 
voting "as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994). The Securities Exchange Act also requires public companies to file 
periodic reports with the SEC, which reports present extensive, detailed corporate information. 
Securities Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a). In accordance with this mandate the SEC 
has enacted a broad-based system of mandatory corporate disclosure. See infra notes 5, 7. 
5. The SEC has enacted a comprehensive, integrated di~closure system to fulfill the man-
dates of the Securities Acts. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 33-6383,24 SEC Docket (CCH) 1262 (Mar. 26, 1982). 
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of whether a corporation has made any charitable contributions,6 what the 
value of such contributions may have been, or which organizations may 
have received such contributions.7 
6. The definition of corporate charitable contributions employed herein is based on that 
elaborated in § 170 of the Code (as is generally consistent with common usage, as well as the 
accepted definition within the states' corporate philanthropy laws). Section 170(a)(I) of the 
Code provides the basis for the deduction of charitable contributions both by individuals and by 
corporations. Section 170(c) defines the term "charitable contribution," providing in pertinent 
part: 
Charitable contribution defined.-For purposes of this section, the term "charitable 
contribution" means a' contribution or gift to or for the use of 
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund or foundation-
(A) created or organi~ed in the United States ... or under the law of the United States, 
any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States; , 
(8) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition 
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equip-
ment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals; 
(0 no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder 
or individual; and 
(0) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of 
attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in 
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf 
of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. 
I.R.C. § 170(c) (1994). Contributions that relate to a taxpayer's bUSiness, but that are made with 
a "reasonable expectation of financial return commensurate with the amount of the transfer" may 
be deductible for the taxpayer as business expenses under § 162-instead of as charitable contri-
butions under § 170. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(5) (1996). 
7. The S-K regulations prescribe the specific informational content of the narrative por-
tions of shareholder proxy statements and SEC filings. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.915 (1996). There 
is no provision of the S-K regulations that specifically calls for disclosure of corporate charitable 
contributions as a general matter. However, disclosure of contributions structured as "charitable 
awards" is required pursuant to Item 402(g) of S-K. Id. § 229.402; see Executive Compensation 
Disclosure, Release No. 33-6962,34-31327,57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992); infra notes 
171-176. Outside of charitable awards, it is unlikely that disclosure of corporate charitable con-
tributions would be required pursuant to the existing S-K disclosure requirements. For example, 
disclosure would be required under Item 303 of S-K ("Management's Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations") only if the donations were so substantial in size 
as to materially adversely affect the corporation's overall financial position. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.303(3) (1996). Because many public companies have tens of millions of dollars in annual 
earnings, millions of dollars are contributed to charity without triggering this disclosure standard. 
For the SEC's requirements applying to financial statement presentation and disclosure, see 
Regulation S-X, ill. §§ 210.1-.12. In particular, see ill. § 210.5.03(b)(9) ("Non-operating 
Expenses") (requiring explicit, separate presentation of "material amounts included under miscella-
neous income deductions" (emphasis added». Because there is no absolute standard of materi-
ality, even in a narrow, quantitative sense, corporations have interpreted this requirement 
loosely, and have generally eschewed making any disclosure of their charitable contributions. 
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Disclosure requirements beyond the federal securities regulations, 
including generally accepted accounting principles,s also fail to redress this 
informational failure. 9 With the exception of contributions arising from 
separately constituted corporate foundations,lo corporations are free to 
make gifts to charitable organizations without creating any public record of 
the amount of such gifts or the identities of the recipients. While many 
corporations voluntarily make some anecdotal disclosure of their 
contributions-either directly to shareholders (most commonly in the 
annual report)1I or in the popular media (especially where public relations 
benefits are. anticipated)-corporate managers are unlikely to permit discl<Y 
sure of gifts that might appear self-serving or prove controversial. 
Compounding the significance of this informational failure is the fact 
that state corporation laws have adopted an extraordinarily laissez-faire 
approach to corporate charitable giving. 12 As described below in Part II, 
8. The most relevant is ACCOUNTING FOR CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS MADE, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 116 (Financial 
Accounting Standards Bd. 1993). FAS-116 does not require corporations' financial statements to 
state expressly the amounts of any charitable contributions made. 
9. Moreover, even a highly motivated shareholder could not compel a charitable orga-
nization to disclose the names of corporate contributors. Privacy interests and First Amendment 
rights of free association protect organizations from compelled disclosure of the identities of con-
tributors or members, absent a compelling state interest. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,64-68 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding constitutionality 
of FECA's mandatory disclosure and reporting provisions). In addition (except in the case of 
private foundations), the Code specifically exempts the names of contributors from the informa-
tion that charitable organizations are required to make public. I.R.C. § 6104(b) (1994). For 
discussion of the principal sources of charitable contributions information, see infra note 22. 
10. Private foundations (including corporate foundations-i.e., foundations established and 
funded by corporations) are themselves charitable organizations qualified under § 501{c){3) of the 
Code. (private foundations are to be distinguished from the class of "public charities" described 
under § 509{a){I)-{4) of the Code.) Private foundations are subject to numerous requirements in 
addition to those under § 501{c){3). For example, Chapter 42 of the Code imposes certain taxes 
on foundation investment income, as well as regulatory excise taxes under §§ 4940-4945. Most 
importantly for our purposes, private foundations are required to disclose both to the IRS and to 
the public detailed information regarding their finances and affairs on their annual exempt orga-
nization returns (the "Form 990-PF") pursuant to § 6033{c). Public charities are not required to 
submit such detailed information to the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6033{a), (b) (1994). For discussion of 
the extensive rules pertaining to corporate foundations, see Lauren Watson Cesare, Private 
Foundations and Public Charities-Definition and Classification, 296-3d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 
(1992). See also JAMES J. FISCHMAN &. STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIAL'> 580-66 (1995). 
11. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-3(b) (1996). 
12. The regulation of corporate internal affairs and the definition of corporate powers has 
been traditionally a matter left to the individual states. Therefore, it is state law that defines the 
power of business corporations to contribute to charity. Certain corporate legal scholars have ar-
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the current laws represent the rejection of an earlier regulatory tradition in 
the states' approach to corporate charitable giving. In stark contrast to 
their legislative antecedents, the modern corporate philanthropy statutes 
impose neither substantive limitations nor procedural safeguards on cor' 
porate charitable contributions. Most importantly, the modern statutes 
have abrogated the requirement that corporate charitable contributions be 
made for the purpose of benefiting the donor corporationY In rejecting 
shareholder wealth maximization as the lodestar of managerial decision, 
making, the modern philanthropy laws depart from the traditional frame' 
work of state corporation law. 14 This departure from the traditional 
normative concerns of corporate law is more dramatic for the fact that the 
modern laws fail to supply an alternative analytic framework to govern 
corporate charitable giving. 15 Therefore, in promulgating the modern 
philanthropy provisions, the states have acted to authorize genuinely phil, 
anthropic corporate contributions, while they have affirmatively declined 
to regulate corporate charitable giving. 
Thus, corporate charitable giving exists in a relative regulatory 
vacuum. The absence of substantive regulation in the states, in conjunc, 
tion with the absence of a disclosure requirement under the federal securi, 
ties regulations, reflects an outmoded and speciously simplistic view of 
corporate charitable contributions. Such contributions have been regarded 
as "merely a form of advertising," or alternatively, corporate "pocket 
change" benefiting the community. This Article provides a reconsideration 
gued that state corporation law has universally abandoned the role of protecting shareholders. 
The debate has therefore turned to the appropriateness and efficacy of implementing federal 
standards of corporate governance. The classic writings are William L. Cary, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: Re/kctions upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974), which argues in favor of imple-
menting federal standards, and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Th~ory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977), which argues against implementation. 
13. The states' elimination of the benefit-to-the-business requirement is discussed infra Part 
II.B. 
14. The model of the corporation as an engine of shareholder wealth maximization is cen-
tral to corporate law and mainstream corporate legal scholarship. See, e.g., ALI, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994). For an alterna-
tive perspective, see MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995). See also PROGRESSIVE 
CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
15. Of course, state legislators have had an interest in facilitating increased corporate chari-
table contributions in order to offset, in some measure, the burdens of taxation. See A.P. Smith 
Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 589 (N.J. 1953) ("In encouraging and expressly authorizing 
reasonable charitable contributions by corporations, our State has not only joined with other 
states in advancing the national interest but has also specially furthered the interests of its own 
people who must bear the burdens of taxation resulting from increased state and federal aid upon 
default in voluntary giving. "). 
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of the contemponiry dimensions of corporate charitable giving as it bears on 
shareholders' rights l6 and corporate law paradigms. 17 
Accordingly, Parts III through VI analyze the diverse causes and expla-
nations for corporate charitable contributions and relate them to corporate 
legal norms. This analysis proceeds under the headings of: (i) managerial 
self-interest; (ii) corporate social responsibility; (iii) politicized philanthropy; 
and (iv) profit-maximizing charitable contributions. First, as described in 
Part III; in the absence of any form of accountability, corporate managers 
are apt to use their control over corporate charitable contributions to con-
fer benefits on themselves, rather than to benefit the firm or the commu-
nity. When managers use the' firm's donations to pursue their personal 
philanthropic objectives, such donations represent a form of agency costs, 
and are inconsistent with the fiduciary obligations imposed by law. Sec-
ond, as discussed in Part IV, when donations are made in the name of 
corporate social responsibility (as opposed to traditional commercial objec-
tives), corporate managers have failed to offer adequate justification for 
their exclusive control over such decisions. Third, as described in Part V, 
corporate charitable contributions to politicized nonprofit organizations 
represent an· increasingly significant form of corporate political speech. 
Such contributions, especially when they are made in the absence of disclo-
sure, jeopardize the free speech and associational interests of corporate 
shareholders. IS Finally, as discussed in Part VI, although corporate execu-
tives increasingly tout the "strategic benefits" accruing from corporate 
16. Because corporate contributions are funded from corporate profits, they are paid for-
and therefore of special concern to-corporate shareholders. Nevertheless, a corporation's chari-
table contributions may frequently be of interest to nonshareholder constituencies as wen (e.g., 
customers, employees, and the public). In practice, if firms are required to disclose their contribu-
tions in reports to shareholders or SEC filings, nonshareholder constituencies will also gain 
greater access to this information. (In light of the fact that shareholders fund corporate contribu-
tions (at least those that do not result in a net benefit for the firm), it is ironic that significant 
solicitude has been paid to employees' charitable preferences-through the establishment of em-
ployee matching grant programs, for example-but not to shareholders'.) 
17. The central thesis of this Article is that the separation between ownership and control 
in the modem public corporation, in combination with an overly laissez-faire system of state and 
federal regulation in the area of corporate philanthropy, has created the potential for gross mana-
gerial abuse of shareholders' property and speech interests. See ADoLF A. BERLE, JR. & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 68 (1932) ("[IJn 
the corporate system, the 'owner' of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership 
while the power, the responsibility and the substance which have been an integral part of owner-
ship in the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control. "). 
18. Because the business corporation is regarded as a private body, shareholders' liberty 
interests do not obtain federal constitutional dimensions. However, the classification of business 
corporations as private entities does not diminish the gravity of shareholder coercion in regard to 
nonconsensual corporate political speech in my opinion. For further discussion, see infra Part V. 
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contributions, without disclosure there is no means t~ assess whether the 
firm's gifts have been structured according to value-maximizing criteria. In 
addition, the inherently contradictory nature of profit-maximizing chari-
table contributions deserves further consideration. 
The absence of substantive regulation, in combination with the 
absence of a disclosure requirement, has meant that corporate senior execu-
tives have had a blank check to make corporate charitable contributions 
independent of both business objectives and shareholder preferences. In no 
other area of corporate affairs do managers enjoy the same degree of discre-
tion with such a concomitant lack of accountability.19 As a response to 
this failure of accountability, this Article argues that the SEC should 
amend the federal securities regulations to require corporations to routinely 
disclose to their shareholders accurate and comprehensive information 
about the corporation's charitable contributions.2o In particular, both the 
aggregate total and the individual amounts of the firm's charitable gifts, the 
identities of recipient nonprofit organizations, and the existence of any 
shared directors on the boards of the corporation and the charities receiving 
its contributions21 should routinely be disclosed to shareholders. In partic-
ular, the SEC should require that summary information be presented in the 
annual report, while affording shareholders a right to obtain a comprehen-
sive, detailed report of the company's charitable contributions upon 
request. 
While disclosure is not a panacea, obligatory disclosure of contribu-
tions information is likely to benefit shareholders in several respects. 
Required disclosure is likely to deter corporate managers from using corpo-
rate contributions to pursue narrow, personal objectives, because it will 
require them to sacrifice a portion of their professional capital if they are 
unable to justify their firms' philanthropic practices according to estab-
lished shareholder preferences or accepted commercial norms. Secondly, 
requiring disclosure of corporate contributions is a first step in democra-
19. For instance, managerial discretion in the area of traditional corporate political activity 
is cabined by the operation of the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") and other laws and 
regulations. For an overview of FECA's requirements, as they relate to corporate expenditures, 
see infra notes 246-263. 
20. Corporations already maintain detailed records of their charitable contributions in order 
to support the deductibility of such contributions under § 170. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13 
(1996) ("Recordkeeping and return requirements for deductions of charitable contributions."). 
Therefore, SEC-mandated disclosure of contribution data should not impose any significant addi-
tional information-gathering costs on corporations. 
21. For a discussion of the "corporate governance" problems raised by common directors 
serving on the board of the corporation and the charities receiving its contributions, see infra 
note 133 and accompanying text. 
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tizing the debate over corporate social resporisibility, so that shareholders-
who fund such expenditures-may be afforded a greater role in elaborating 
how, when, and according to what criteria the firm should allocate its 
philanthropic capital. Thirdly, disclosure will afford shareholders the 
option to withdraw their investment if they are opposed to the corpora-
tion's politicized charitable contributions, or to voice their opposition 
through various forms of shareholder activism. Finally, disclosure will 
afford both analysts and shareholders alike the opportunity to assess the 
profit-maximizing claims made in regard to corporate contributions, and 
will facilitate scholarly progress in the study of corporate philanthropy. 
I. A BRIEF QUANTITATIVE AND PRACTICAL SURVEY OF 
CORPORATE PHILANTI-IROPY 
A. Quantitative Perspectives 
Corporate charitable contributions amount to several billion dollars in 
aggregate on an annual basis,zz Direct 'corporate grants and grants by ~or-
22. Because ther~ is widespread misunderstanding regarding the availability of ~~q,orate 
contributions information, I will describe the principal sources of this data. Since 1936, the 
Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") has compiled and published statistical information on 
corporate charitable contributions. These figures are made publicly available by. the IRS, on an 
aggregated and company-blind basis, in a volume entitled Statistics of Income, Corporation Income 
Tax Returns (the "SOl"). Unfortunately, there is a substantial delay in the publication of the 
SOl, which seriously compromises the usefulness of this data. For example, the most recent 
corporate contributions figures available in the SOl are for 1993. The SOl's corporate charitable 
contributions figures represent the total dollar valuation assigned to direct corporate contributions 
to qualified charitable orgariizations for which a deduction under § 170 has been claimed in the 
year (together with carryovers), including 'transfers to corporate foundations. (To avoid double 
counting, the SOl data does not reflect corporate foundations' transfers to "third-party" chari-
table organizations.) Despite certain technical caveats, as well as a substantial delay in its 
publication, the SOl has been the single most important source of quantitative information on 
corporate charitable contributions, providing the basis of almost all econometric study and 
general quantitative analysis: See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND 
CHARITABLE GIVING 195-96 (1985). A3 mentioned above, the crucial shortCOming of the SOl 
data, in relation to corporate shareholders' interests, is that the SOl does not present any contri-
bution data on a company-specific basis. Its findings are therefore of no use to shareholders (or 
anyone else) interested in studying the philanthropic behavior of particular firms. 
The other important source of data on corporate philanthropy is a joint survey conducted 
annually by the Council for Aid to Education (the "CFAE'') and The Conference Board. These 
survey results are published annually in the organizations' separate reports. The CFAE's data is 
published by the American A3sociation of Fund-Raising Counsel (the "AAFRC") in its annual 
report entitled, Giving USA. The Conference Board publishes its annual report on ,corporate 
charitable contributions under its own name. In these cases, too, the data is presented on a 
company-blind basis. There are slight methodological differences between these' three reports, 
leading to slight discrepancies between the figures reported therein. Because of their greater 
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porate foundations totalled $7.4 billion in 1995,23 without including con~ 
tributions arising from cause~related marketing, corporate special~event 
sponsorships, or corporate public affairs departments. 24 Nontraditional 
corporate "assistance" expenditures are also unreflected in the $7 .4~billion 
charitable contributions figure. 25 The vast majority of corporate chari~ 
table contributions, approximately 75%, are made directly by corporations, 
as opposed to through corporate foundations.26 Cash predominates as the 
most popular currency for corporate contributions. Cash transfers have 
typically constituted more than 80% of the total value of corporate con~ 
tributions, with the remainder representing donations of products, property, 
and equipment. 27 Although there are no established sources of company~ 
specific data,28 the IRS publishes aggregated contributions data based on 
industry classifications.29 From this data we know that certain industries-
especially pharmaceuticals; food, beverage, and tobacco; petroleum, gas, 
and mining; and telecommunications companies-have consistently been 
among the largest corporate contributors.3o 
timeliness, the figures presented in the text are based on the CFAE and The Conference Board's 
survey results. 
23. AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 1996: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON 
PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1995, at 89 (1996) [hereinafter GIVING USA 19961. Although 
$7.4 billion is unquestionably a substantial sum, it should be recognized that corporate con-
tributions represent only a small fraction of total annual charitable contributions. For 1995, 
which was roughly typical of previous years, they represented 5.1 %. Id. Individuals are by far the 
largest class of contributors, being responsible for about 80 cents of every dollar annually con-
tributed to charity. Id. at 55. Nevertheless, corporate contributions appear to function as a bell-
wether for contributions from other sources, and are thus regarded by some as having importance 
exceeding their individual amounts. 
24. Id. at 89. For a discussion of contributions arising from cause-related marketing pro-
grams and corporate special-event sponsorships, see infra Part VI. 
25. AUDRIS D. TILLMAN, THE CONFERENCE Bo., CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS, 1994, at 
15 (1995) [hereinafter CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS, 19941. 
26. GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 89. According to Foundation Center and CFAE 
data for 1994, corporate foundations' grants accounted for $1.6 billion out of a total of $6.9 
billion in corporate charitable contributions. See also AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, 
GIVING USA 1995: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1994, at 79 (1995) 
[hereinafter GIVING USA 19951. 
27. The Conference Board reported the 1995 statistics, which reflect a slight decrease in 
cash giving in comparison to recent years: 78% cash, 19% corporate product, and 3% property 
and equipment. AUDRIS D. TILLMAN, THE CONFERENCE Bo., CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS IN 
1995: AN ADVANCE REPORT 8 (1996) [hereinafter CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS IN 19951. 
28. See supra note 22. 
29. See, for example, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME, 
1993-CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 1993. 
30. According to The Conference Board's figures for 1995, the most heavily contributing 
industries were (1) pharmaceutical companies, $325 million, (2) food, beverage, and tobacco 
companies, $211 million, and (3) petroleum, gas, and mining companies, $165 million. 
CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS IN 1995, supra note 27, at 6. 
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Notwithstanding methodological variations31 and incomplete data,32 
there is widespread agreement that corporate contributions have increased 
substantially over the past twenty years33 despite inconsistent trends in 
corporate profits. 34 Recent estimates put corporate charitable giving for 
1975 at $3.72 billion (in "constant" or inflation-adjusted dollars).35 The 
$7.4 billion figure for 1995 thus represents double the slim of twenty years 
earlier. Assessing the magnitude of corporate charitable contributions, one 
commentator observed that the $6.5-billion aggregate corporate contribu-
tions figure of the late 1980s was on par with the entire annual U.S. foreign 
aid budget at that time.36 
31. Variations exist in regard to statistical sampling techniques, companies represented 
(public-only or public and private), carryovers from year to year, and the inclusion of corporate 
transfers to corporate foundations versus foundation payments to third-party charities, for 
example. Both Giving USA and The Conference Board's annual reports include detailed 
descriptions of their research methodologies. 
32. Researchers have persistently complained about inadequate disclosure of corporate chari-
table contributions data, describing the resultant informational gaps as impediments to their 
analysis. See, e.g., AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 1992: THE ANNUAL 
REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1991, at 25 (1992) [hereinafter GIVING USA 1992] 
("Nonprofit managers, their donors, and researchers who study them would also benefit from 
accurate reporting and access to accurate information about the sector."); STEVEN R. NEIHEISEL, 
CORPORATE STRATEGY AND THE POLITICS OF GooDWILL 8-9 (1994) ("The majority of corpora-
tions do not want the public to know how much they are contributing and to whom they are 
contributing. Reliable data are therefore very difficult to obtain."); see also JAMES T. BENNETT, 
PATTERNS OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY #5, at 10 (1989) ("It is highly disturbing that many 
corporate managers are so secretive about the distribution of company funds for public affairs 
purposes; in many cases even shareholders are denied access to such information."). Further 
evidence that many fitrnS resist releasing this data upon shareholders' requests is prOVided by 
corporations' efforts to exclude shareholder proposals (under the federal proxy system) calling for 
such disclosure. See infra note 223. 
33. In addition to gross dollar analysis, corporate giving is also analyzed as a percentage of 
pretax corporate income. The average rate of corporate contributions as a percentage of corpo-
rate income was 0.82% in 1975; it was 1.24% in 1995. GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 90. 
The highwater mark was reached in the mid-1980s, when giving briefly exceeded 2% of pretax 
income. Interestingly, although total corporate giving has increased on a gross dollar basis since 
1992, on a percentage of income basis, giving has decreased during this period. This partly re-
flects the increases in corporate profits occurring during the previous few years. CORPORATE 
CONTRIBUTIONS, 1994, supra note 25, at 11. Such average statistics hide substantial discrepan-
cies among individual fitrnS, of course. For example, various groups of business organizations in 
major cities have established "Five Percent" and "Two Percent" clubs to encourage corporate 
contributions at such levels. KENNETH A. BERTSCH, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY REsEARCH CTR., 
CORPORATE GIVING IN THE REAGAN YEARS 1 (1985). 
34. For an illustration of comparative rates of corporate contributions and corporate profits, 
see AUDRIS D. TILLMAN, THE CONFERENCE Bo., CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS, 1993, at 13 
(1994). 
35. GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 88. The contributions data derived from Giving 
USA and presented in the text is presented in constant dollars. 
36. Usha C.V. Haley, Corporate Contributions as Managerial Masques: Reframing Corporate 
Contributions as Strategies to Influence Society, 28 J. MGMT. STUD. 485,485 (1991). 
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Examining the pattern of contributions over this period in closer de, 
tail, increases are represented as being continuous between 1975 and 
1987.37 Thereafter, beginning in the late 1980s, a period of stagnation 
occurred.38 This stagnation, which amounted to a series of incremental 
decreases when inflation was taken into account, had been regarded as 
continuing through the mid,1990s. Research reports published in 1995 
indicated that giving had slowed, and incrementally decreased in light of 
inflation between 1988 and 1994.39 However, researchers have recently 
altered their estimates of corporate contributions levels in the early to mid, 
1990s. Reports based on data through 1995 suggest that the total con, 
tributions figures for 1993 and 1994 had previously been underestimated, so 
that the magnitude and duration of the decline had been overstated. 40 
Giving USA 1996 indicated that contributions increased in both current 
and constant dollars in 1993, 1994, and 1995.41 Contributions for 1995 
represented a 4.56% increase over the prior year measured in constant 
dollars (7.5 % in current, unadj usted dollars). 42 And companies responding 
to The Conference Board's survey for 1995 predicted that moderate in' 
creases incorporate philanthropic giving would continue throughout 1996 
and 1997.43 
Furthermore, analysts have revised their view of the relationship be, 
tween traditional corporate charitable contributions and contributions 
arising from corporate public affairs and marketing budgets. In reports 
issued in 1995, commentators suggested that marketing,oriented, "strategic" 
giving was supplanting traditional corporate philanthropy.44 In contrast, 
Giving USA 1996 indicated that there may be a synergistic effect between 
traditional corporate giving and public affairs and marketing,oriented con' 
37. GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 88. 
38. 1d. But see Hayden W. Smith, Corporations Are More Generous Than You Think, 
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 22, 1991. 
39. GIVING USA 1995, supra note 26, at 77. 
40. Giving USA 1995 reported that contributions had failed to keep pace with inflation for 
seven consecutive years. 1d. at 77. 
41. GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 88. 
42. 1d. 
43. CoRPORATE CoNTRIBlITlONS IN 1995, supra note 27, at 3-4. 
44. GIVING USA 1995, supra note 26, at 77. At a press conference announcing the 
AAFRCs charitable contributions figures for 1994, the chairman of the AAFRC stated: "Tradi-
tional giving, directed by a philanthropy staff and the interests of executive officers, is giving way 
to more strategic and less statistically observable programs overseen by financial officers and 
housed in marketing and public affairs departments." AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy, Voluntary 
Contributions to Non-Profits Continue to Rise, Individual Contributions Lead the Way, 
Corporate Giving Going Through Changes, Affecting Level of Corporate Donations (May 25, 
1995) (press release, on file with author) (emphasis added). 
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tributions, so that both forms of corporate giving are seen to be increas-
ing. 45 In addition to the traditional forms of corporate contributions, cor-
porations continue to make "corporate assistance expenditures," including 
subsidizing employee volunteering and executive consulting programs, the 
use of corporate facilities and services, and below-market transactions (in-
cluding commercial loans)-all of which, again, are not reflected in the 
$7.4 billion contributions figure.46 
B. The Role of Corporate Senior Executives 
While in certain corporations the contributions function has been 
decentralized, in most public corporations senior executive officers still 
exert extraordinary influence over the size of gifts and the selection of 
beneficiary organizations. Trends in contributions-based marketing and 
strategic alliances with corporate public affairs departments have affected 
the administration of corporate charitable contributions in certain in-
stances,47 but a host of studies and commentaries attest to the continued 
control and influence exerted by senior corporate executives in relation to 
their firms' philanthropic practices.48 
45. GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 89. 
46. The Conference Board reported the value of such "corporate assistance expenditures" 
reported by survey respondents at $157 million for 1994, $186 million for 1993, and $99 million 
for 1992. CORPORATE CONTRIBlTfIONS, 1994, supra note 25, at 15. For further commentary, 
see Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the Expense of 
Sharehokkr Gain-A Survey of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7 
(1988), and, though not as timely, Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social 
Crisis, 50 B.U. L. REV. 157 (1971), both of which discuss the variety of channels for corporate 
altruism and the sources of legal authority therefor. 
47. See Craig Smith, The New Corporate Philanthropy, 72 HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 
1994, at 105. 
48. NEIHEISEL, supra note 32, at 54 ("CEO influence is important not only where we might 
expect-at the level of goal setting-but it is also deep in that it extends to even determining 
specific beneficiaries. This is quite extraordinary given the size of the contributions function 
relative to other corporate functions."). (Neiheisel's work also emphasized the importance of the 
professional contributions staff.) A number of studies assay the power that senior executive offi-
cers and corporate directors retain over corporate contributions. See, e.g., JAMES F. HARRIS & 
ANNE KLEPPER, THE CONFERENCE Bo., CORPORATE PHILAmHROPIC PuBLIC SERVICE 
ACTIVITIES (1976) (finding that top management plays a major role in setting the goals, priorities, 
and budget levels of the contributions function); KATHRYN TROY, THE CONFERENCE Bo., THE 
CORPORATE CONTRIBlTfIONS FUNCTION (1982) (contributions managers reported meeting with 
their CEOs on at least a monthly basis and rated the CEOs influence on program content and 
grant size as about a four on a five-point scale); Arthur H. White & John Bartolomeo, Corporate 
Giving: The Views of Chief Executive Officers of Major American Corporations, COUNCIL ON 
FOUNDS., May 1982, at 49, 50 (reporting that 81% of respondents surveyed indicated that the 
CEO had total or a large degree of influence over budgets and 68% said that the CEO had a large 
degree of influence in selecting specific recipients). (These studies are cited in NEIHEISEL, supra 
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C. Corporate Charitable Foundations 
In contrast to direct corporate grant-making, certain firms have estab-
lished separate charitable foundations to administer a portion of their phil-
anthropic giving. 49 The principal function of these foundations-which 
are themselves charitable organizations qualified under § 501(c)(3)-is to 
disseminate the donor corporations' grants to third-party charitable organi-
zations.5o Private. foundations are subject to special regulatory require-
ments and penalties, in addition to those under § 501(c)(3).51 Most 
significantly for our purposes, private foundations are required by the IRS to 
file a detailed informational return, the '.'Form 990-PF," and to make. it 
available for inspection by third partiesY The Form 990-PF indicates the 
individual amounts of the foundation's grants,. and the identities of the 
recipients. Such required disclosure of foundation-based corporate grant-
making contrasts markedly with the absence of disclosure in regard to direct 
corporate grant-making. 53 
note 32, at 53-55.) See also Richard 1. Morris & Daniel A. Biederman, How.to Gille Away Money 
InteUigently, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 151, 153 ("[Chief executive officers') peers 
approach them constantly to support pet causes, and they reciprocate. A company's full contri-
butions budget can easily be committed in this way, and large slices of the CEO's time are con-
sumed in the process. "). For discussion of the philanthropy laws' construction of decisional 
authority in regard to corporate contributions, see infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
49. For an overview of key Code provisions pertaining to 'corporate foundations, see supra 
note 10 and the citations therein. For discussion of the historical development and public policy 
controversies surrounding private foundations, see, for example, COMMISSION ON FOUNDS. AND 
PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY, FOUNDATIONS, PRIVATE GIVING AND PUBLIC POLICY: REpORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON FOUNDATIONS AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY 
(1970). 
50. See supra note 10. 
51. See Cesare, supra note 10. 
52. See I.R.C. § 6033(c) (1994). However, it should be noted that the usefulness of such 
foundation disclosure is compromised by the relative inaccessibility of the Form 990-PFs. Founda-
tions are required to allow inspection of Form 990-PFs at their premises, but are not required to 
copy them or to allow them to be removed from their premises. See id. § 6104(d). The logistical 
problems historically associated with obtaining the informational returns of nonprofit organiza-
tions are discussed in GIVING USA 1992, supra note 32, at 28-29. On July 30, .l996, Congress 
enacted the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996), which 
(among other changes) revised § 6104(e) to make Form 990 reports of public charities readily 
available to individuals upon request (and payment of a small fee). Curiously, the legislation did 
not affect private foundations' filings (the Form 990-PF), so that corporate foundations' reports 
remain relatively inaccessible. 
53. The Form 990-PF disclosure requirement pertaining to private foundations' affairs grew 
out of the public controversy that surrounded corporate foundations' activities in the late 1960s. 
This controversy led to various investigations by private commissions and a congressional re-
sponse thereto in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See supra note 49. The absence of regulation in 
the area of direct corporate grant-making may represent a classic catch-22: The absence of a dis-
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While distinct patterns and rules pertain to foundation-based corporate 
grant-making,54 it is important to recall that corporate foundations are not 
the source of most corporate charitable contributions. As mentioned previ-
ously, approximately 75% of all corporate contributions are made on a 
direct basis. 55 Also significant is the fact that even where firms have es-
tablished a separate foundation, a substantial portion of their donations 
have continued to be made on a direct basis.56 No rule requires a corpora-
tion to disseminate its gifts through its charitable foundation merely be-
cause such a foundation has been established. Thus, where confidentiality 
is considered important, a firm may simply elect to make any "sensitive" 
contributions directly, thus avoiding a disclosure requirement. 
Furthermore, the establishment of a corporate foundation need not 
curtail the influence of a corporation's senior officers. It is common prac-
tice for a company's high-level officers to serve on the board of directors of 
the foundation, or to closely monitor the foundation's affairs,51 There-
fore, the existence of corporate charitable foundations has largely func-
tioned to recapitulate the issues pertaining to corporl;lte grant-making-as 
they relate to shareholders' interests-on another institutional level. 
In conclusion, in light of the absence of meaningful substantive stan-
dards or other mechanisms of accountability, the contemporary legal 
critique of corporate charitable giving must address a situation in which 
corporate executives maintain control over billions of dollars of corporate 
(and corporate foundation) resources which they may allocate to charitable 
entities independent of commercial considerations and according to their 
own pleasure. 
closure requirement may be based on the relative absence of information-which may explain the 
absence of attention paid to the subject. It is also possible to make a public cholce-oriented 
interpretation of the confidentiality and permissiveness that characterize the legal posture toward 
corporate charitable contributions; i.e., politicians derive benefits from corporate gifts to politi-
cized charitable organizations serving their policy objectives, see infra Part V, and from any re-
duction in taxes attributable to voluntary corporate charitable support, and are thus unlikely to 
advocate .measures intended to increase oversight in this area. 
54. A thorough treatment of foundation-based corporate grant-making and its significance 
vis-a-vis legal policy is beyond the scope of this Article. For an analysis of the economic aspects 
of corporate charitable foundations' affairs, see Natalie Jeanette Webb, Company Foundations 
and the Economics of Corporate Giving (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke Uni-
versity). 
55. See supra note 26. 
56. Webb, supra note 54, at 44. 
57. ld. at 65-71. A particular example is supplied by Mary Cunningham Agee's appoint-
ment to the presidency of Morrison Knudsen Corporation's charitable foundation. See Brian 
O'Reilly, Agee in Exile, FORTUNE, May 29,1995, at 51, 56. 
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II. THE STATES' DECISION NOT TO REGUlATE 
CoRPORATE PHIlANTHROPY 
Over the course of this century, the states' approach to corporate 
charitable giving has undergone a complete about-face. At the tum of the 
century, in light of the operation of the ultra vires doctrine, the pervasive 
statutory silence concerning corporate charitable contributions was inter-
preted by the courts as prohibiting true corporate philanthropy. By mid-
century, the majority of states had enacted laws that validated corporate 
philanthropic authority, but these statutes typically imposed substantial 
limitations and requirements on the practice of corporate charitable giving. 
Mter mid-century, these "regulatory" philanthropy laws were universally 
repealed in favor of open-ended enabling laws. These modem laws license 
truly philanthropic corporate giving; furthermore, in light of the statutory 
history preceding them, they must be regarded as reflecting a decision on 
the part of the state legislatures to forego the regulation of corporate charita-
ble giving. But in failing to supply any objective standards or safeguards to 
govern corporate executives' decisions in this area, the modem corporate 
philanthropy laws have failed to protect shareholders' best interests. 
A. The Legal Background of the Modem Philanthropy Provisions 
1. The Ultra Vires Problem 
From the late nineteenth century through the early twentieth century, 
the most pressing legal question concerning corporate charitable contribu-
tions was whether businesses had the legal authority to make them. 58 
Under the doctrine of defined corporate powers, corporations were regarded 
as having only such powers as were granted by the state and reflected in the 
58. See, e.g., Brinson Ry. v. Exchange Bank, 85 S.E. 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 1915); McCrory v. 
Chambers, 48 Ill. App. 445, 452-53 (1892) (directors of bank were without authority to contri-
bute to a fund collected for purpose of retaining manufacturing firm within city's limits, despite 
indirect benefits that might be obtained by company and community generally); Davis v. Old 
Colony R.R. 131 Mass. 258 (1881) (finding railroad company's guarantee for payment of music 
festival's expenses unlawful, despite probability that company would benefit from the festival). 
As Phillip Blumberg noted, these decisions did not involve gifts to established charitable organi-
zations, and are thus distinguishable from the modem corporate philanthropy decisions. See 
Blumberg, supra note 46. 
Corporate Philanthropy 595 
corporation's. charter. 59 All other acts were "ultra vires" -literally 
"beyond the powers" of the corporation:60 Thus, charitable expenditures 
by business corporations were originally regarded as "waste" because, prior 
to the 1930s, almost all the states' incorporation statutes failed to include 
corporate philarithropic authority within the corporate powers enumerated 
therein.61 . 
2. Incidental Powers as Authorization for Contributions 
In the initial process of legal liberalization, various courts relied on the 
notion of "incidental corporate' powers"62 to uphold the legality of nontra-
ditional expenditures when it could be demonstrated that the corporation, 
and not merely the surrounding community in general, would foreseeably 
59. For an early treatment of the ultra vires doctrine in the area of corporate philanthropy, 
see Samuel Davis, The Application of the Doctrine of Ultra Vires to Expenditures of Corporations 
Outside the Usual Course of Business-Some Elementary Principles Recalled, 1 B.U. L. REV. 99 
(1921), See also Hyarnsy. Old Dominion Co., 93 A 747, 752 (Me. 1915) ("[C]orporate powers 
are limited to those expressly granted and incidental implied powers necessary to carry into effect 
the powers so expressly granted. "). For discussion of the early contributions cases, see Blumberg, 
supra note 46, at 168-73; Theodore W. Cousens, How Far Corporations May Contribute to Charity, 
35 VA. L. REV. 401 (1949); Davis, supra note 46, at 57-64; and J.J. Marticelli, Annotation, 
Power of a Business Corporation to Donate to a Charitable or Similar Institution, 39 AL.R.2d 1192 
(1955). . 
60. The longeviry of the ultra vires concern in the context of corporate charitable contribu-
tions is reflected in the fact that as late as 1953, in the landmark case of A.P. Smith 
Manufacturing Co. II. Barlow, the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically addressed itself to the 
question of Smith corporation's legal authoriry to make the charitable gift. AP. Smith Mfg. Co. 
v. Barlow, 98 A2d 581 (N.J. 1953). And, of course, the ultra vires doctrine explains the rhetori-
cal posture of the modem corporate philanthropy laws, which speak to the matter of corporate 
power expressly. 
61. See infra note 66. 
62. The classic description of the scope of 'incidental corporate powers is provided in 
Steinway II. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 720 (Sup. Ct. 1896): "If that act is one which is 
lawful in itself, and not otherwise prohibited, is done for the purpose of serving corporate ends, 
and is reasonably tributary to the promotion of these ends, in a substantial, and not in a remote 
and fanCiful, sense, it may fairly be considered within charter powers." From the perspective of 
incidental corporate powers, foreseeable financial benefits validated the legaliry of contributions 
(and other corporate acts), because the corporation's fundamental purpose was to maximize 
profits. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("The difference 
between an incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for the benefit of employees, 
like the building of a hospital for their use, and the employment of agencies for the betterment of 
their condition, and a general purpose to benefit mankind at the expense of others is 
obvious .... A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders. "). 
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benefit therefrom. 63 Nevertheless, the incidental powers doctrine 
represented an infirm legal footing for corporate philanthropy: Differing 
interpretations of the directness of the required benefits gave rise to sub-
stantial variation in the interpretation of the scope of permissible versus 
impermissible contributions.64 In addition, the relative infrequency of 
litigation in the area meant that the earlier, more conservative holdings 
retained their precedential stature in many jurisdictions. Thus, throughout 
the first several decades of the twentieth century, there was substantial 
variation among the state jurisdictions in the law governing corporate 
charitable giving. 
3. Early Legislative Prescriptions 
Uncertainty regarding the legal authority for corporate charitable 
giving was regarded as i~ibiting the practice of corporate philanthropy in 
some measure.65 In response to this uncertainty, state corporate philan-
thropy law underwent yet another evolutionary step. Starting from around 
1920, several states enacted philanthropy provisions as part of their corpo-
63. Charitable giving is described as an incidental corporate power in Hutton (I. West Cork 
Railway, 23 Ch. D. 654, 673 (1883) (Bowen, J.): "[C]harity has no business to sit at boards of 
directors [as) charity. There is, however, a kind of charitable dealing which is for the interest of 
those who practice it, and to that extent and in that garb ... charity may sit at the board but for 
no other purpose." See also Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International Military Encampment Co., 29 
N.E. 1044 (Ill. 1892); Virgil v. Virgil Practice Clavier Co., 68 N.Y.S. 335 (Sup. Ct. 1900). The 
liberal interpretation of incidental corporate powers is exemplified by AnnstTOng Cork Co. (I. H.A. 
Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922), which upheld the legality of the corporation's commit-
ment to fund the business curriculum at a local college and university on the grounds that the 
business might have benefited therefrom, notwithstanding the company's intervening bankruptcy. 
64. See Ray Garrett, Corporate Donations to Charity, 4 Bus. LAW. 30 (1948); George D. 
Gibson, Corporate Contributions to Charity and Enabling Legislation, 14 Bus. LAW. 439 (1959) 
("The old cases requiring that public gifts be 'reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the 
company's business for the company's benefit' or 'reasonably tributary to the promotion of those 
[corporate) ends' are among the most strained, technical and contradictory doctrines of the law, 
which should be gladly interred and forgotten." (foomotes omitted». 
65. See Miguel A. de Capriles & Ray Garrett Jr., Legality of Corporate Support to Education: 
A SuTtley of Current Developments, 38 A.B.A. J. 209 (1952) (expressing the need for continued 
statutory reform in order to legitimate and facilitate increased levels of corporate giving). Of 
course, the continued prevalence of the incidental powers doctrine (and thus the direct benefit 
requirement) represented a substantial legal impediment to the validation of corporate philan-
thropy at the nationalleve!' See Garrett, supra note 64, at 28-39 (describing certain contempo-
rary corporate giving initiatives as resting "solely upon public approval and the current general 
acceptance of the idea by stockholders" rather than on secure legal grounds). 
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rations codes. By 1949, thirteen states and Hawaii had passed statutory 
provisions expressly licensing certain corporate charitable contributions.66 
Nevertheless, with Texas' unqualified corporate philanthropy 
provision as the exception,67 the philanthropy statutes enacted prior to 
mid-century were highly prescriptive in nature, imposing substantial re-
quirements and limitations on corporate charitable contributions.68 For 
example, the early statutes almost universally required express board of 
director approval to authorize corporate contributions.69 The laws fre-
quently limited the permissible amount of annual corporate contributions 
66. These states include Texas (1917), Ohio (1920), New York (1923), Tennessee (1925), 
New Jersey (1930), Massachusetts (1933), Michigan (1935), Missouri (1937), Delaware (1941), 
Maryland (1945), North Carolina (1945), Pennsylvania (1945), and Virginia (1947). Hawaii 
enacted a provision in 1947. (Illinois had enacted a contributions provision in 1917, but until 
1949 it applied only to wartime donations.) For discussion of the early statutes, see Gibson, supra 
note 64, at 434; Bert S. Prunty, Jr., Lolle and the Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. REv. 467 (1960); 
F. EMERSON ANDREWS, CoRPORATE GIVING app. C (Transaction Publishers 1993) (1952) ("Per-
missive Legislation in the States and Territories"). I have relied on Andrews' statutory appendix 
for the citations to the early philanthropy laws that are presented herein. (The reader is directed 
to these laws for the fulfstatutory citation and for a noteworthy treatment of the early history of 
corporate charitable giving practices.) For additional citations, see Garrett, supra note 64, at 
34-39. For further commentary on the development of corporate philanthropy, see RICHARD 
EELLS, CoRPORATION GIVING IN A FREE SOCIETY (1956); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, 
PHILANTHROPY AND THE BUSINESS CoRPORATION (1972); Peter Dobkin Hall, Business Gilling 
and Social Inllestment in the United States, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 221 (Richard Magat ed., 
1989). Also of relevance is JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS 
CoRPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970). 
67. Law of Feb. 13, 1917, Ch. IS, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 25. 
68. A good example is prOVided by New York's first (extra-wartime) contributions provision, 
enacted in 1923. Appearing in Chapter 25 of New York's General Corporation Law, it prOVided: 
§ 45. Expenditures for social and economic benefit. Nothing contained in this chapter 
or in any other law shall be deemed to make it unlawful for any corporation or joint-
stock association to cooperate with other corporations and With natural persons in the 
creation and maintenance of instrumentalities conducive to the Betterment of the social 
and economic conditions under which such corporation or joint-stock association is 
operating, and its directors or trustees may appropriate and expend for such purposes such 
reasonable sum or sums as they may deem expedient and as in their judgment will con-
tribute to the protection of the corporate property and tend to promote the interests of 
the corporation and its stockholders. 
CAHILL'S CoNSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK 785 (James C. Cahill ed., 1923). 
69. Board approval was required in the laws enacted by Ohio (1920), New York (1923), 
Tennessee (1925), New Jersey (1930), Massachusetts (1933), Missouri (1937), Delaware (1941), 
Maryland (1945), North Carolina (1945), and Virginia (1945). ANDREWS, supra note 66. In 
contrast, board approval was not explicitly mandated under Texas' (1917) or Michigan's (1933) 
statutes. ld. Pennsylvania's law, enacted in 1945, provided that contributions could be made to 
the extent provided for in the corporation's bylaws or "by resolution of its shareholders." Id. 
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by establishing a maximum level of contributions within the exclusive 
discretion of the board, with larger gifts being permissible in the absence of 
a shareholder veto.70 Pennsylvania's and Hawaii's early philanthropy laws 
required shareholder approval for corporate contributions.71 Some states 
required corporations to make donations to charities located neru;-by the 
business' operations, thus imposing a loose geographic version of the 
common law's benefit-to-the-business requirement.72 Many 'states also 
imposed a requirement that the company's contributions be made in con-
70. For example, New York's wartime contributions provision, enacted in 1918, provided 
directors with the following authority: 
That during the continuance of the war any corporation organized under the laws of this 
state may co-operate with other corporations and with natural persons in the creation 
and maintenance of instrumentalities conducive to the winning of the war, and its direc-
tors or trustees may appropriate and expend for such purposes such sum or sums as they 
may deem expedient and as, in their judgment, will contribute to the protection of the 
corporate interests, provided that whenever the expenditures for such purposes in any 
calendar year shall in the aggregate amount to .one per centum on the capital stock out-
standing, then, before any further expenditure is made during such year for such purposes 
by the corporation, ten days' notice shall be given to the stockholders in such manner as 
the directors or trustees may direct of the intention to make such further expenditure, 
specifying the amount thereof, and if written objection be made by stockholders holding 
twenty-five per centum or more of the stock of the corporation, such further expenditure 
shall not be made until it shall have been authorized at a stockholders' meeting. 
Law of Apr. 16, 1918,ch. 240, § 1, 1918 N.Y. Laws 885. Ohio (1920) and New Jersey' (1930) 
enacted philanthropy provisions (which were not limited to wartime contributions) containing a 
similar shareholder-veto term. ANDREWS, supra note 66. New York repealed the above statute 
in 1923 and enacted a'more general philanthropy law, which did not contain the shareholder 
veto term .. 
71. Pennsylvania's earliest law (1945) required that fintis' philanthropic contributions be 
sanctioned by the corporation's bylaws or, otherwise, "by resolution of its shareholders." 
ANDREWS, supra note 66. Hawaii's 1947 statute provided simply that donations "may be autho-
rized by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the stock of any such corporation." 
Id. 
n. For example, New York's 1923 statute authorized contributions to "instrumentalities 
conducive to the betterment of the social and economic conditions under which such corporation or 
joint-stock association is operating." CAHILL'S LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 68, at 785 (emphasis 
added). Similarly, Massachusetts' statute, enacted in .1933, provided as follows: 
Every corporation organized under the laws of this commonwealth and doing business or 
operating therein may, by vote of its directors, or of its officers having the powers of 
directors, contribute such sum or sums of money as said directors or officers may deter-
mine to be reasonable to any general fund being raised by a relief committee or agency 
approved by the commissioner of public welfare, as evidenced by a writing filed in his 
office, and formed for the purpose of raising money to be used for, the betterment of 
social and economic conditions in any community' in which such corporation is doing busi-
nw. . 
Acts of Feb. 9, 1933, ch. 8, § 1, 1933 Mass. Laws 18, 19 (emphasis added). Missouri's statute, 
enacted in 1937, provided that corporations could make charitable contributions to any chari-
table corporations organized under the laws of Missouri. See Laws of Mar. 25, 1937, 1937 Mo. 
Laws. 
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cert with other corporations' or natural persons' contributions,73 which 
perhaps reflected a concern that corporate directors might otherwise exploit 
their newfound discretion to subsidize pet charities of their own creation. 
In some cases the scope of authorized donations was limited to those "fur-
thering the corporation's interests" (or some analogous criteria)-which 
meant that these statutes represented only a minor liberalization from the 
previous common-law direct benefit requirement. 74 Finally, at different 
times, both Ohio75 and New York76 imposed a disclosure requirement on 
corporate charitable contributions, which mandated that both the amounts 
of the contributions and the identities of the recipients be disclosed. 
The corporate philanthropy statutes enacted prior to mid-century were 
an experiment in legislative balancing. A variety of factors had. mandated 
greater legal authority for corporate charitable contributions, yet the states 
had historically looked to protecting corporate shareholders' property inter-
ests. Although the state legislatures acted throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century (and thereafter) to legitimize the contributions function 
as a valid corporate power, the highly prescriptive nature of the early laws 
reflected the legislatures' sensitivity to the potential for waste and abuse in 
73. This requirement is present in the early statutes of Ohio (1920), New York (1923), New 
Jersey (1930), Massachusetts (1933), and Delaware (1941). ANDREWS, supra note 66. 
74. Such states include, for example, Ohio (1920) (authorizing contributions as would "con-
tribute to the protection of corporate interests"); New York (1923) (authorizing contributions 
which would "contribute to the protection of the corporate property and tend to promote the 
interests of the corporation and its stockholders"); New Jersey (1930) (authorizing contributions as 
would "contribute to the protection of corporate interests"); Delaware (1941) (authorizing contri-
butions as "will benefit or contribute to the protection of the corporate interests"). See id. 
75. Ohio's original legislation, from 1920, imposed the following disclosure requirement: 
All such corporations making appropriations and expenditures under the provisions of 
this act shall report annually to the secretary of state the sums so appropriated or ex-
pended and the name or names of the community funds or philanthropic, charitable or 
benevolent instrumentalities in whose behalf such sums are appropriated or expended. 
Act of Feb. 4, 1920, 108 Ohio Laws 1245. The disclosure requirement was eliminated in 1927, 
upon the enactment of Ohio's General Corporation Act. 
76. New York enacted a disclosure requirement for the first time in 1950. It provided: 
A domestic corporation which submits an annual report to its stockholders and which, 
pursuant to the authority of this section, appropriates, spends or contributes a sum or 
sums aggregating in excess of five hundred dollars to or on behalf of anyone donee, 
during the period covered by such report, shall include in such report the identity of 
each such donee together with the total amount appropriated, spent or contributed to it 
or on its behalf during such period. If such corporation does not submit such an annual 
report to its stockholders it shall send to each one a statement of the total amount of all 
such appropriations, expenditures and contributions made during each fiscal year and any 
stockholder, upon written request, shall be entitled to an itemized list of such donees and 
amounts. The corporation need not comply with such a request regarding any year more 
than five years prior to that in which such request is made. 
Act of Mar. 30, 1950, ch. 297, § I, 1950 N.Y. Laws 974, 975 (repealed 1951). 
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the area of corporate philanthropy. The imposition of precisely defined 
requirements and limitations in regard to corporate charitable contributions 
was thus intended as an accommodation between the potentially conflict, 
ing priorities of shareholder wealth maximization and corporate,funded 
social activism. 
4. The Organized Bar Advocates "New or Improved" Corporate 
Contributions Statutes 
The balancing, approach characteristic of the early philanthropy stat, 
utes proved short' lived. In .light of congressional validation of corporate 
charitable giving,77 increased statutory recognition of corporate philan, 
thropic authority in the states,78 and corporate practice established over 
the course of two world wars,79 the organized bar took up the cause of 
liberalizing the states' corporate philanthropy laws. 
Ray Garrett; Jr., chairman of the American Bar Association's (the 
"ABA") Committee on Business Corporations,80 addressed the ABA's 
annual meeting in 1948, and advocated broad,based statutory reform.S! 
Garrett admonished those present: "If we believe that business corporations 
should be entitled to make donations to charity, it seems that we, as law, 
yers, should seek means to legalize them so far as possible. "82 Garrett 
promptly formulated "a proposal that the states be urged to enact unrestric, 
tive statutes authorizing donations to community chests and to charitable, 
scientific and educational institutions in such amounts as the board of 
77. The historical context surrounding Congress' enactment of the corporate charitable 
deduction in 1935 is discussed in Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Gilling, 44 DEPAUL 
L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1994). The enactment of the corporate charitable deduction was viewed as 
congressional "encouragement" of corporate charitable giving. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. 
Trustees, Inc., 329 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah 1958) ("In 1935 Congress encouraged corporate contribu-
tions to eleemosynary causes by allowing a deduction for tax purposes in such cases." (emphasis 
added». 
78. As indicated previously, Ray Garrett observed that by 1949 thirteen states and Hawaii 
had enacted some form of statutory authorization for corporate philanthropy. Garrett, supra note 
64, at 31. 
79. For historical treatments of the development of corporate charitable giving, see supra 
note 66. In addition, the opinion in A.P. Smith II. Barlow describes the social and economic 
developments that had mandated in favor of expanded corporate philanthropic authority. A.P. 
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953). 
80. The ABA's Committee on Business Corporations was subsequently renamed the "Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws." See de Capriles & Garrett, supra note 65, at 211. 
, 81. See de Capriles & Garrett, supra note 65, at 209-12. The full text of Mr. Garrett's 
speech to the ABA Committee on Business Corporations was published in The Business Lawyer. 
See Garrett, supra note 64. 
82. Garrett, supra note 64, at 33. 
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direetors may deem proper,"83 and submitted the proposal to the ABA's 
Committee on Business Corporations immediately thereafter. 84 
In 1949 and 1950, the ABA's Committee on Business Corporations 
circulated the proposal advocating the adoption of unrestrictive corporate 
philanthropy laws to all secretaries of state and state bar association presi-
dents. 85 The Committee's model philanthropy provision, which was char-
acterized by the absence of any language qualifying the scope of corporate 
philanthropic authority, was codified as section 4(m) of the ABA's Model 
Business Corporation Act, first published in 1950.86 Thereafter, the pace 
of legal reform accelerated dramatically. Many state legislatures enacted 
unqualified corporate .philanthropy provisions of the kind endorsed by the 
ABA. ,Other states, having .previously enacted detailed, prescriptive phil-
anthropy provisions, repealed them in favor of the pared-down, "modern-
ized" version endorsed by the ABA.87 
Liberalization in the courts' approach to corporate charitable contribu-
tions was also apparent at this time. Most notably, the landmark case of 
A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, decided by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in 1953, reflected the changing view of corporate phil-
anthropy.88 In upholding the validity of Smith Corporation's $1500 con-
tribution to Princeton University, the court endorsed what it viewed as 
evolving expectations of "corporate citizenship"89 and elaborated on busi-
83. Id. 
84. See de Capriles &. G'arrett, supra note 65, at 211. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. The original Model Business Corporation Act was a product of the collaborative ef-
forts of Mr. Garrett's ABA committee and the American Bar Foundation. The first edition of 
the Model Act was published in The Business Lawyer. See Model Business Corporation Act, 6 Bus. 
LAW. 75 (1950) ("Section 4. GENERAL POWERS. Each corporation shall have power: ... (m) 
To make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes; and 
in time of war to make donations in aid of war activities."). 
87. As described supra note 66, only 13 states and Hawaii had enacted some statutory 
authorization for corporate charitable contributions by 1949. Yet only five years later, in 1953, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that 29 states had enacted statutes authorizing corporate 
philanthropy. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 587 (N.J. 1953). In 1959, George 
D. Gibson indicated that 42 states had enacted statutes authorizing corporate charitable contribu-
tions. Gibson, supra note 64, at 434-35. 
88. The A.P. Smith opinion provides an extended examination of the legal, historical, so-
cial, and economic changes that mandated expanded corporate philanthropic authority. For 
example, the court noted the "increased" calls by the public for corporations to make additional 
donations and thereby "assume the modem obligations of good citizenship." A.P. Smith, 98 A.2d 
at 586, 589-90. In the same vein, see de Capriles &. Garrett, supra note 65, at 209-12. 
89. A.P. Smith, 98 A.2d at 586 ("[Mlodem conditions require that corporations 
acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of the communi-
ties within which they operate."); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 329 P.2d 3~8, 
400-01 (Utah 1958) ("The new concept of corporate social responsi~ility seems to have become 
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ness' obligation to support the conditions facilitating free enterprise.90 In 
contrast, it devoted only scant attention to the issue of shareholders' pr~ 
perty interests. 
B. The Current State of the States' Philanthropy Laws~ 
The legal progeny of the unrestrictive philanthropy provision endorsed 
by the ABA, the modem philanthropy laws appearing within the states' 
corporation codes have assumed three distinct formulations. In twenty,four 
states and the District of Columbia the provisions state simply that corpora, 
tions shall have power "to make donations for the public welfare or for 
charitable, scientific or educational purposes. "91 Delaware, the state in 
which close to tw~thirds of the Fortune 500 are incorporated, has a philan, 
thropy provision of this kind.92 In nineteen other states, two provisions 
govern corporate contributions. One authorizes contributions "furthering 
the business and affairs of the corporation," while the other authorizes truly 
fait accompli. "). 
90. AP. Smith, 98 A.2d at 586 ("More and more [businesses] have come to recognize that 
their salvation rests upon sound economic and social environment which in tum rests in no 
insignificant part upon free and vigorous nongovernmental institutions of learning."). 
91. These states are as follows: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Dela· 
ware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Illinois; Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, and 
West Virginia. See ALA. CODE § 10·2A·20(13) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.010(13) (Michie 
1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10"()04(A)(13) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26·204 (Michie 
1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33·291(d) (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1993); HAw. 
REv. STAT. § 415·4(13) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 30·1-4(M) (1994); ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 
5/3.10(m) (West 1994); KAN. CORP. CODE ANN. § 17-6102(9) (West 1995); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 12:41(12) (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 2·103(13) (1994); MICH. 
COMPo LAWS § 450.1261(k) (West 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.385(12), (15) (West 1994); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21·2004(13) (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 78.070(6) (Michie 1993); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 5J.11-4(M) (Michie 1994); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(0) (Banks·Baldwin 
1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1016(9) (West 1994); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1502(a)(9) 
(1994); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4(13) (1993); S.D. CODIAED LAWS § 47-2·58(13) (Michie 1994); 
TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(14) (West 1994); W. VA. CODE § 31·1·8(M) (1996). 
The District of Columbia also has this kind of contributions provision. D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 29·505(13) (1994). Arkansas and Maryland have statutes that generally follow this format but 
also require board of director approval. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4·25·103 (Michie 1994); MD. CODE 
ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 2·103(13) (1994). Nebraska's law requires that corporations make 
donations "in the territory in which it operates." NEB. REv. STAT. § 21·2004 (13) (1993). The 
states differ slightly in their enumeration of authorized philanthropic purposes, but the differences 
are largely semantic. In all cases the language employed is very general. 
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1993) ("Specific Powers.-Every corporation created 
under this chapter shall have power to: ... Make donations for the public welfare or for chari· 
table, scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or other national emergency in aid 
thereof."). 
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philanthropic contributions, as it contains no such limiting language. (The 
latter provisions are thus identical to the first class of laws described above, 
which simply authorize donations for charitable, scientific, and educational 
purposes.) 93 Seven other states-including California, New York, and 
New Jersey-have enacted laws authorizing corporations to make charitable 
contributions "irrespective of corporate benefit." The abrogation of the 
benefit-to-the-business requirement is made express in the language of these 
statutes. 94 Exhibiting only minor semantic differences, the modern phil-
anthropy laws are uniform in their significance. They authorize seemingly 
unlimited philanthropic contributions from corporate capital without regard 
to whether the firm will be benefited thereby. 
As the above discussion illustrates, these statutes function to validate 
corporate philanthropic authority, but they do not regulate the practice of 
corporate charitable giving. In contrast to the early statutes, the modern 
laws fail to define any quantitative parameters for corporate charitable 
giving. They also fail to prescribe a decisional framework for corporate 
philanthropy: They are absolutely silent on the matter of who shall have 
decision-making authority over corporate charitable contributions. This 
silence vis-a-vis decisional authority abrogates any statutory claim on the 
part of corporate shareholders to have a right to participate in corporate 
philanthropic decision-making, because the states' corporations codes allo-
93. States having such twin donations provisions include Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi (which requires also that the contributions be accounted for as 
an operating expense), Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Vermont, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See COLO. REv. 
STAT. § 7-103-l02~, (n) (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0302(12), (14) (West 1993); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 14-2-302(13), (16) (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-22-2(13), (15) (Michie 1994); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.302(13), (15) (West 1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271B.3-020(m), (0) 
(Michie 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-3.02(13), (15) (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 35-1-115(13), (15) (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:3.02(13), (15) (1995); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 55-3-02(a)(13), (15) (1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 60.077(2)(n), (P) (1993): S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 33-3-102(13), (15) (law. Co-op. 1995); TENN .. CODE ANN. § 48-13-102(13), (14) (1995); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 16-10a-302(13), (15) (1994): VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 3.02(13), (15) (1993): 
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-627(A)(12), (13) (Michie 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 23.B.03.020(2)(0), (q) (West 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0302(13), (15) (West 1994): Wyo. 
STAT. § 1 H6-302(A)(XIlI) (Michie 1994). 
94. Such provisions have been adopted in California, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, New York, and North Dakota. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (West 1995) (provid-
ing authority for charitable donations "regardless of specifiC corporate benefit"); ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 202(G) (West 1994); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. B, § 9(k) (1994); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § A.161(11) (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-4 (West 1995); N.Y. BuS. 
CORP. LAW § 202(12) (Consol. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-26(11) (1993). Additionally, 
New Jersey and two other states require board of director approval of corporate contributions. 
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-204 (Michie 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS. 
§ 2-103(13) (1994). 
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cate plenary authority to directors and only specific, prescribed powers to 
shareholders. Thus, in affording them full decisional authority in regard to 
corporate contributions, these laws have conferred extraordinary power and 
discretion on corporate managers.95 
In fact, the issue of decisional authority in regard to corporate contri~ 
butions has another important dimension. By failing to require board 
approval for corporate contributions, the law permits delegation of philan~ 
thropic authority to individual corporate executives. Full board review is 
the most common mechanism of intrafirm accountability within state cor~ 
poration law. The absence of a requirement of board of director approval 
has thus contributed to lax oversight of the contributions function, and has 
allowed individual executive officers to pursue narrow, personal objectives 
in the administration of corporate charitable contributions. 
The significance of this permissiveness in the modem philanthropy 
provisions is, of course, amplified dramatically by the eradication of the 
benefit~to~the~business requirement, which has meant that corporate philan~ 
thropic behavior is not constrained by the usual institutional imperative of 
profit maximization. In no other area of corporate affairs are managers 
authorized to make decisions affecting the allocation of corporate capital 
without regard to how they will affect the firm's financial interests. 96 In 
all other instances, corporate and shareholder wealth maximization operates 
as the fundamental, governing norm within corporate law.97 In recogni~ 
tion of managers' expertise in commercial matters, and in the name of 
enhanced efficiency,98 state corporation law imposes few mandatory rules 
95. According to state corporation law, it is the board of directors th)lt has authority over 
the business and affairs of the corporation, and thus (by default) its charitable contributions. The 
absence of a specific grant of authority or participation rights on behalf of shareholders means 
that they have no legal right to participate in corporate philanthropic decisions. See, e.g., DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (ConsoJ. 1994). 
96. The corporate philanthropy laws are far more significant, therefore, as a departure from 
traditional profit-oriented corporate norms, than are the constituency statutes enacted by many 
states in the 1980s. The latter, curiously, have received far more attention. For further discus-
sion of the constituency statutes, see infra notes 213-215 and accompanying text. 
97. See, e.g., ALI, supra note 14, § 2.01. 
98. For a defense of the primacy of economic (market) forces and the centrality of efficiency 
concerns within corporate law, see, for example, FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). For a more political inter-
pretation, see Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 
1276 (1984), which argues that corporate law empowers corporate management and disempowers 
corporate shareholders as part of law's rationalization of bureaucracy and the status quo. 
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on the governance of business corporations.99 But the flexibility within 
state corporation law is otherwise intended to afford corporate directors and 
officers the freedom to operate the firm most profitably and efficiently.loo 
In contrast, the unregulated nature of corporate philanthropic giving affords 
corporate managers the authority to depart from profit maximization. In 
this regard, the philanthropy provisions are sui generis within corporation 
law. 
C. The Modem Judicial Treatment of Corporate 
Charitable Contributions 
Because they authorize corporate executives to make philanthropic 
donations of corporate assets irrespective of benefit to the firm, but fail to 
articulate any meaningful limits or requirements in relation thereto, the 
modem philanthropy statutes have posed an interpretive dilemma for the 
courts. 101 In light of the legislatures' deliberate failure to delineate objec, 
99. In responding to the transformation of the states' corporation codes into broad, "en-
abling" laws, Bayless Manning remarked: "[C]orporation law, as a field of intellectual effort, is 
dead in the United States .... We have nothing left but our great empty corporation statutes-
towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but 
wind." Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal RellU!dy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE 
L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962). A 1989 symposium conducted by the Columbia Law Review was dedi-
cated to the discussion of which (if any) corporation law rules should be mandatory. Symposium, 
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 CoWM. L. REv. 1395 (1989). For an argument that 
state corporate law notrnS are increasingly marginal, see Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law 
Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1990). 
100. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 {Del. 1984); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 
(Sup. Ct. 1944) ("To encourage freedom of action on the part of directors, or to put it another 
way, to discourage interference with the exercise of their free and independent judgment, there 
has grown up what is known as the 'business judgment rule'. "). For a comprehensive overview of 
the subject, see DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DunES OF 
CoRPORATE DIRECTORS (4th ed. 1993). 
101. Despite the numerous questions left unresolved by the states' philanthropy provisions, 
corporate charitable contributions have rarely been the subject of shareholder suits. After mid-
century, there are only four cases importantly addressing the scope of corporate philanthropic 
authority and the propriety of particular contributions. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 
A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953); Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 329 P.2d 398 (Utah 1958); Kahn v. 
Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 {Del. 1991); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 {Del. 
Ch. 1969). The absence of litigation in this area reflects several factors: the lack of publicly 
available information regarding most corporate charitable contributions; the fact that the statutes 
appear to sanction any corporate charitable contributions; and the fact that the governing legal 
standards are sufficiently broad as to make a successful shareholder suit unlikely. In addition, aca-
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tive criteria, according to what guidelines or principles should the courts 
adjudicate the propriety of particular challenged donations? Because the 
modem philanthropy laws represent the legislatures' deliberate decision to 
deregulate corporate charitable giving (in light of the earlier existence of 
highly prescriptive statutes), it would seem highly inappropriate for the 
courts to impose a substantial scheme of judicial oversight in this area. On 
the other hand, a rule permitting corporate managers to make any and all 
contributions of corporate capital to charitable organizations seems unten, 
able in light of the' traditionally shareholder, centered orientation of corp0' 
rate law. 
In responSe to this dilemma, the courts have' resorted to a permissive 
standard of "reasonableness" in adjudicating the propriety of particular 
contributions. While the early statutes and cases occasionally spoke in 
terms of "reasonable" donations,Io2 it was Theodora Holding Corp. v. 
Henderson, decided by the Delaware Chancery Court in 1969, that ex, 
pressly adopted "reasonableness in amount and purpose" as the appropriate 
standard for defining the permissible scope of corporate contributions. lo3 
The standard of reasonableness was also endorsed by the Delaware Supreme 
Court i~ Kahn v. Sullivan,l04 and it appears, to date, to be the authorita, 
tive standard. 
In' both Theodora and Kahn, the courts constructed the normative 
parameters of reasonableness on the basis of the Internal Revenue Code's 
charitable contributions provisions. IDS The Code's annual ceiling for de' 
ductible corporate charitable contributions of ten percent of taxable corp0' 
demic commentators generally have failed to focus on the duty of loyalty issues arising in the area 
of corporate charitable giving, thereby contributing to their continued transparency. (Given the 
centrality of the problem of managerial accountability within modem corporate legal scholarship, 
the paucity of attention devoted to the subject of corporate philanthropy is indeed surprising.) 
Previous commentators have generally attributed the absence of litigation in the area to a con-
sensus in favor 'of corporate charitable giving. See, e.g., de Capriles & Garrett, supra note 65, 
at 210. ' 
102. See, e.g" Armstrong Cork: Co: v. H.A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y 1922); 
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Grape Prods. Co., 290 P.2d 481, 484 (Cal. 1955). 
103. Theodora, 257 A.2d at 405 ("I conclude that the test to be applied in' passing on the 
validity of a gift such as the one here in issue is that of reasonableness, a test in which the provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to charitable gifts by corporations furnish a helpful 
guide."). 
104. Kahn, 594 A. 2d at 61 ("Thus the Court of Chancery (in the opinion in Theodora 
Holding Corp. v. Henderson) concluded that the test to be applied in examining the merits of a 
claim alleging corporate waste 'is that of reasonableness, a test in which the provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code pertaining to charitable gifts by corporations furnish a helpful guide.' We 
agree with that conclusion." (citations omitted». 
105. See supra notes 103-104. 
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rate profits (as defined under § 170(b)(2», 106 has been adopted as the 
appropriate upper limit for annual corporate charitable contributions under 
. Delaware corporation law. 107 And satisfaction of § 501(c)(3)'s require~ 
ments for status as a charitable organization has been used to define the 
scope of appropriate beneficiaries-Le., the "reasonable purposes" for corp~ 
rate charitable contributions. 108 
Delaware's adoption of the Tax Code as the principal heuristic in 
defining the reasonable parameters of corporate contributions has affected 
both the theory . and practice of corporate philanthropy. From a practical 
perspective, reliance on the aforementioned tax~based, quantitative stan~ 
dards has failed to impose any substantial constraints on corporate charit~ 
able giving. Ten percent of ~ual corporate profits is an extraordinarily 
generous "allowance" in the context of large public corporations. 109 
And, as mentioned above, Delaware has answered the question of the 
reasonable purposes for corporate charitable contributions by reference to 
the kinds of charitable beneficiaries qualifying under § 501(c)(3) of the 
Code. 110 Here again, the applicable tax~based standards are very liberal. 
In light of the relevance of constitutional guarantees of liberty and due 
process, the IRS has had difficulty delimiting which causes and groups 
should not be eligible to claim "charitable," "educational," or "religious" 
status. 111 Thus, because an extraordinary variety of organizations may 
qualify as charitable, educational, or religious for purposes of § 501(c)(3), 
corporate charitable contributions may be made to an extraordinarily broad 
spectrum of groups pursuant to this standard. 
106. The enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 raised the ceiling for the 
deductibility of corporate charitable contributions from 5% of taxable corporate income (without 
regard to any net operating loss or capital loss carryback) to 10%. I.R.C. § 170 (b)(2) (1994). 
107. See supra notes 103-104. 
108. See supra notes 103-104. 
109. In fact, I believe that is inapposite to view the 10% figure as having been intended as a 
true "allowance" or "limit." In enacting the corporate charitable deduction in 1935, in the 
aftermath of the Depression, Congress sought to stimulate corporate giving, not to limit it. And, 
in 1981, when Congress increased the upper limit from 5% to 10% of corporate pretax profits, it 
was operating from a similar perspective. The ten-percent-of-profits figure represents more of a 
target-a hortatory appeal for increased corporate largesse-than an aUowance, as such. This view 
is also supported by the fact that large corporations typically contribute only 2% to 5% (or less) of 
their annual profits-far below the maximum allowable deduction of 10% of profits. I.R.C. 
§ 170(b)(2). For annual corporate contributions rates as a percentage of corporate pretax income, 
see GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 90. The average annual rate of contributions as a per-
centage of pretax corporate profit was estimated at 1.24% for 1995. ld. 
110. Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48,61 (Del. 1991); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 
257 A.2d 398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
111. See, e.g., Dellelopments in the LAw-Nonprofit CorpOTations, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1578, 
1612-34 (1992); see also infra Part V. 
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Because it is presently the last word on the subject-and in view of the 
precedential nature of Delaware corporate law decisions-the opinion in 
Kahn merits special consideration. The Delaware Supreme Court's resort to 
the tax-based standards described above (in adjudicating the acceptable 
parameters of Occidental Petroleum's planned charitable contributions) 
functioned as a handy short-cut therein,112 as it had earlier in 
Theodora. 113 But, while reliance on the standards operative under the 
Tax Code has lent objectivity to these determinations, it has also allowed 
the courts to resolve disputes about corporate charitable contributions 
without focusing on shareholders' interests. More particularly, an analysis 
of whether a corporation's gifts have conformed to the Tax Code's stan-
dards for deductibility (that is, Congress' determination of what is socially 
desirable in regard to charitable support) is not a proxy for an examination 
of shareholders' interests in regard to corporate-based altruism. The class of 
charitable organizations qualifying under § 501(c)(3) does not supply a 
definition of the reasonable purposes of corporate charitable contributions-
that is, the rationale for encouraging charity at the level of the corporation, 
as opposed to the individual level. The invocation of the Code's ten-
percent-of-corporate-profits standard appears similarly perfunctory. If 
donations are good for the firm, why should state law limit them? If they 
represent managerial largesse with the shareholders' money (either in favor 
of society or, even more problematically, themselves), what principle within 
corporate law justifies them in the first instance? 
Of course, courts have had good reasons to avoid confronting the 
trenchant issues raised by corporate charitable contributions. Little consen-
sus has existed regarding the causes and explanations for corporate charita-
ble contributions. Inadequate information has existed regarding the effect 
of corporate philanthropy on corporate performance. And substantial 
disagreement has existed (and will probably continue to exist) regarding the 
propriety of corporate-based altruism. In addition, the overall managerial 
bias within corporate law has meant that courts have had little difficulty 
justifying their deferential posture towards corporate philanthropy. 114 
112. The court's approach, admittedly, was affected by the procedural posture of the litiga-
tion: The supreme court was reviewing the chancery court's approval of a shareholder derivative 
suit settlement. Kahn, 594 A.2d at 48. 
113. Theodora, 257 A.2d at 404. 
114. See, e.g., Steiner v. Meyerson, [1995 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
'98,857, at 93,148 (Del. Ch. July 18, 1995): 
Absent an allegation of fraud or conflict of interest courts will not review the sub-
stance of corporate contracts; the waste theory represents a theoretical exception to the 
statement very rarely encountered in the world of real transactions. There surely are 
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The legislatures' rejection of a regulatory approach to corporate charitable 
giving may appropriately reflect the complexity of the contributions func-
tion within modem corporate affairs, and, consequently, the courts may be 
unequipped to address the problem, but the potential for abuse arising from 
managerial control over corporate giving necessitates that some system of 
accountability be established. In order to address the void left by the mod-
em laws and cases, and in order to illustrate the interests and issues at stake 
in this area, the remainder of this Article analyzes contemporary corporate 
giving practices in relation to corporate legal norms and shareholders' 
interests. 
III. CoRPORATE PHILANTI-IROPY AND MANAGERIAL SELF-INTEREST 
Corporate charitable contributions may be used by corporate execu-
tives to confer substantial personal and professional benefits on themselves. 
Because traditional mechanisms of accountability are absent in this area, 
corporate philanthropy represents· an area of corporate conduct in which 
managerial self-interest may flourish. 
Conflicts of interest on the part of management and the potential for 
managerial opportunism in general are subjects of importance within corpo-
rate law and legal theory.115 The problem of self-interested conduct on 
the part of corporate management has been addressed through the promul-
gation of fiduciary standards of loyalty, 116 statutory and common law stan-
dards of fairness,117 and requirements of ratification by disinterested par-
ties. 118 Although courts and commentators have failed to apply these 
cases of fraud; of unfair self-dealing and, much more rarely negligence. But rarest of 
all-and •.. possibly non-existent-would be the case of disinterested business people 
making non-fraudulent deals (non-negligently) that meet the legal standard of waste! 
See also supra note 100. 
115. According to one leading casebook, ''[nhe principal task of corporation law is to create 
a governance structure for corporations that promotes an appropriate degree of accountability 
among the participants." LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 9 
(1994). For a comprehensive treatment of fiduciary obligation and the problem of managerial 
opportunism in the corporate form, see ROBERT CHARLES Q.ARK, CORPORATE LAW 141-223 
(Francis A. Allen et al. eds., 1986) (chapters 4-7). 
116. See SOLOMON ET AL., stipTa note 115, at 750 ("Simply put, the duty of loyalty requires a 
manager to place the corporation's best interests (and thus those of the stockholders) above her 
own."). 
117. See, e.g., Fleigler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976); see also DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 713(b) (Consol. 1994). 
118. Fleigler, 361 A.2d at 221; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1), (2); N.Y. BuS. 
CORP. LAW § 713(a)(I), (2). For discussion of ratification by disinterested directors of 
transactions involving managerial conflicts of interest, see WILLIAM L. CARy &. MELVIN ARON 
EISENBERG, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 684-88 (7th ed. 1995). 
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forms of heightened scrutiny to corporate charitable-contributions deci-
sions,119 it is plain that where corporate managers approve such contribu-
tions as a means of furthering their personal objectives, such contributions 
represent a species of agency costs,120 and are inconsistent with the essen-
tial fiduciary fabric of corporate law. 
In addition to state corporate law, the federal securities regulations 
have functioned to discipline corporate managers (and therefore reduce 
agency costs) by requiring disclosure of executive compensation arrange-
ments and other matters potentially involving managerial conflicts of inter-
est. 121 More particularly, under Item 402 of the SEC's S-K regulations, 
comprehensive, detailed information about both cash and noncash director 
and officer compensation is required to be presented to corporate share-
holders. 122 Item 404(a) of the S-K regulations requires disclosure of corpo-
rate transactions wherein directors and officers have an interest as 
principals. 123 And Item 404(c) of the S-K regulations requires disclosure 
of any loans which the company makes to its directors and officers.124 
Furthermore, while the SEC's disclosure mandates have failed to ad-
dress corporate philanthropy as a general matter, the SEC has recently 
recognized one kind of corporate charitable contributions arrangement, 
119. Although the duty of loyalty issues existing in the context of corporate contributions 
have remained largely unaddressed within legal scholarship, the duty of loyalty is recognized to be 
"a residual concept that can include factual situations that no one has foreseen and categorized." 
CLARK, supra note 115, at 141. Both courts and commentators have dealt exhaustively with 
problems of managerial self-interest (i.e., the contours of the duty of loyalty) in the context of 
executive compensation, so-called "interested director transactions," and the doctrine of "corpo-
rate opportunities." The fact that benefits accrue to corporate executives from their control over 
corporate contributions creates analogies between the contributions function and these classic 
conflict scenarios. The explicit connection between corporate philanthropy and executive com-
pensation is discussed below. See infra notes 173-176 and accompanying text. 
120. The seminal, early treatment of the agency cost problem in the context of the modem, 
public corporation is BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17. For a concise review of modem agency 
theory, as applied to corporate charitable contributions, see Jia Wang & Betty S. Coffey, 
Board Composition and Corporate Philanthropy, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 771 (1992). See generaUy 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 98; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behallior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
Cf. Aleta O. Estteicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45 
RUTGERS L. REV. 513 (1993) (arguing that corporate legal scholarship has focused myopically on 
agency cost issues, to the detriment of important, alternative aspects of corporate performance). 
121. For a discussion of SECmandated disclosure as a response to the problem of agency 
costs, see PaulO. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1047 (1995). See also 1 loUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 171-225 
(3d ed. 1989). For recent commentary on the goals of SECmandated disclosure, see Edmund W. 
Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 764 (1995). 
122. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1996). 
123. ld. § 229.404. 
124. ld. 
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known as "charitable awards" or "director legacies" {collectively, "chari-
table awards"}, as a form of "disclosable" executive compensation. 125 In 
, . 
1992, in the context of broadly revising the executive compensation disclo-
sure rules, the SEC expressly called for disclosure of any such "charitable 
awards" within the executive compensation disclosure presented in proxy 
statements and other SEC filings. 126 Thus, the SEC has recognized that 
corporate directors and officers may derive personal benefits from corporate 
charitable contributions, and has responded with a specific disclosure man-
date. However, by confining the scope of required disclosure to charitable 
awards, the SEC demonstrated that it has yet to recognize or address the 
full extent of the managerial benefits inhering in "ordinary" corporate 
charitable contributions. 
A. Managerial Discretion and Politicized Philanthropy 
Part V of this Article analyzes "politicized" charitable contributions, 
which are consonant with the maximization of corporate profit. Of course, 
corporate managers may authorize donations to politically active charities as 
a means of furthering their own political and ideological preferences, irre-
spective of the firm's best interests. When corporate managers approve 
donations on this self-serving basis, they satisfy the letter of the lawl27 but 
fail to fulfill their fiduciary obligation to protect corporate shareholders' 
property interests. Furthermore, because corporate contributions to politi-
cized nonprofit organizations represent a form of corporate political speech 
{and one which is not commonly brought to the attention of shareholders}, 
such donations also undermine shareholders' free speech and associational 
interests, as discussed fully in Part V. 
One recent example of politicized charitable co~tributions made irre-
spective of corporate interests is provided by Morrison Knudsen Corpora-
125. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Release No. 33·6962, 34·31327, 57 Fed. Reg. 
48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992). 
Various corporate and other commentators maintained that charitable award or legacy 
arrangements need not be disclosed, since the directors are not receiving value through 
the arrangement. Other commentators contended that such arrangements should be 
disclosed to shareholders since the arrangements clearly relate to directors' board service, 
and the premiums can be considerable, particularly relative to amounts paid annually to 
directors, and are material in assessing the relationship of directors to the registrant. The 
Commission agrees, and thus reaffirms its initial conclusion that such arrangements are 
required to be disclosed pursuant to the requirements of Item 402(g). 
Id. at 48,137. 
126. rd. 
127. For a discussion of the lax standards applicable under state law, see supra Part II. 
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tion's contributions to a small pro-life charity, "The Nurturing Network." 
As reported by The New York Times128 and Fortune magazine,129 Mary 
Cunningham Agee, the wife of Morrison Knudsen's CEO, established The 
Nurturing Network consistent with the couple's opposition to abortion. 13o 
As the president of the company's charitable foundation,l3l Mary Agee 
presided over various direct and foundation-based donations that the com-
pany made to The Nurturing Network. While The New York Times 
reported that the company's foundation "made grants to the Nurturing 
Network, and the corporation itself regularly donated goods and services to 
the charity,"132 the full extent of the firm's gifts to The Nurturing Net-
work has remained confidential-because there is no means to obtain infor-
mation regarding the donations made on a direct basis. 
In addition to monetary support, Mr. Agee and his wife also fostered 
the connection between Morrison Knudsen and The Nurturing Network by 
encouraging the corporation's directors to serve on the charity's board. In 
total, in addition to the Agees, three directors and five other directors' 
wives assumed board positions at The Nurturing Network. 133 Both the 
128. Diana B. Henriques, A Celebrity Boss Faces Exile from 2d Corporate Kingdom, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at AI; Diana B. Henriques, Ties That Bind: His Directors, Her Charity, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at D1 [hereinafter Henriques, Ties That Bind]. 
129. O'Reilly, supra note 57, at 51. 
130. Id. at 56 ("Mary's chief interest was the Nurturing Network, a charity she founded that 
offers help, including housing and jobs, to give pregnant college and working women an alterna-
tive to abortion. It was an activity that made her highly visible to bishops and cardinals in the 
Catholic Church, and even today, much of her life appears to revolve around it. In the days after 
Agee was fired, several church leaders sent letters of encouragement to her. j. 
13l. Mary Cunningham Agee was appointed president of Morrison Knudsen's corporate 
foundation by her husband, the company's CEO. In addition to being the founder of The Nur-
turing Network, she served as its "unpaid executive director." Henriques, Ties That Bind, supra 
note 128, at 04; O'Reilly, supra note 57, at 56 ("[Bill) Agee, who should have been sensitive to 
nepotism charges after his experience at Bendix, put Mary in charge of another charity, the 
Morrison Knudsen Foundation. It spends close to $1 million a year on social and cultural 
causes."). 
132. Henriques, Ties That Bind, supra note 128. 
133. Therefore, besides the Agees, eight Morrison Knudsen directors were affiliated with the 
charity's board. The interlocking directorates between Morrison Knudsen corporation and The 
Nurturing Network and, especially, the presence of presumably "independent," outside corporate 
directors and their wives on the board of the charity are suggestive of serious departures from 
sound corporate governance. These larger corporate governance issues were the focus of the 
second New York Times article, The Ties That Bind. Subtitled Did Joining the Agees' Cause Make It 
Hard to Say No in the Board Room?, the article suggested that extra-curricular affiliations between 
corporate insiders and purportedly "independent" outside directors may have undermined the 
outsiders' ability to be objective in the boardroom. Id. at Dl. Although extremely important, 
this larger corporate governance question relating to extra-curricular affiliations between inside 
and outside directors is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the problem, see, for 
example, James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations 
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 84 (1985). This 
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financial and administrative support and the directorial connections 
through which Morrison Knudsen supported The Nurturing Network came 
to light only because the company had become subject to scrutiny on 
account of its deteriorating financial conditionY4 The company's proxy 
statements and its annual reports to shareholders, consistent with the SEC's 
current requirements,135 contained no information about the contribu-
tions which the company made to The Nurturing Network or the interlock-
ing directorates existing between the firm and the charity.136 
Unfortunately, the generally confidential nature of corporate philan-
thropy, combined with the fact that politicized donations are especially 
likely to be kept confidential from corporate shareholders (and other mem-
bers of the public), means that it is very difficult to unearth examples of 
such politicized, noncommercial charitable contributions. Stories like the 
one above come to light only where particular news reporters have gone out 
of their way to uncover information. Nevertheless, the self-serving (or 
"rationally maximizing") aspect of human nature, the prevalence of politi-
cized philanthropies, and the absence of mechanisms of accountability, in 
combination, suggest that politicized charitable contributions that satisfy 
managers' (but not necessarily shareholders') interests may indeed be preva-
lent. 137 
B. Managerial Discretion and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate social responsibility may serve as a legitimate rationale for 
corporate charitable contributions, as discussed in Part IV. But "social 
Article addresses the situation of '~shared" directors between corporate and nonprofits' boards as 
it relates to the issue of managerial self-promotion, suggesting that executives use corporate con-
tributions to "purchase" board seats at prominent charities as a system of professional and social 
status enhancement. See infra notes 158-159 and accompanying text. 
134. It is tempting to speculate that mandatory disclosure of the firm's unusual philanthropic 
practices might have signaled the presence of other even more costly forms of waste and abuse. 
In fact, mandatory contributions disclosure might function, in general, as the proverbial "canary 
in the bird cage": Wayward contributions practices might alert shareholders to an overall lack of 
discipline and contro\. 
135. Item 401(e)(2) of the S-K regulations requires disclosure of directors' other directorships 
with public companies, but not directorships with affiliated charitable organizations. Thus if, as 
it has been interpreted, the rule is intended to expose potential conflicts of interest, it is highly 
underinclusive. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (1996). 
136. This assessment is based on my review of the Morrison Knudsen proxy statements and 
annual reports covering the years 1990-1995. 
137. It is difficult to attest to the magnitude of this problem precisely because this informa-
tion is unobtainable-hence the need for obligatory disclosure of corporate charitable contribu-
tions information. 
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responsibility" may also function as a'rationalization for managers to spend 
corporate resources to actualize their personal preferences in regard to social 
welfare and civic engagement. l38 A survey of the area has uncovered 
only one 'public corporation that has systematically empowered its s,hare-
holders to affect the allocation of the corporation's charitable capital. IJ9 
While 'corporate contributions may be legitimated on the basis of corporate 
social responsibility, as a general matter, there is no reason that corporate 
managers should cOl1trol the decision to constitute the firm as a deliberate 
agent of social change. l40 Put simply, by providing for centralized 
decision-making in the area of corporate charitable contributions, state law 
has afforded corporate managers the equivalent of taxing authority. Where 
contributions are not employed as commercial resources (as is consistent 
with the charitable deduction under the Code), there is no reason to pre-
vent shareholders from having a meaningful voice in the formulation of 
corporate philanthropy policies, a fortiori, for keeping contributions infor-
mation confidential from them. (This issue is discussed in depth in Part N, 
below.) 
138. This is consistent with Adolph Berle's views expressed in the essays he exchanged with 
Professor Dodd. As he expressed therein, Berle's concern for licensing self-intere,sted conduct by 
management led him to oppose legal validation of extra-shareholder obligations on the part of 
the firm. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. 
L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932) ("When the fiduciary obligation of the corporate management and 
'control' to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the management and 'control' become for all 
practical purposes absolute. The claims upon the assembled industrial wealth and funneled indus-
trial income which managements are then likely to enforce (they have no need to urge) are their 
own." (footnote omitted». ' 
139. This corporation 'is Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. under the direction of CEO Warren 
Buffet. See, e.g., BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 54-55 (1991). 
140. The problem of the authority of corporate managers to oversee corporate social activism 
has been Widely noted. See, e.g., HENRY O. MANNE & HENRY C. WALLlCH, THE MODERN 
CoRPORATION AND SOCIAL REsPONSIBILTTY 10 (1972) (H. Manne, first lecture) ("The concept of 
corporate responsibility flatters businessmen that they are the divine-elect, as Andrew Carnegie 
would have had it ••.. [B]usinessmen as a group are at best only slightly more expert in eco-
nomic theory than the general population. "). 
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C. Managerial Benefits Arising from Corporate Charitable Contributions 
1. Managerial Utility and the Theory of the Firm 
In constructing the theory of the business firm, classical economists 
and law-and-economics scholars have employed profit maximization as the 
primary incentive of management. Alternatively, various other econo-
mists, 141 legal scholars, 142 and academics in other fields l43 have taken 
141. Various economists studying corporate charitable contributions have included "manage-
rial utility maximization" within their hypotheses. See, e.g., Q.OTFELTER, supra note 22, at 190 
("[AI company's charitable contributions may enter the utility functions of managers. Accord-
ingly, the management may choose to sacrifice profits in order to make such contributions."); 
Armen A. Alchian & Reuben A. Kessel, Competition, Monopoly and t~ Pursuit of Money, in 
AsPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 157 (1962) (business' contributions are one facet of the attempt 
to acquire status, prestige, and goodwill for management and the firm); Ferdinand K. Levy & 
Gloria M. Shatto, T~ Evaluation of Corporate Contributions, 33 PUB. CHOICE, Issue 1978, at 
19-28 (managers use contributions as a "preferred expensej; Webb, supra note 54, at 82 ("Mana-
gers may give because they are altruistic or because they enjoy the prestige associated with being 
a big giver (thus contributions might be viewed as part of the compensation package for upper 
management). "). 
142. Henry G. Manne has argued that corporate managers have a fund of discretionary 
resources (including funds available for "pet charities") that is roughly equivalent to the transac-
tion costs of removing them from office. MANNE & WALLlCH, supra note 140. Addressing the 
incentives problem in another context, scholars have suggested that certain executives have 
pursued corporate growth (and thus, enhanced perquisites) independent of concerns over share-
holder wealth maximization. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: T~ 
Strain in t~ Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1986); Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: 
T~ory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 148-49 (1992) (observing that mana-
gerial ego cannot be dismissed as an incentive to engage in takeovers). Of course, the agency cost 
problem has been exhaustively analyzed in the context of managerial resistance to takeover bids. 
See, e.g., Bryan Ford, In Whose Interest: An Examination of t~ Duties of Directors and Officers in 
Control Contests, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 91 (1994). More generally, the desire to win esteem, status, 
and fellowship (as an important complement to material or economic objectives) is receiving 
increased attention in the legal literature. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and 
Conflict: T~ Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REv. 
1003 (1995) (including citations to recent sociological literature analyzing status production and 
group coheSion). 
143. Within management science, see Haley, supra note 36, at 485-504. From the 
perspective of sociology, see, for example, JOSEPH GALASKIEWICZ, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF AN 
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a broader view of managers' objectives in the allocation of corporate re-
sources. In particular, Oliver Williamson has identified the desire for in-
creased power, status, and prestige as being a principal motivational factor 
in managerial decision-making. 144 
2. Contributions as a Source of Psychic Rewards 
Sociologists have documented the function of gift giving within di-
verse systems of status enhancement. 145 As documented by the work of 
Joseph Galaskiewicz, corporate grant-making partakes of this larger dynamic 
of status competition. l46 Galaskiewicz's study of the grant-making econ-
omy of the Minneapolis-St. Paul area demonstrated that corporate charit-
able contributions have served as a medium through which corporate 
executives have competed for the fellowship and esteem of elite nonprofit 
leaders and other business executives. 147 
According to Galaskiewicz, nonprofit leaders have fueled this status 
competition by applying various forms of "peer pressure," including threats 
of social and professional ostracism.l48 Galaskiewicz described peer pres-
sure as operating through themes of reciprocity (executives approved corpo-
rate contributions requests in the expectation that their own solicitations 
would be favorably received in the future)149 and. themes of community 
URBAN GRANTS ECONOMY (1985); Lisa Atkinson & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Stock Ownership and 
Company Contributions to Charity, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 82, 82-100 (1988). 
144. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: 
MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM 28-37 (1964). Williamson identified seven 
objectives: salary, security, status, power, prestige, social service, and profeSSional excellence. 
145. This literature is summarized by Joseph Galaskiewicz. See GALASKIEWICZ, supra note 
143, at 14-30. Galaskiewicz described commonalities in the status-driven gift-giving rituals prac-
ticed by Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest (in the form of the Potlach), id. at 26-27, by the 
"Big Men" of the New Guinea Highlands and the Solomon Islands (in various feasts and rituals), 
id. at 27-28, and in the more contemporary settings of American and British "nouveau riches," 
id. at 28-30. 
146. ld, at 214. For a recent critique of charitable giving by individuals as a system of social 
status enhancement, see FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF 
ELITE PHILANTHROPY 133 (199;;) (concluding on the basis of interviews with wealthy New York-
ers that the very affluent use charitable contributions to create a distinct social and cultural life 
that fosters their elite status). 
147. GALASKIEWICZ, supra note 143, at 214. 
148. ld. at 74 ("Of the 26 respondents, 19 made some reference to the fact that individuals 
would either lose face before their peers in the business community or would be excluded from 
certain community events •••• Several others talked about individuals losing esteem, respect, and 
standing among their business peers. H). 
149. ld. at 72. One of Galaskiewicz's survey respondents stated: "Peer pressure is responding 
to friends. Essentially, if you don't go along with their requests and pet projects, they won't 
support yours." ld. 
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{executives valued the' ability to participate in local professional and social 
networks, and therefore authorized' corporate contributions as part of the 
'''price' of admission"}.I50 Galaskiewicz also discovered that local non-
profit leaders had superior professional and social credentials than their peer 
group of CEOs. lSI Galaskiewicz thus concluded that corporate executives 
approved substantial corporate contributions as a means of qualifying for 
membership in an elite social and professional network that, as part of its 
function, oversaw substantial philanthropic activity. 
Galaskiewicz also observed that firms that contributed at substantial 
levels were more likely to be regarded as financially successful business 
ventures. 152 According to his research, this effect was created "indepen-
dent of actual average annual pretax. earnings and. performance indica-
tors. "153 Thus, corporate contributions have functioned as complex 
signifiers in the eyes of local commercial and philanthropic leaders. 154 By 
communicating a favorable message about their firm's financial robustness 
through the authorization of substantial corporate contributions, the execu-
tives were also communicating a message about their own status as modem 
day, financial "Big Men." Galaskiewicz's work supports the view that 
corporate executives have sought to "upgrade" their own professional and 
social credentials through the currency of corporate charitable contribu-
tions. 
Galaskiewicz also sought to document the relative importance of com-
mercial factors, in comparison to sociological ones, as determinants of 
corporate giving behavior. He reported finding "considerably more support 
for the Contributions-as-Social-Currency thesis than the Contributions-as-
Public Relations thesis." 155. In fact, Galaskiewicz concluded that apart 
from firm cash-flow, sociological factors relating to executives' social stand-
ing had had a greater effect on contributions levels than did either the 
market position of the firm or its dependency on the local community for 
150. ld. at 73 ("More commonly, executives portrayed peer pressure as a sort of ritual 
whereby people are integrated into the business community and attain social standing. For 
example, being solicited is a sign that one is part of the g.:oup. Responding to a solicitation indi-
cates that one accepts membership. '). 
151. ld. at 76 ("For example, 56.7% of the [philanthropic) elite had been the president, 
CEO, or chairman of a Fortune 500 or 50 firm as compared to only 20.4% of the 98 CEOs."). 
152. Id. at 71-78. . 
153. Id. at 71. 
154. Usha Haley's work has also analyz~d this signalling function of corporate contributions. 
Employing the terminology of Renaissance dramaturgy, he described corporate contributions as 
"masques"-i.e., complex symbolic messages communicated to a diverse set of publics. Haley, 
supra note 36, at 485-504. 
155. GALASKIEWICZ, supra note 143, at 79. 
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employees, for example. 156 Galaskiewicz concluded that none of these 
commercially-based criteria had "had a statistically significant positive 
effect" on the level of firm contributions. 157 
3. Nonprofit Board Service as Form of Benefit 
In addition to increased prestige, esteem, and fellowship, the social 
currenCy accruing to corporate executives from their power over corporate 
charitable contributions frequently translates into tangible rewards. Most 
notably, charitable organizations commonly make invitations to senior 
corporate executives to serve on their boards of directors, especially when 
the firm's charitable support has been extensive or when additional contri-
butions may be anticipated. 158 Consistent with the previous discussion,· 
such board positions are regarded by many people as evidence of heightened 
social status. Moreover, the position on the charitable board would itself 
represent an increase in the executive's personal power in most cases, 
because the directors of nonprofit organizations exercise considerable discre-
tion in the administration of the arts, education, environmental conserva-
tion, and the provision of social services, for example. 
Yet even if nonprofit board service was not in itself considered a 
valuable fringe benefit of the corporation's philanthropy, most executives 
would value such charitable board positions for the collateral benefits likely· 
to accrue therefrom-in terms of both personal and profeSSional opportuni-
ties. For example, the directors of nonprofit organizations typically enjoy 
special invitations to gala benefits and opening night performances, and 
special audiences with politicians and celebrities. The accretion in profes-
sional capital arising from multiple board service was a central focus of 
Michael Useem's work, The Inner Circle. Useem documented the existence 
of a super-stratum of elite business leaders (the "inner circle") active in the 
formulation of American and British industrial and public policy.159 One 
of his central findings was that multiple board service, including service on 
high profile nonprofit organizations' boards, has played a crucial part in the 
grooming process by which qualified corporate executives have ascended to 
156. ld. at 70-80. 
157. ld. at 70. 
158. See Michael Useem, Corporate Philanthropy, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 340, 344 
(Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) ("A conventional fund-raising strategy used by many nonprofits is 
to invite a senior manager onto the governing board as a first step toward soliciting large-scale 
support from his or her firm. "). 
159. MICHAEL USEEM, THE INNER CIRCLE (1984). 
Corporate Philanthropy , 619 
the upper echelons of the power elite. Nonprofit board service has pro-
vided executives with experience and connections that have contributed to 
their professional ~cendancy ~oth within the corporate hierarchy and 
beyond the firm. Thus, Useem's work also supports the view that corporate 
charitable contributions are a valuable currency through which corporate 
senior executives have purchased a variety of benefits, including enhanced 
professional power: '. 
4. When Insiders Establish Charities and Subsidize Them , 
Through Corp~rate Contri~utions 
The above analysis is incomplete in representing CEOs and corporate 
directors as passively waiting to exchange a commi~ent for increased 
corporate support for an invitation to serve on a prestigious nonprofit orga-
nization's board of directors. The reality is that corporate executiyes often 
seize the initiative to establish charitable organizations reflecting their 
personal interests and then seek to have them subsidized thro,ugh the firm's 
contributions. 
The connection between insiders' pet causes and corporate contribu-
tions was illustrated by the relationship between Mary CUnningham Agee, 
the .wife of Morrison Knudsen's CEO, and that company's gifts to The 
Nurturing Network (e~tablished by Ms. Agee), as described above. l60 But 
an example of more extraordinary managerial hubris is provided by Occi-
dental Petroleum Corporation's ("OPC") commitment to fund "The 
Armand Hammer Museum and Cultural Center" through corporate chari-
table contributions in the amount of $85 million dollars. 161 Although it 
was approved by a committee of OPC's board of directors, the plan for the 
museum was initiated by Dr. Hammer himself. 162 In fact, Dr. Hammer 
had planned to donate his art collection to the Los Angeles County Art 
Museum, but when that museum failed to acquiesce to his extraordinary 
demands, Dr. Hammer informed them that he "had decided to create [his] 
own museum"-hence his proposal to OPC's board. 163 Because of the 
substantial sums involved, and Dr. Hammer's obvious self-interest in the 
160. See supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text. 
161. The facts relating to ope's comminnent to fund the museum project through its chari-
table contributions are set forth in Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 52-57 (Del. 1991). For further 
discussion of Dr. Hammer's life and career at Occidental, see EDWARD JAY EpSTEIN, DosSIER: 
THE SECRET HISTORY OF ARMAND HAMMER (1996). 
162. Kahn, 594 A.2d at 52. 
163. ld. 
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project, two groups of OPC shareholders filed suit challenging the propriety 
of the gift. l64 Operating on the baSis of the loose standard of reasonable, 
ness described earlier, the Delaware courts upheld a settlement in one of 
the derivative suits, which left OPC's plans for the museum largely intact. 
Nevertheless, both the Chancery Court and the Supreme Court went out of 
their way to articulate their displeasure with OPC's board's approval of the 
charitable contributions. 165 
D. Corporate Charitable Contributions as Income to Corporate Insiders 
Because corporate managers may retain control over corporate charita' 
ble contributions, and may therefore "substitute" corporate contributions 
for personal ones, such contributions have sometimes been analogized to 
dividends or additional compensation to management. 166 
1. Tax Jurisprudence 
The current approach within federal income tax jurisprudence is to 
honor the separate identity of the corporate contributor, 167 but certain 
early tax court rulings dealing with close corporations' contributions had 
suggested that the correct approach would be to "look through" the corp~ 
rate entity to view the company's contributions as a constructive dividend 
to the controlling shareholders, followed by a personal contribution on 
164. Because of the lax standards applicable in the area of corporate charitable contributions 
(as described above), as well as the loose definition of "independence" applied to determining the 
objectivity of "outside" directors, the shareholders had virtually no chance of succeeding in their 
challenge to the gifts. For discussion of the relevant state law standards applying to corporate 
charitable contributions, see supra notes 91-114 and accompanying text. 
165. See Kahn, 594 A.2d at 58 n.23 ("If the Court was a stockholder of Occidental it might 
vote for new directors, if it was on the Board it might vote for new management and if it was a 
member of the Special Committee it might vote against the Museum project."). 
166. As Nancy Knauer has observed, "If a corporate transfer to charity is really a substitute 
for a transfer by a corporate manager, then the ability to claim the deduction at the corporate 
level produces a favorable tax benefit for the corporate manager." Knauer, supra note 77, at 48. 
As Knauer explains, the individual level income tax deduction for the charitable contribution 
may not produce a neutral tax consequence for individual taxpayers receiving corporate divi-
dends. 
167. For an excellent critique of the tax code's failure to examine who is responsible for 
making the contribution (and hence who should enjoy the deduction) in the case of corporate 
level gifts, see Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate 
Philanthropy, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997). 
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their part. l68 Under this earlier approach, corporate level contributions 
that "serve only the personal interest of the shareholder,"169 could be 
treated as constructive income to such controlling shareholders. Tax juris, 
prudence has subsequently moved away from this position, validating the 
distinction between corporate level gifts and controlling persons' personal 
contributions. 170 And dividends to controlling shareholders are distinct, 
formally, from additional compensation to corporate management. Never, 
theless, the existence of this earlier, alternative approach in the tax treat' 
ment of corporate charitable contributions underscores the fact that con' 
trolling parties (controlling shareholders in close corporations, and mana' 
gers in public corporations) accrue personal benefits in their administration 
of corporate charitable contributions-especially when such contributions 
are not required by law to advance the interests of the corporate donor. 
2. Required Disclosure of "Charitable Awards" 
Although tax jurisprudence has moved away from treating corporate 
charitable contributions as income to those persons authorizing them, the 
SEC has recently taken a position reminiscent of the earlier tax cases. l7l 
168. See Rev. Rul. 68-658, 1968-2 C.B. 117 (superseding Rev. Rul. 68-314, 1968-1 C.B. 101; 
revoked by Rev. Rul. 79-9, 1979-1 C.B. 125): 
It has been held that a payment or gratuitous disposition of property by a corporation to 
a third person on behalf of or for the benefit of the controlling shareholder is a distribu-
tion to the shareholder if the payment serves only the personal interests of the share-
holder. (Citations omitted.) Thus, a charitable contribution by a corporation to an 
organization described in section 170 (c)(2) of the Code, which contribution in reality 
serves only the personal objectives of its sole shareholder, is tantamount to a distribution 
to the shareholder followed by a donation on his part to the charitable organization. 
But cf. Knott v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 681 (1977), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1. 
169. Rev. Rul. 68-658, 1968-2 C.B. 117. This more thoughtful approach addressed who, in 
particular, should qualify as making the gift and being eligible for the deduction-the entity or 
the individuals in control. But, unintentionally, it also raised the problem of whether gifts that 
did serve corporate objectives (rather than insiders') could still qualify as "charitable" for purposes 
of § 170. 
170. In refuSing to disallow the corporate level charitable contribution in the case of Knott II. 
Commissioner, the tax court also emphaSized the absence of the receipt of tangible benefits by the 
controlling shareholders as a result of the corporation's contribution. Knott, 67 T.e. at 681. 
171. In October 1992 the SEC completed its long-standing project of revising the executive 
compensation disclosure provisions under Item 402 of the S-K regulations. Recognizing that 
disclosure operates as a significant check on managerial overreaching in the area of compensa-
tion, the SEC sought to require more accurate and comprehensive disclosure of all forms of com-
pensation arrangements. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Release No. 33-6962, 
34-31327,57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992). 
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In 1992, in order to provide for greater clarity and comprehensiveness 
therein, the SEC amended the executive compensation disclosure require-
ments pertaining to proxy statements and periodic reports. 172 In the final 
release implementing the new rules, the SEC indicated that it viewed 
"charitable award or legacy arrangements" as forms of management com-
pensation subject to required disclosure. 173 In the typical charitable 
award arrangement, the corporation makes a commitment to fund a chari-
table contribution in the name of the specified director or officer for the 
benefit of a charity of his or her choice, at a specified future date. l74 The 
contributions are characteristically funded from insurance plans, typically in 
the amount of $1 million dollars, which are purchased by the corporation 
for this purpose. The insurance plan pay-out is usually tied to the named 
executive's retirement or death. 175 The fact that the executives never 
directly receive any payments in these arrangements had created confusion 
regarding whether such awards would be considered part of executive com-
pensation by the SEC. However, in the final release implementing the 
revised executive compensation disclosure rules, the SEC stated its view 
that charitable awards confer substantial benefits on the named executives, 
and would hence be regarded as part of the required disclosure.176 
Id. 
172. Id. at 48,137. 
173. The release described charitable awards as follows: 
Under such programs, registrants typically agree to make a future donation to one or 
more charitable institutions in a participating director's name, payable by the registrant 
upon the director's death or retirement, or some other designated event. Funding vehi-
cles for these programs commonly take the form of corporate-owned insurance policies on 
the lives of participating directors. 
174. See Lawrence Brody et aI., Insurance-Related Compensation, 386-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 
A-22 (1994) ("One of the more innovative executive perks in recent years has been executive 
legacy programs .... These programs give focus to a corporation's charitable giving strategy and 
tum it into a 'benefit' for executives. Even though nothing goes directly to the executive under 
the program, there is a perceived benefit in haVing a major charitable gift made in the executive's 
name."). 
175. Id. 
176. Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,137. It should also be noted 
that charitable awards are not a form of incentive-based compensation: Neither the establishment 
of the award nor the circumstances that trigger a pay-out are typically related to the firm's finan-
cial performance. Scholars, commentators, and even the SEC have increasingly advocated in-
creased levels of incentive-based compensation. See, e.g., id. at 48,126; see also Geoffrey S. 
Rehnert, Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency Costs, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (1985). Forbes magazine recently reported on the increasing use of chari-
table awards as part of compensation to outside directors. See Dana Wechsler Linden et aI., The 
Cosseted Director, FORBES, May 22, 1995, at 169-73. Of particular note were the following (ag-
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3. Ordinary Contributions Versus Charitable Awards 
Thus, charitable awards are subject to mandatory disclosure under 
existing securities regulations, while "ordinary" corporate contributions are 
subject to no such disclosure requirement-despite the fact that corporate 
insiders may use ordinary contributions to confer substantial benefits on 
themselves, as described above. Indeed, the differences between charitable 
awards and ordinary contributions are frequently essentially formalistic. In 
both instances, the corporation funds the contributions. In the case ;of 
charitable awards, the corporation purchases an insurance policy thatr will 
generate funds for the contributions, whereas regular charitable contribu-
tions are funded from corporate earnings. In both situations, corporate 
directors or officers may have dispositional authority over the gift-whether 
through the formalized arrangements of the charitable award or through the 
ordinary dispositional authority that executives may retain over corporate 
contributions. In the case of charitable awards, the executive's name is 
formally associated with the donation-but this may be equally true in the 
case of regular contributions, as was illustrated by the example of the 
Armand Hammer Museum and Cultural Center. 177 Even when the exec-
utive's name is not formally associated with the firm's charitable gifts, he or 
she stands to gain both psychic income and tangible benefits from authoriz-
ing them. Indeed, these benefits more readily accrue to corporate 
executives in the context of ordinary contributions, because in the case of 
charitable awards the corporate official is typically retiring or may even be 
deceased. 
In sum, the differences between charitable awards and ordinary corpo-
rate charitable contributions do not support disparate disclosure treatment. 
The managerial benefits that the SEC has recognized in the context of 
charitable awards may just as frequently inhere in the context of ordinary 
corporate contributions. The SEC's current disclosure mandate is thus 
substantially underinclusive: Comprehensive disclosure of corporate chari-
table contributions information is the appropriate standard that should be 
implemented by the SEC. 
gregated) charitable awards: Vernon Jordan, Jr. ($3.25 million), Frank Carlucci ($2 million), 
Clayton Yeutter ($1.5 million), Harold Brown ($1 million), and Ann McLaughlin ($1 million). 
According to the Forbes article, Ayco Co. (a financial advisory firm) indicated that it was setting 
up charitable awards for directors at the rate of one every two weeks. ld. at 170. 
177 . See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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E. Disclosure and the Problem of Managerial Self.Dealing 
The federal securities laws reflect the view that systematic, required 
disclosure of corporate information, in conjunction with the operation of 
the marketplace, will operate as a check on various forms of managerial 
opportunism. 178 This view is evident in the SEC's regulations requiring 
disclosure of interlocking corporate directorships, loans to insiders and 
other "interested" corporate transactions, executive compensation ·gener. 
ally, and charitable awards in particular .179 In each of these cases, state 
corporation law and federal disclosure requirements (taken in combination) 
reflect a consensus that, while the underlying behavior should be (or must 
be, in the case of executive compensation, for example) permitted, a system 
of accountability based on required publicity is needed to deter corporate 
waste and mismanagement. Corporate charitable contributions present 
analogous problems of managerial conflicts of interest, and yet there are 
strong arguments for continuing to permit corporations to make charitable 
contributions. l80 Moreover, the argument in favor of a precise system of 
substantive regulation, and attendant penalties for noncompliance, is under· 
mined by the difficulty of measuring and offsetting potential gains to 
178. The extensive legislative history surrounding the enactment of the Securities Acts is 
presented in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES Acr OF 1933 AND SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934 Oack S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) [hereinafter 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY). Concerns over insider overreaching and the disempowerment of public 
shareholders are expressed, in particular, in S. REp. No. 73-1455, at 30 (1934) (the "Fletcher 
Report"), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at Item 21, which describes trading and 
operational abuses and the need to enlighten shareholders through enhanced disclosure and 
improved mechanisms of shareholder suffrage, and H.R. REp. No. 73·1383, at 13 (1934) (the 
"Rayburn Report"), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at Item 18 (section entitled 
"Control of Unfair Practices by Corporate InSiders''). The classic statement of disclosure's opera-
tion as a prophylaxis against abuse is that of Louis D. Brandeis: "Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policemen." LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OrHER PEOPLE'S 
MONEY 92 (1914). Also noteworthy is President Roosevelt's statement upon the enactment of 
the Securities Act: "What we seek is to return to a clearer understanding of the ancient truth 
that those who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies handling or using other people's 
money are trustees acting for others." S. REp. NO. 73-47, at 6-7 (1933), quoted in 1 Loss & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 121, at 178-79. For analysis of the SEC's mandate, pursuant to the 
Exchange Act, to effectuate systematic corporate reporting for the protection of investors, see Jill 
E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 V AND. L. REV. 1129 (1993). 
179. For the relevant S-K disclosure requirements, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401, .402, .404 
(1996). The release announcing the amended executive compensation disclosure rules' also de-
scribes disclosure as a means of deterring abuse. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. 
Reg. at 48,137. For recent commentary on the relationship between rigorous financial reporting 
standards and the promotion of effective corporate governance, see Louis Lowenstein, Financial 
Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 
(1996). 
180. These arguments are presented infra note 187. 
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insiders from corporate contributions, potential gains to corporations there-
from, and the increased costs of shareholder litigation arising from such a 
regulatory initiative. Nevertheless, the ability of managers to use corporate 
contributions to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders, without 
there necessarily being any offsetting benefits to the corporation, is not 
only a real and significant potentiality, but one that is presently condoned 
by state. and federal law. Consistent with the general philosophy of the 
federal securities laws and regulations, required disclosure of corporate 
charitable contributions is likely to import an appropriate measure of hldi-
ciousness in corporate executives' oversight of corporate contributions 
programs'. The means to effect the professionalization of the contributions 
function are increasingly available to corporate management, so are the 
means to inquire about shareholders' preferences in regard thereto. A 
disclosure requirement would signal to managers, and to shareholders, the 
need to value contributions as strategic resources, or alternatively, the need 
to evaluate philanthropic practices in light of shareholder preferences. 
N . CoRPORATE DoNATIONS AND CoRPORATE SocIAL REsPONSIBILITY 
Many public corporations donate millions of dollars each year in the 
name of "corporate social responsibility. "181 Corporate executives fre-
quently cite corporate social responsibility as the principal motivation 
behind their charitable donations,I82 and public corporations' reports to 
181. The definitional problems presented by the term "corporate social responsibility" are 
discussed infra note 191. At this juncture. I wish to clarify that this Article does not take a 
position in the debate over the propriety of philanthropically motivated corporate charitable 
contributions. Rather. my central objective in this Part of the Article is to emphasize that views 
on corporate social responsibility (including philanthropically motivated corporate contributions) 
are inherently political. I argue. therefore. that they should be subject to a more democratic 
decisional process than applies in regard to traditional, commercial corporate conduct. See David 
L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1. 1 (1979) ("The reso-
lution of nearly every issue of corporate social responsibility depends heavily on one's beliefs 
about'how our political process operates and one's convictions about the ideal political process. "). 
182. See"e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 582-83 (N.J. 1953) (testimony of 
Smith company executives describing corporate social responsibility as a basis for corporate phi-
lanthropy); NEIL J. MITCHELL, THE GENEROUS CORPORATION: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
ECONOMIC POWER passim (1989); Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American 
Competitiveness March 1990,46 Bus. LAW. 241 (1990); Linda D. Lerner &. Gerald E. Fryxell, 
CEO Stakeholder Attitudes and Corporate Social Activity in the Fortune 500, Bus. &. SOC'Y, Apr. 
1994. at 58,59 ("Top managers iricreasingly operate from a perspective that recognizes the impor-
tance of managing or balancing the needs and demands of a variety of constituencies or stake-
holder groups. "). Various studies have documented executives' favorable views of corporate social 
responsibility and of corporate charitable giving as a vehicle for fulfilling corporate obligations to 
society. See, e.g., Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More than a 
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shareholders have frequently spoken in terms of corporate "citizenship" and 
"corporate obligations to the community" in describing corporate charitable 
contributions. The media, too, has fostered the image of the socially 
responsible corporation in its popular reportil1g on corporate gifts. 183 
Some of the statements about business' social responsibilities have reflected 
shrewd business strategy,l84 but arguments about business' "enlightened 
self-interest" have not replaced the notion of the truly philanthropic corpo-
ration. 18S In light of its durability throughout this century,l86 the 
Marketing Strategy?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 246, 249-50 (Richard Magat ed., 1989) (describ-
ing 1982 study for Council on Foundations finding that "[albout 7 in 10 [executivesl claim to be 
motivated by a desire to help the needy in the communities in which their company has 
plants/locations and by a desire to do what is ethically correct," along with less altruistic goals); 
Charles Peter Corcoran, Corporate Philanthropy: Attitudes of Institutional Shareholders, Individ-
ual Shareholders, and Corporate Philanthropy Executives 201 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Minnesota) (on file with author) (finding broad-based support among corporate 
executives for the proposition that "shareholders' interests go beyond purely economic consider-
ations," notwithstanding that "profits from corporate philanthropy are uncertain"); John J. 
Siegfried & Katherine Maddox McElroy, Corporate Philanthropy in the U.S. (1980) (Working 
Paper No. 81-W26, Vanderbilt University, Department of Economics) (surveys indicated that 
corporate managers overseeing philanthropy programs regarded corporate social responsibility as 
the most important reason for making contributions), cited in CLOTFELTER, supra note 22, at 172. 
183. Prior to the late 1980s, the media routinely described corporate charitable contributions 
in terms of social responsibility. This has changed, however. The current trend in media report-
ing, and in executives' remarks describing contributions, is to highlight the "strategic benefits" 
that may accrue to the firm therefrom-for example, favorable publicity, public goodwill, and 
political favor. In this vein, see, for example, RICHARD STECKEL & ROBIN SIMONS, DoING BEST 
BY DoING GooD (1992); Smith, supra note 47. 
184. The goodwill generated from the firm's reputation for generosity may be translatable, in 
certain instances, into monetary gains. For this reason, corporate charitable contributions are 
frequently described as being a matter of business' "enlightened self-interest." For an influential 
treatment of the concept of business' enlightened self-interest, see W.J. Baumol, Enlightened Self-
Interest and Corporate Philanthropy, in COMMISSION ON FOUNDS. AND PRIVATE PHILANTROPY, 
supra note 49, at app. VI (1970). The term has gained widespread currency. For further discus-
sion, see Part VI infra. 
185. From a philosophical perspective, various authors have questioned the soundness of 
speaking of the firm as capable of acting "charitably." See, e.g., Bill Shaw & Frederick R. Post, A 
Moral Basis for Corporate Philanthropy, 12 J. Bus. ETHICS 745 (1993); Menlo Smith & Patrick 
Mendis, Should Corporations Be Charitabk?, 89 Bus. & SOC'Y REv. 19 (1994). More generally, for 
a discussion of altruism within economic theory, see, for example, Natalie S. Glance & Bernardo 
A. Huberman, The Dynamics of Social Dikmmas, SCI. AM., March 1994, at 76; John Haltiwanger 
& Michael Waldman, The Rok of Altruism in Economic Interaction, 21 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 
1 (1993); Herbert A. Simon, Altruism and Economics, AM. ECON. REV., May 1993, at 156; Robert 
Sugden, Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, 
Winter 1993, at 69. 
186. The belief that corporations should affirmatively embrace social responsibilities beyond 
wealth maximization has had distinguished critics. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32; see 
also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-34 (1962); MANNE & WALLlCH, supra 
note 140; STUART NOLAN, PATTERNS OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY (1994); Eugene V. 
Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsibk?, in THE 
Corporate Philanthropy 627 
notion of the philanthropic corporation (as one incident of the socially 
responsible corporation) deserves distinct consideration as a matter of law 
and policy.187 
A. Managerial Control over Corporate Social Responsibility 
As described above, state law has validated corporate authority to 
make donations irrespective of benefit to the firm .. But because the law has 
stopped short of mandating corporate charitable giving, decisions regarding 
the allocation of corporate capital for charitable purposes must be made 
individually by each firm. For this reason, the establishment of a corporate 
philanthropy program as part of the firm's objectives is inextricably linked 
to the question of the allocation of decision-making power within the firm. 
The centralized administration of corporate resources has traditionally been 
legitimated on the basis of managerial expertise,188 but this rationale is 
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1960); Paul H. Weaver, After 
Social Responsibility, in THE U.S. BUSINESS CORPORATION: AN INSTmmON IN TRANsmoN 133 
(John R. Meyer & James M. Gustafson eds., 1988). Corporate social responsibility has also had 
formidable advocates. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 
(1976); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975). 
187. Although they are too complex to be discussed in depth, some of the arguments both in 
favor of and against philanthropic corporate contributions may be summarized as follows. (Only 
the first rationale is directly tied to shareholders' interests.) First, the centralized administration 
of corporate contributions s'aves shareholders time: and effort, in comparison to the process of 
individual contributing. Of course, the very serious trade-off is a loss of individual choice in the 
selection of beneficiaries. Moreover, tax expenditures are meant to foster individual choice and 
diversity, values that are undermined when the federal subsidy is located at the corporate level. 
Second, the current tax system provides a substantial'incentive for firm-level giving. If one (or 
society) is primarily concerned with m:iximizing the value of contributions received by charities, 
corporate giving is superior to individual giving after the receipt of corporate dividends. Of 
course, at least theoretically, ~he tax system could be changed to eliminate this preference, but no 
such change is likely to be forthcoming. Third, the centralized administration inherent in corpo-
rate grant-making, and the ability of corporate grant makers to wield substantial resources, may 
increase accountability and good management at charitable organizations. On the other hand, it 
is inherently risky for charitable organizations to become too dependent on a small group of large 
donors, such as corporations. Fourth, in an environment of underregulation, corporate charitable 
contributions may reflect the internalization of costs which would otherwise be imposed on inno-
cent third parties (e.g., gifts to environmental groups reduce the effects of pollution). Firms may 
attempt to forestall further, mandatory regulation in this manner, potentially reducing costs over-
all. However, the potential for firms effectively to address larger social problems in this ad hoc 
manner, in the absence of stated public policies and objectives, is uncertain. Also, certain com-
mentators argue that contributions function as fancy bribes, thereby undermining the political 
(and regulatory) process. Lastly, the distt:ibution of benefits to the community (i.e., free-riders) 
through philanthropic contributions, as a side-effect of benefits targeted at employees, may be 
regarded as an acceptable cost of doing business. 
188. For the alternative argument that claims of managerial expertise within corporate law 
operate as political' sops desigiled to legitimize the status quo, see Frug, supra note 98. 
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inapposite in the context of corporate altruism. Thus, the present manage-
rial control over philanthropically motivated corporate contributions has 
failed to offer a sufficient account of its legitimacy. 
In fact, the problem of legitimacy or decisional authority in regard to 
philanthropically motivated corporate charitable contributions is ultimately 
a crucial one. Serious consideration of the corporate social responsibility 
debate yields the conclusion that there cannot be a definitive, authoritative 
resolution to the problem of allocating responsibility between government, 
busir-ess, and individual persons. 189 Rather, assertions regarding corporate 
social responsibility mask complex, normative conclusions about the inter-
relation of the public and private sectors, the functioning of the capital 
markets, the power of corporate management, and the nature of corporate 
shareholdership. The existing empirical analysis in this area fails to resolve 
the problem of defining (or designing) optimal institutional arrangements. 
Because questions relating to corporate social responsibility and philan-
thropically motivated corporate contributions are properly regarded as 
matters of social policy or politics, principles of consensus-building and 
accountability must be substituted for objective assertions of right. With 
respect to the best interests of shareholders, therefore, the question of 
whether the firm should make philanthropically motivated charitable con-
tributions is best addressed through a process of controlled experimentation 
in an environment promoting managerial accountability and receptivity to 
shareholders' concerns. 190 
B. The Definition and Development of Corporate Social Responsibility 
1. Defining Corporate Social Responsibility 
There is no authoritative definition of corporate social responsi-
bility ,191 but its central tenet can be described as the belief that busi-
189. Engel, too, concluded that these fundamental normative questions cannot be resolved 
on the level of generalities, but rather require issue by issue analysis in particular substantive 
areas. See Engel, supra note 181, at 3-4. 
190. In this vein, see Medical Committee for Human Rights II. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), lIacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). 
191. The profound difficulty in arriving at an acceptably clear definition of corporate social 
responsibility has been noted throughout the literature. For a good working definition, see Engel, 
supra note 181, at 5-6: "The term [corporate social responsibility] is most useful if taken to de-
note the obligations and inclinations, if any, of corporations organized for profit, voluntarily to 
pursue social ends that conflict with the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit." See 
also MANNE & WALLICH, supra note 140, at 3-8. In light of definitional and other conceptual 
difficulties, a substantial portion of the social responsibility literature has existed at a high level of 
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nesses, especially large, public corporations, have an obligation to contri, 
bute to the betterment of society in a manner distinct from the maximiza, 
tion of corporate profit and obedience to the law. 192 
Typically, the arguments in favor of corporate social responsibility can 
be reduced to three distinct conceptual grounds. 193 First, there is an ap, 
peal to social necessity: The financial needs of arts, education, and commu, 
nity service organizations exceed the capacity of individuals and the 
government to fund them. 194 Second, there is an appeal based on corp~ 
rate capacity: As a result of their vast scale and scope, American business 
corporations are in a position to be agents of social progress. 195 LaStly 
there is an appeal based on morality, in which the corporation is likened to 
a "citizen" having moral and ethical responsibilities analogous to those of 
natural persons. 196 In sum, the ideology of corporate social responsibility 
abstraction or, otherwise, has addressed the problem of "means" without resolving other basic 
issues. For an important critique of the means literature, and particularly the notion that a sys-
tem of independent directors might resolve social responsibility issues, see Victor Brudney, The 
Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982). For an 
intelligent critique of the corporate social responsibility debate as a dialectic about the scope of 
public and private affairs, see Alan Wolfe, The Modem Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?, 
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1673 (1993). See also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception 
of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 261 (1992) (arguing that corporate law's inabil-
ity to choose between private property and social responsibility norms reflects the fundamental 
duality of human nature). Definitional problems have also hindered economic analysis of the 
relation between corporate social responsibility expenditures and corporate financial performance. 
See, e.g., Kenneth E. Aupperle et aI., An Empirical Examination of the Relationship Between Corp~ 
rate Social Responsibility and Profitability, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 446-63 (1985); Arieh A Ullmann, 
Data in Search of a Theory: A Critical Examination of the Relationships Among Social Performance, 
Social Disclosure, and Economic Performance of U.S. Firms, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 540 (1985). 
192. Within the management science literature, see, for example, William C. Frederick, 
From CRS J to CRS 2: The Maturing of Business-and-Society Thought, Bus. & SOC'Y, Aug. 1994, at 
150. See also Lerner & Fryxell, supra note 182. 
193. This intellectual construct is based on my interpretation of the charitable contributions 
cases, as well as a survey of the commentary on corporate social responsibility, as cited herein. 
194. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969); AP. 
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A2d 581, 585-86 (N.J. 1953) ("With the transfer of most of the 
wealth to corporate hands and the imposition of heavy burdens of individual taxation, [indi-
viduals] have been unable to keep pace with increased philanthropic needs. They have therefore, 
with justification, turned to corporations to assume the modem obligations of good citizenship in 
the same manner as humans do."); MANNE & WALLlCH, supra note 140; Blumberg, supra note 
46. For influential arguments in favor of corporate responsibility efforts, see NADER ET AL., supra 
note 186; STONE, supra note 186. 
195. A.P. Smith, 98 A2d at 584 ("Control of economic wealth has passed largely from indi-
vidual entrepreneurs to dominating corporations, and calls upon the corporations for reasonable 
philanthropic donations have come to be made with increased public support."). 
196. Such personification is evident in the ALI's treatment of the subject of corporate pur-
pose, for exa: •. ;Jie. See ALl, supra note 14. In defining the objective and conduct of the corpora-
tion, § 2.01(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
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holds that in light of pressing social needs, the vastness of corporate wealth 
and power, and evolving ethical norms, corporate America should make 
increased social expenditures. 197 
2. A Brief Intellectual and Legal History 
The evolution of corporate social responsibility as a distinct perspec-
tive on industrial and social organization has been associated with econ-
omic and intellectual developments occurring within the United States 
early in the twentieth century. By the teens and the twenties, with the 
themes of Progressive-era politics in the air, there was no denying the in-
creasing concentration of wealth in corporate hands. 198 According to 
Neil Mitchell's The Generous Corporation, .by this time the notion of free 
competition no longer supplied satisfactory justification for the visible 
accumulation of corporate wealth. Corporate executives therefore turned 
to corporate "social" spending as a means to persuade both labor and the 
general public that business' wealth and power would not be subversive to 
the public interest. l99 According to Mitchell, most of these expenditures 
were directed at employees and their families. They included corporate-
funded pension benefits, life insurance,· access to medical care, improved 
working conditions generally, and of course, charitable contributions.2OO 
From a legal perspective, it was during this period that certain states first 
enacted statutes authorizing corporate charitable contributions. 201 
Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, 
in the conduct of its business: ... 
(2) May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as 
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; .... 
Id. § 2.01(b). The question of corporate moral agency has, historically, been related to discus-
sions of the nature of the corporation. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 191; David Millon, Theories of 
the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201. For a slightly different ·perspective, see Jeffrey Nesteruk, 
Bellotti and the Question of ~rporate Moral Agency, 1988 COLUM. ~US. L. REv. 683. 
197. As others have noted, the combined operation of the corporate philanthropy statutes 
and the business judgment tule has meant that exeCl,ltives' social responsibility decisions will 
generally be immune from shareholder attack. See Davis, supra note 46. Defenses Of managerial 
prerogative in this area have often been couched in the language of long-term benefit to the firm, 
as noted by Davis and Chancellor Allen. See Allen, supra note 191, at 273 ("The long-
term/short-term distinction preserves the form of the stockholders oriented property theory, while 
permitting, in fact, a considerable degree of behavior consistent.with a view that sees public 
corporations as owing social responsibilities to all affected by their operation."). 
198. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17; see also MrrCHELL,.supra note 182. 
199. MrrCHELL, supra note 182, at 10-25. 
200. Id. 
201. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text .. 
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Thereafter, the problem of business' social responsibilities received 
serious academic consideration in the early 1930s in a series of polemical 
essays exchanged between Columbia Law School's Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and 
Harvard Law School's E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. 202 In The Modem Corporation 
and Private Property, Berle and Means had described the increasing separa-
tion of ownership from control in the public corporation as having "placed 
the community in position to demand that the modem corporation serve 
not alone the owners or the control but all society."203 In light of his 
concern over licensing managerial overreaching, Berle backed away from 
this position in his essay, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust. But it was 
too late to quell debate. In 1932, Dodd argued that the new institution of 
the modem corporation was consistent with business assuming increased 
responsibility to address social problems.204 In fact, Dodd argued that 
"public opinion" had already made "substantial strides in the direction of a 
view of the business corporation as an economic institution which has a 
social service as well as a profit-making function. "205 And, consistent 
with Dodd's view of the matter, Congress enacted a federal income tax 
deduction for corporate charitable contributions in 1935.206 
Claims regarding business' social responsibilities and the propriety of 
managers allocating corporate capital on this basis have been made 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Consistent with what 
Jeffrey Gordon has described as the "high tide of benevolent managerial-
ism"207 and in light of the various economic advantages enjoyed by Amer 
ican business at the time, the 1950s witnessed the enactment of unrestric-
202. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931); 
Berle, supra note l38, at 1365; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 
45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932) !hereinafter Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?]; 
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciilry Duties of Corporate Managers 
Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 194 (1935); see also A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the 
Corporation SeTlle? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991) 
(describing issues addressed in the Berle-Dodd debate in relation to the evolving jurisprudence on 
hostile tender offers). 
203. BERLE &. MEANS, supra note 17, at 356. 
204. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, supra note 202, at 1153. 
205. ld. at 1148. 
206. The enactment of the corporate charitable conrribution deduction in 1935 must be 
viewed as congressional validation of genuinely philanthropic corporate conrributions, because 
business-related donations would already have been deductible under existing Code provisions. 
Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648, 1661 (1936); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, 
Inc., 329 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah 1958) ("In 1935 Congress encouraged corporate conrributions to 
eleemosynary causes by allOWing a deduction for tax purposes in such cases. H). 
207. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COWM. L. REv. 1931, 1982 
(1991). 
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tive corporate philanthropy laws by many states. In fact, without conced-
ing that he had been wrong, Berle acknowledged in 1954 that the theory of 
corporate social responsibility advocated by Dodd (consistent with Dodd's 
prediction) had come to occupy the field of popular opinion and the 
law. zOB Thereafter, throughout the social upheaval of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, increasingly vocal demands were made on business to take part 
in ameliorating social problems.ZOO 
3. Recent Developments 
Despite the increasingly conservative tone of political debate since the 
early 1980s, notions of corporate social responsibility have become embed-
ded in public policy discourse and in the law. Several U.S. presidents, 
including former Presidents Reagan and Bush, have called for increased 
corporate social spending.zIO And from a legislative perspective, in 1981, 
208. Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor E. 
Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate 
. powers were powers held in trust for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued 
that these powers were held in trust for the entire community. The argument 
has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor 
Dodd's contention. 
ADoLF A. BERLE JR., THE TwENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954); see also 
A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953) ("[Mlodern conditions require that 
corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of 
the communities within which they operate. H). 
209. Engaging .in some hyperbole, the Delaware Chancery Court, in the case of T~odora 
Holding Corp. v. Henderson, described the corporate philanthropy statutes in the states as reflect-
ing "[tlhe recognized obligation of corporations towards philanthropic, educational and artistic 
causes." Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969) (emphasis 
added). The same sensibility is reflected in Blumberg, supra note 46. Also, the Project on Cor-
porate Social Responsibility initiated "Campaign OM" in 1970, in which approval of OM's 
shareholders was sought in regard to a number of social responsibility initiatives. For description 
and commentary, see Donald E. Schwartz, T~ Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on 
Campaign OM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1971); and for a history of the development of the share-
holder proposal system, which has been used as a vehicle for substantial shareholder advocacy in 
the area of social responsibility since the 1970s, see Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to t~ 
Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 37 (1990); Fisch, supra note 178. 
210. On December 3, 1981, President Ronald R,eagan announced the establishment of the 
Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives, which called upon businesses to devote time and money 
to working with community organizations to address social problems (in light of reduced public 
sector aid). See Reagan Names 44 to Special Group on Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1981, at 027; 
see also Reagan Delivers ChaUenge to Business, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1982, at K1; Reagan Study 
Group Urges Donations of 5% for Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1982, at A26; Roundtable Urges 
CEOs to Increase Volunteerum, INDUSTRY WEEK, June 28, 1982, at 14; 32 State Private Sector 
Initiative Panels Formed, INDUSTRY WEEK, June 28, 1982, at 14. As part of his America 2000 
educational reform initiative, President Bush announced the establishment of the New American 
Schools Development Corporation, which immediately raised $30 million "from business interests 
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in the context of enacting the Economic Recovery Act, Congress rein-
forced its commitment to encouraging corporate philanthropy by increasing 
the' annual ceiling pertaining to the corporate. charitable deduction from 
5% to 10% of annual corporate profits,2l1 In so doing, Senators Byrd and 
Kennedy spoke emphatically about the need for increased corporate philan-
thropy and the importance of corporate social responsibility in general.212 
Within corporation law, certain commentators have interpreted the 
enactment of the so-called "constituency statutes" by many states during 
the 1980s as evidence of the continued currency of theories of corporate 
social responsibility.213 Enacted in the context of an active market for 
corporate control, these statutes describe the discretion of corporate manag-
ers to consider the interests of. employees, customers, creditors, and the 
community, as well as shareholders' "long-term" interests, within their 
decision-making.214 Although their obvious application is to takeover de-
fense, the expanded discretion they afford corporate managers is not con-
fined thereto according to the express language of the statutes.215 In the 
absence of interpretive precedent, the full significance of the constituency 
~tatutes remains unclear, but their express terms provide authority for cor-
porate executives to make decisions based on expanded social responsibility 
criteria. 
represented on the board." See Janet Bass, Corporation Fanned to Raise Money for New Schools, 
UPI, July 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File (listing group's leaders drawn from 
bUSiness, government, and education); Short Ta~s: New Schools' Funding, WASH. POST, July 9, 
1991, at A17; see also Karen De Witt, Brought to You by Exxon-School Reform, N.Y. TIMES, July 
21, 1991, (Week in Review), at A4; Margaret Spillane & Bruce Shapiro, Bush's New American 
Schools: A Small Qrcle of Friends, 258 NATION 278 (1992). It is ironic and fascinating that the 
conservative push towards privatization has sparked ren~wed interest in corporate social expendi-
tures. 
211. I.R.C. § 170(b) (1994). For commentary on the increase in the annual upper limit of 
deductible contributions pursuant to the Economic Tax Reform Act of 1981, see Knauer, supra 
note 77, at 19-20, 28-32. 
212. 127 CONGo REc. S8353 (1981) (statement of Sen. Byrd); id. at S5352 (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy). 
213. For citation and commentary, see, for exampl~, William W. Bratton, Confronting the 
Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency Rights, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1449 
(1993); David Millon, New DirectionS in Corporate Law, Communitarians: Contractarians, and the 
Cruis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1373 (1993); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A 
Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REv. 
579 (1992); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992). 
214. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(d) (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 14A:6-1(2), 6-14(4) (West 1995); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988); PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 515-16 (West 1995). 
215. See sources cited supra note 214. According to Mitchell, by 1992,28 states had enact~d 
some form of constituency statute. See Mitchell, supra note 213, at 579 n.1. 
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The continuing legal vitality of corporate social responsibility is evi-
dent also in certain judicial opinions analyzing the permissible rationales for 
the deployment of takeover defenses. Certain Delaware cases have 
described the "community of interests" making up the corporation in defin-
ing the circumstances justifying management's resistance to unsolicited 
takeover bids.216 In addition, the American Law Institute's Principles of 
Corparate Governance, finalized in 1994, describes corporate managers as 
having authority to make decisions on the basis of "ethical considerations 
that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of 
business"-in addition to their particular authority over corporate chari-
table contributions.217 
From a political perspective, with the Republican congressional victory 
in 1994 and the presidential race in 1996, discussions of "limited govern-
ment" and increased private initiative-which inevitably raise the issue of 
the social responsibilities of business-moved to the forefront of national 
debate. 218 Irrespective of particular political outcomes, the notion that 
business must give something back to the community will continue to play 
a part in the evolution of modem political debate. 
C. Democratizing the Social Responsibility Debate 
The question of corporations' social responsibilities has been debated 
throughout this century. Yet the centralized administration of corporate 
216. See especiaUy Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 
1989); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see also Allen, supra note 
191; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets and CoUTtS, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1931 (1991) (sug-
gesting that the Paramount decision reflected judicial concern over the nonmonetary costs 
imposed on shared community values by an unrestrained market in corporate control). More 
generally, the idea that takeovers imposed undue costs on nonshareholder constituencies gave rise 
to renewed concern during the 1980s for creditors, employees, and the larger community sur-
rounding the corporation. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the 
Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989); Millon, supra note 196. 
217. ALI, supra note 14, § 2.01(b)(2), (3). 
218. The issue of corporate social responsibility was highly visible in the political debate 
surrounding the 1996 presidential race. See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Republicans and Democrats 
Jumping on the Issue of Corporate Social Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at B15. Begin-
ning on March 3, 1996, The New York Times published a series of seven special reports on the 
subject of corporate downsizing that explicitly faced the question of corporate social responsibil-
ities and the effect of corporate layoffs on employees and local communities. See also Robert B. 
Reich, How to Avoid These Layoffs?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, at AZl (arguing in favor of ex-
panded legal and political support (e.g., public sector subsidies) for corporations which are solici-
tous of the needs of employees and other nonshareholder constituencies); c[. William Safire, The 
. New Socialism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at A13 (arguing that calls for increased corporate 
social responsibility amount to a revivified form of SOCialism). 
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affairs has hindered a more democratic approach to the issue, particularly 
one that would take account of the views of corporate shareholders-the 
parties who fund such expenditures. While a perfectly democratic system is 
unattainable in light of the collective-action problems affecting the share-
holder franchise in the public corporation, the lack of an ideal system of 
shareholder participation has too readily functioned as a justification for 
maintaining the status quo. The dangers implied by the concentration of 
not only the factors of production, but also communal resources in the 
hands of corporate management, mandates in favor of implementing rea-
sonable measures to involve corporate shareholders in decisions regarding 
philanthropic corporate contributions. 
D. Disclosure and Philanthropic Contributions: From 
Information to Action 
A variety of mechanisms would serve to facilitate shareholder involve-
ment in corporate philanthropy. The proxy-voting mechanism established 
by federal law and SEC regulation is readily adaptable to this purpose: The 
system adopted by Berkshire Hathaway corporation under Warren Buffett's 
direction provides a working, practical modeL219 The increased opportu-
nities for intrashareholder communication created by recent amendments to 
the proxy rules may also facilitate the ability of shareholders to express their 
views on corporate philanthropy.22o Additionally, the shareholder pro-
posal system under the federal proxy rules should provide a vehicle for 
shareholders to communicate their views on corporate philanthropy to 
management.221 Finally, shareholders may express their views on corpo-
219. For citations to the company's annual reports, see supra note 140. 
220. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-31326,57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (1992). 
221. There is a long history of shareholders submitting proposals on corporate philanthropy 
under Rule 14a-8. As provided under Rule 14a-8(c)(7), companies may omit a proposal that 
"deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the registrant." 
17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-8(c)(7) (1996). For many years, the SEC's position had been that the alloca-
tion of corporate funds by management among various charitable recipients, as well as other 
matters pertaining to corporate philanthropy, involved significant matters of corporate policy and 
hence, could not be excluded as "ordinary business." See Union Pacific Corp. (Feb. 5, 1993); 
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. (Mar. 7, 1991); McDonnell Douglas Corp. (Feb. 8, 1990); Quaker Oats 
Co. (Aug. 4, 1987); Archer Daniel Midland Co. (Aug. 14, 1987); International Business 
Machines Corp. (Mar. 7, 1988); E.l. du Pont de Nemours and Co. Oan. 25, 1984); Dow Chemical 
Co. Oan. 18, 1979); Humana, Inc. (Oct. 10, 1979). However, in the early 1990s, the staff of the 
Division of Corporate Finance "reconsidered" certain of its prior determinations and held that a 
firm's decision to commence contributions to a particular cause or group would be viewed by the 
staff as a matter of "ordinary business." See, e.g., Aema Life and Casualty Co. (Feb. 13, 1992); 
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rate philanthropy, and corporate social responsibility in general, when 
voting for directors and through their investment decisions, if they so 
choose.222 However, shareholders will be able to pursue these avenues for 
involvement and assume a meaningful role in the formulation of corporate-
philanthropy policies only if corporations provide them with accurate and 
complete information regarding their charitable contributions-something 
that most firms have failed to do voluntarily.223 
V. THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
Corporations engage in political advocacy in order to increase the 
rewards and reduce the penalties accruing to them through political and 
legal channels. Certain forms of corporate political activity are 
overt-namely, lobbying and campaign-finance spending conducted through 
political action committees ("PACs").224 Less obviously, but no less deli-
berately, corporations have used technically philanthropic donations225 to 
politicized charities226 to promote their long-term financial interests in 
the political arena. Corporate philanthropy obtains expressly political 
SCE Corp. (Feb. 20, 1992); PacifiC Telesis Group (Feb. 20, 1992). Therefore, the ability of share-
holders to employ the shareholder proposal process as a means of affecting corporations' giving 
practices remains in doubt under current SEC practice. 
222. Certainly, the continued development of computer-based information technology will 
increasingly facilitate the process of information gathering and communication between share-
holders and managers in these matters. 
223. Corporations' resistance to disclosure of charitable contributions information is illus-
trated, for example, by companies' attempts to exclude shareholder proposals requesting such 
disclosure. See, e.g., IBM Corp. (Jan. 31, 1994); Superior Oil Co. (Mar. 9, 1982); The Upjohn 
Co. (Feb. 17, 1982); E.I. du Pont de Nemours (Leeds) (Jan. 16, 1981); American Telephone and 
Telegraph Co. (Jan. 9, 1979); Marriott Corp. (Sept. 17, 1976); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. (Oct. 2, 
1979). 
224. Corporate P ACs are increasingly being studied by political scientists. See, for example, 
DAN CLAWSON ET AL., MONEY TALKS: CORPORATE PACS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE (1992); 
THEODORE J. EISMEIER &. PHILLIP H. POLLOCK, BUSINESS, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE PACS IN AMERICAN ELECfIONS (1988); FRANK' J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES (1992); M. Margaret Conway &. Joanne Connor Green, Political 
Action Committees and the Political Process in t~ 1990s, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 155 (Allen 
J. Cigler &. Burdett A. Loomis eds., 4th ed. 1995). 
225. I have elected to continue to refer to the donations described herein as "charitable" and 
"philanthropiC" in order to emphasize that they are made to charitable organizations qualified 
under § 501(c)(3) of the Code-as opposed to PACs or other entities. 
226. For a technical analysis of the lobbying and campaign finance limitations pertaining to 
charitable organizations under the Code, see Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Lobbying and Political 
Expenditures, 613-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (1996). For an insightful discussion of the issue, see 
Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organi~ation Advocacy: Matching t~ Rules to t~ Rationales,63 IND. L.J. 
201 (1987). Many of the charitable organizations described in this section of the Article skirt the 
outer boundaries of permissible nonprofit advocacy. 
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dimensions in corporate gifts to politicized foundations, legal defense funds, 
and special interest groups-all of which may constitute themselves tax-
exempt, charitable organizations under § 501(c)(3) of the Code, as described 
below. 
Charitable contributions that are made for the purpose of advancing 
the corporation's political interests are consonant with traditional corporate 
legal norms (Le., wealth maximization). At least theoretically, they pose no 
threat to shareholders' property interests. Nevertheless, because politicized 
corporate charitable contributions are a form of corporate political speech, 
they may impinge on shareholders' speech and associational interests. In 
light of the fact that shareholders are typically not provided with informa-
tion regarding the firm's charitable contributions, the investment decision 
cannot represent a legitimate proxy for shareholder consent to politicized 
charitable contributions. 227 As commentators have elsewhere noted, a 
deep conflict exists between the firm's right to promote its political inter-
ests and the shareholders' interest in not being compelled to subsidize 
speech with which they are in disagreement. This section of the Article 
analyzes this conflict in the context of politicized corporate charitable 
contributions. 
A. The Legal Basis for the Politicization of the Nonprofit Sector 
Politically motivated corporate philanthropy is used to influence a 
variety of constituencies within the United States, including members of 
Congress and the judiciary, organized interest groups, and the public in 
general. 228 Of course, corporate charitable contributions would be rela-
tively ineffective political instruments were it not for the increasingly poli-
tical nature of many charitable organizations. 229 
227. See Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARy 
BILL RTS. J. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment]; 
Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE 
L.J. 235 (1981) [hereinafter Brudney, Business Corporations]; cf. Alan J. Meese, Umitations on 
Corporate Speech: Protection for Shareholders or Abridgment of Expression?, 2 WM. & MARy BILL 
RTS. J. 305 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109 
(1992). 
228. The diverse forms of political influence that may be exerted through corporate chari-
table contributions are discussed in NEIHEISEL, supra note 32. See also Haley, supra note 36, at 
496-97. 
229. That is, the charitable organizations function as conduits for corporate political advo-
cacy. Many charities engage in political advocacy as a crucial aspect of furthering their public 
service objectives. Karen W. Arenson, Legislation Would Expand Restrictions on Political Advocacy 
by Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,1995, at AI0 ("'Those at the bottom of the ladder very often 
need both the social services and the advocacy .... '" (quoting Sara Melendez, president of 
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While the language of § 501(c)(3) would seem to deny charitable orga-
nizations a meaningful political life, this has not been the case. The lobby-
ing limitations and absolute proscription on campaigning that apply to 
charitable organizations ·under § 501(c)(3)Z30 have not prevented chari-
table organizations from beco~ing politically active. The inclusion of 
"education" as a charitable purpose under § 501(c)(3),Z31 and the Treasury 
regulations' broad definition thereof,Z3Z has supplied a basis for consider-
able advocacy on the part of charitable organizations, and especially educa-
tional foundations.Z33 In light of the relevance of constitutionally 
Independent Sector». Nonprofit political advocacy has been a source of recent controversy. In 
July 1995, three representatives introduced legislation that would "sharply circumscribe not just 
lobbying efforts, but also all other attempts to influence public policy at the national, state or 
local level by [nonprofit) recipients of Federal grants." Id. For related discussion, see infra 
note 239. 
230. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). An organization qualifyi!tg for charitable status pursuant 
to § 501(c)(3) is one in which 
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise 
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h», and 
which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of 
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for 
public office. 
Id. In response to the ambiguity surrounding the "substantial part" test, the IRS enacted 
§ 501(h) as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-455,90 Stat. 1720, 1723 (1976). 
Section 501(h) is a safe harbor permitting qualified electing organizations to spend a precisely 
defined amount of their funds on lobbying without tunning afoul of the § 501(c)(3) substantial 
part test. 
231. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)·(d)(3) (1996) ("An organization may be educational even 
though it advocates a particular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a suffiCiently full and 
fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an indepen· 
dent opinion or conclusion."). However, the "full and fair exposition" test was held unconstitu· 
tionally vague by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. 
United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The IRS has therefore resorted. to a "methodo-
logy test," which identifies various factors for consideration in making the distinction between 
education and advocacy. See Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986·2 C.B. 729. Of course, the IRS cannot base 
any such determinations on the content of the ideas expressed without running afoul of the First 
Amendment. 
233. The issue of political advoca.cy by nonprofit organizations has received congressional 
attention, but is not susceptible to easy resolution. See Hearings on Lobbying and Political Activities 
of Tax-Exempt Organitatioru Before the Subcomm: on 'Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 100th Cong. (1987); SUBCOMMI1TIE ON OVERSiGHT OF THE CoMM. ON WAYS AND 
MEANS, 100TH cONG., REpORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON LOBBYING AND POLITICAL 
ACTIVITIES OF TAX·ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (Comm. Prip.t ~987). For an important discussion 
of the Code's and Treasury regulations' treatment of the definition of "education" 'in the context 
of foundations identified with particular politicians, se~ Francis R. Hill, Newt Gingrich and Oliver 
Twist: Charitable Contributions and Campaign Finance; 66 TAX NOTES 237 Oan. 9,1995); see also 
Laura Brown Chisolm, Sinking the Think Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of Tax Exemption 
Law to Address the Use and Misuse of Tax.Exempt Organitations by Politicians, 51 U. Pm. L. REV. 
577 (1990). Political spending by charitable foundationS had attracted substantial controversy in 
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guaranteed liberties, the IRS has had a difficult time distinguishing between 
permissible educational activities, permissible advocacy, and impermissible 
lobbying, propagandizing, and campaigning. 234 Furthermore, § 501(c)(3) 
itself provides a basis for some lobbying by charitable organizations, so long 
as such lobbying does not constitute a substantial part of the organizations' 
activities.235 The Treasury regulations have further facilitated the political 
empowerment of charitable organizations by providing particular, itemized 
exceptions to the-definition of prohibited lobbying,236 and by distin-
guishing judicial, executive and administrative bodies from those 
"legislative bodies" that may not be lobbied consistent with 
§ 501(c)(3).237 
Thus, the porous nature of § 501(c)(3)'s requirements and that of the 
accompanying regulations, combined with the increasingly factionalized, 
interest-group-based nature of society and politics,238 has meant that the 
universe of politically empowered § 501(c)(3) charitable organizations has 
expanded dramatically in th~ last three decades.239 Many of these entities 
the mid- and late 1960s. Congress took steps to prevent future abuses by enacting new rules and 
penalties pertaining to foundations as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. For historical back-
ground on the controversy and on Congress' reaction thereto, see COMMISSION ON FOUNDS. 
AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY, supra note 49. Congress failed to confront the problem of direct 
corporate giving, however. 
234. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, From Big Mama Rag to National Geographic: ~ Controversy 
Regarding Exemptions for Educational Publications, 41 TAX L. REv. 693 (1986). For additional 
commentary on the tax-based limitations pertaining to political advocacy by nonprofit orga-
nizations, see Chisolm, supra note 226; Laura Brown Chisolm, Political Advocacy Meets the 
Internal Revenue Code: 'There's Got to Be a Better Way' (1994) (New York University School 
of Law, Program on Philanthropy and the Law). 
235. See supra note 230. 
236. Most Significantly, pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(1)-(4) (1996), charitable orga-
nizations may engage in "nonpartisan" analysis and make their finding available to governmental 
bodies, may examine and discuss broad social and economic problems (including problems gov-
ernment would ultimately be expected to address), may address governmental bodies if they do so 
in response to an invitation therefrom, and may appear before governmental bodies in regard to 
matters affecting the powers and duties of the charitable organization itself. 
237. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(d)(3) (1996) ("'Legislative body' does not include executive, 
judicial, or administrative bodies. H). 
238. Political scientists have observed that organized interest groups have played an increas-
ingly critical role in politics since the 1970s. See, e.g., KAy LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. 
TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986); see also INTEREST GROUP 
POLITICS, supra note 224. 
239. The problem of distinguishing the appropriate characteristics and limits of charitable 
organizations (as opposed to "advocacy" organizations) is at the heart of the recent controversy 
regarding the Combined Federal Campaign (the "CFC"), a federally-sponsored charity fund-
raising effort through which federal employees make charitable contributions (to the groups they 
select). In June of 1995, Representative John L. Mica (R-Fla.) criticized the presence of 
"advocacy-oriented" charities within the CFC, and held hearings to consider banning them from 
continued participation therein. See, e.g., Statement of Chairman John Mica: Hearing on Combined 
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are unrelated to the classes of causes and problems historically associated 
with philanthropy, and many of them, as mentioned above, are at least 
informally committed to influencing public policy.240 Thus, the breadth 
of politicized causes and entities qualifying for § 501(c)(3) charitable status 
has enhanced the opportunities for corporations to use philanthropic con-
tributions to accomplish political objectives. 
B. The Limitations and Disincentives Attaching to Traditional Corporate 
Political Advocacy 
Significant legal limitations apply to traditional corporate campaign-
finance activities241 and substantial tax-based, financial disincentives per-
tain to traditional corporate lobbying.242 Corporate philanthropy has 
therefore become an especially attractive vehicle for corporate political 
advocacy. By pursuing political objectives through technically philanthro-
Federal Campaign Before the Subcomm. on alii! Sew. of the House Comm. on GOlI't Reform, Federal 
Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, June 7, 1995, allailable in LEXIS, Legis 
History, CNGTST File; Testimony of Charles Stephen, Senior Staff Attorney NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund: Hearing on Combined Federal Campaign Before the Subcomm. on allil Sew. of the House 
Comm. on GOlI'i Reform, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, June 7, 
1995, allailable in LEXIS, Legis History, CNGTST File. Prior to the 1980s, the CFC was limited 
to charitable organizations providing direct services in the area of human health and welfare; 
however, litigation brought by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund succeeded in opening the CFC 
to a wider group of charities. Although it has received some support, groups across the political 
spectrum have criticized Mica's proposal to ban the "bad," advocacy groups from the CFC, 
noting the impossibility of distinguishing between "advocacy" and "non-advocacy" oriented 
charities. Mica himself acknowledged that he had not entirely figured out how to distinguish 
advocacy groups from charities. See Constance Casey, Congress Targets 'Good,' 'Bad' Charities, 
CLEV. PLAIN DEALER July 10, 1995, at 3E (quoting Mica as stating, "I know what they 
aren't .... It's sort of like pornography. I'd know what one was when I saw it."). Mica's initia-
tive, conducted as chairman of the House Civil Service Subcommittee, has understandably been 
viewed as part of recent Republican efforts to "defund the left". See Jeff Shear, The Ax Files, 27 
NAT'L J. 924 (1995); ·War on Nontn'ofits" Heats Up, NONPROFIT WORLD, Jan.lFeb. 1996, at 8. 
240. See sutn'a note 229. In addition to the limitations described above, § 501(c)(3) requires 
that qualifying organizations be "organized" and "operated" exclusively to fulfill a charitable 
purpose. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). These organizational and operational requirements are fur-
ther elaborated in Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)-(c) (1996). Entities which engage in impermis-
sible advocacy are classified as "action organizations." See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.50 1 (c)(3)-1 (c)(3)(ii), (iv) (1996). 
241. For discussion of the Federal Election Campaign Act, see infra notes 246-263 and ac-
companying text. 
242. In 1993, the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 amended § 162(e) of the Code to 
eliminate the deduction for business lobbying expenses (except those pertaining to local lobby-
ing). An analysis of the 30-year life of the business lobbying deduction is presented in 
Cummings, sutn'a note 226. 
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pic contributions, corporations may lawfully avoid the limitations and disin-
centives pertaining to traditional corporate political advocacy. 
1. Laws and Regulations Affecting Traditional Corporate 
Political Activity 
The most important laws governing traditional corporate political 
activity are' the·Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA")243 (and analo-
gous state laws)244 and the Code's provisions governing the deductibility 
of business lobbying expenses. 245 The significance of the under-regulated 
nature of corporate philanthropy becomes apparent when compared to the 
heavily regulated nature of traditional corporate political activity. 
a. Corporate Campaign Spending and FECA 
FECA absolutely prohibits corporations and labor unions from making 
contributions and expenditures to federal election campaigns.246 These 
243. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994). There are 
a variety of other federal laws affecting lobbyists' activities. In fact, Congress passed significant 
lobbying reform measures in 1995, in the form of rules limiting gifts that could be accepted by 
Members (these rules were enacted separately by each House). It also passed the Lobby Disclo-
sure Reform Act of 1995, which requires for the first time that public disclosure be made of paid 
lobbyists' efforts to influence the legislative and regulatory process in both the legislative and the 
executive branches. See Alice A. Love, CongTess Appro\les First CNerhaul of Lobby Disclosure Law 
Since '40's, ROLL CALL, Nov. 30, 1995; Refonning CongTess; Changing the Way Washington Works, 
HERITAGE FOUND. REps., Dec. 1995, No. 29, at 1. In addition, see Lobbying Disclosure Act of 
1995,2 U.S.C.S. §§ 1601-1611 (Law. Co-op. 1996); Truth in Lobbying Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1352 
(1994). 
244. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-330(a) (West 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, 
§ 7 (Law. Co-op. 1990); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 169.254 (West 1992); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 130.029 (West 1980); N.Y. ELEC. LAw § 14-116 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1996); OHIO REv. 
CODE ANN. § 3599.03(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1995); 25 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3253 (West 1994). For 
further citation to the states' campaign finance laws, see State Capital Law Finn, Lobbying, PACs 
and Campaign Finance, 50 STATE HANDBOOK (1994). For commentary on the states' campaign 
finance laws, see COMMON CAUSE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN THE STATES 14 (Aug. 
1985); Christopher Cherry, Note, State Campaign Finance Laws: The Necessity and Efficacy of 
Refonn, 3 J.L. & POL. 567 (1987); John M. Hamilton, Note, State Campaign Finance Schemes and 
Equal Protection, 61 IND. L.J. 251 (1986). See also Austin V. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding constitutionality of state campaign finance law prohibiting corpo-
rations from using corporate funds for independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to 
candidates running in state elections). 
245. I.R.C. § 162(e) (1994). 
246. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). For a politically savvy account of FECA's effect on the federal 
election process, see SORAUF, supra note 224. 
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prohibitions reflect the view that unrestrained corporate campaign spending 
would pose a substantial threat to the democratic political process, and 
create at least the appearance of unseemly political quid pro quOS.247 
FECA also reflects concern for the potentially coercive nature of corporate 
(and union) campaign spending vis-a-vis the individual political beliefs of 
dissenting shareholders and union members.248 
FECA's seemingly absolute prohibition on corporate campaign spend-
ing is mitigated by the fact that the Act permits corporations to establish 
and administer "separately segregated funds"-commonly referred to as 
PACs.249 Under FECA, corporations may establish a PAC and pay all of 
its administrative expenses (including its office space, salaries, phone bills, 
bank charges, and solicitation expenses, etc.),250 but the funds that the 
PAC will donate to federal election campaigns must come from voluntary 
contributions from stockholders, employees, and their families.251 Such 
contributions cannot come from corporate treasury funds. 252 These re-
quirements are intended to prohibit corporations from using their P ACs as 
conduits for corporate campaign contributions. 253 
b. FECA's Regulations Affecting Corporate PACs 
While the distinction between corporate funded administrative costs 
and "pass-through contributions" is problematic, FECA imposes other 
regulatory safeguards on corporate PACs' involvement in federal election 
247. These views are enunciated in the various Supreme Court cases testing the constitution-
ality of FECA's provisions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); United States 
v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. Painters Local Union, 79 F. Supp. 516 (D. 
Conn. 1948). For discussion of the historical antecedents of FECA, see Jeremiah D. Lambert, 
Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033 (1965). 
248. UAW, 352 U.S. at 567; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); United States v. 
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562, 434 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1970), rell'd in part and lIacated in part, 
407 U.S. 385 (1972); Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd by 471 F.2d 811 (3rd 
Cir.1973). 
249. Organizational matters pertaining to PACs (or "Separately Segregated Funds") are pre-
scribed under 2 U.S.C.S. § 432 (Law. Co-op. 1996). See also United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 
755 (1973); 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(b) (1996). 
250. 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(b) (Separate Segregated Funds-Use of Treasury Monies); id. 
§ 114.1(b) (Definitions-Establishment, Administration and Solicitation Costs). 
251. 2 U.S.C.S. § 441b(a)(4)(A) & (B). 
252. ld. § 441b(a); see also 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.2(b), 114.5(b). 
253. 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b), 114.5(b). The distinction is somewhat artificial, of course. To the 
extent that corporations fund the administration and basic operations of a PAC, they free up 
other capital to go to election campaigns. 
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campaigns. In particular, FECA limits the amount that individuals and 
other noncorporate .organizations254 may contribute to P ACs. 255 It also 
imposes various procedural requirements and amount limitations on the 
contributions that P ACs may make in federal election campaigns. 256 
. FECA also imposes stric;t reporting obligations on P ACs and on politi-
cians. 257 All PACs are required to register with the Federal Election 
Commission within ten days of their establishment. 258 And FECA re-
quires PACs to' disclose the total contributions that they have received,259 
as well as to identify information regarding any contributors who have 
given more than $200 to the PAC in a given year. 260 The PAC, in tum, 
must disclose information regarding all campaign contributions it makes, 
irrespective of amount.261 Finally, FECA imposes disclosure obligations 
on feder~1. election candidates themselves: They must disclose the amounts 
of PAC contributions they receive and identify information pertaining to 
PAC contributors. 262 These disclosure. obligations provide. additional 
legal prophylaxis against the invisible political exercise of corporate wealth 
in federal elections. 263 . 
c. The Nondeductibility of Business Lobbying Expenditures 
In comparison to other business related expenses, the Code has placed 
a disincentive on traditional corporate lobbying. In 1993, pursuant to the 
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress amended § 162{e) of the 
Code to deny corporations (and other business taxpayers) a deduction for 
most lobbying expenses.264 With the exception of expenses attributable 
to lobbying local government, the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 
eliminated the deduction for expenses incurred in direct attempts to influ-
254. Again, corporations may not make any contributions to the PACs' campaign funds; 
they are only permitted to fund the PACs' operations. See supra note 252. 
255. 2 U.S.C.S. § 441a(a). 
256. ld. 
257. ld. § 434. 
258. ld. § 433(a). 
259. ld. § 434(b)(2). 
260. ld. § 434(b)(3). 
261. ld. § 434(b)(4) & (5). 
262. ld. § 434(b)(5) & (6) .. 
263. See Pichlery. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
264. I.R.C. § 162(e) (1994). 
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ence legislation, expenses attributable to communicating with high federal 
executive office personnel (whether or not in connection with specific 
legislation), trade association dues attributable to state and federal lobbying, 
and grass roots lobbying expenses. 265 
2. In Comparison to Political Philanthropy 
As the previous discussion illustrates, corporations get a three-fold 
benefit from structuring their political activity as philanthropy. First, chari-
table contributions to foundations associated with particular politicians or 
party platforms provide an alternative to traditional campaign contribu-
tions, which corporations are prohibited from making, at least on a direct 
basis, under FECA and analogous state laws. Second, so long as a firm's 
annual charitable contributions do not exceed ten percent of its taxable 
income, such donations would generally be tax-deductible for the corpora-
tion under § 170 of the Code-in contrast to the currently nondeductible 
status of corporate lobbying expenses. Third, by using technically philan-
thropic contributions to accomplish political objectives, corporations law-
fully avoid the disclosure requirements applicable under FECA. 
C. Politicized Philanthropies: Foundations Identified with Politicians and 
Party Platforms 
Because of the difficulty of arriving at a constitutionally sound, justi-
ciable standard for distinguishing education from advocacy,266 § 501(c)(3) 
"educational" foundations have been relatively free to engage in campaign-
related and legislative advocacy. This readily occurs in situations where a 
politician has developed a particular affiliation with an educational founda-
tion. 267 In such cases, with a modicum of care paid to the partisan nature 
of its statements, the foundation may serve as a mouthpiece for the candi-
date, one dedicated to disseminating his or her political message and, indi-
265. See Cummings, supra note 226, at A-4 ("The reasons for this abrupt about face are not 
entirely clear. In part, the 1993 revision was revenue driven. The Congress may have intended 
to penalize and possibly reduce business lobbying, which may be further explained as a change of 
view about 'neutrality' in the tax treatment of lobbying expenses." (footnote omitted». For an 
argument that Congress went too far in disallowing the deduction for business lobbying, see 
Jasper L. Cummings Jr., Tax Policy, Social Policy, and Politics: Amending Section 162(e), 9 EXEMPT 
ORO. TAX REv. 137 (1994). For discussion of the issue of. the Tax Code's "neutrality" in the 
matter of nonprofit organizations' advocacy, see Chisolm, supra note 234. 
266. See Shaviro, supra note 234. 
267. See Chisolm, supra note 233. 
Corporate Philanthropy 645 
rectly, advancing his or her political career.268 The problems raised by 
affiliations between candidates, office holders (that is, potential candidates), 
and educational foundations are particularly nettlesome. Describing the 
"candidate organization dilemma" as "virtually unaddressed," Francis Hill, 
a tax expert in the area, has indicated that such fO),lndations provide a 
mechanism for enterprising politicians to "treat themselves as their political 
supporters' favorite charities. "269 
Hill has described politician-charity links as being common across the 
political spectrum,270 but a particularly striking example is provided by 
Newt Gingrich's affiliation with several nonprofit educational foundations, 
and especially The Progress and Freedom Foundation ("PFF").271 
268. Tax Notes described the broad boundaries of what Mr. Gingrich could talk about in 
conducting his college course without running afoul of the Code's limitations on' nonprofits' 
advocacy: "[HIe could say pretty much whatever he wanted, as long as it did not include 'and 
vote for me,' or 'join the Republican Party,' or something like that." See Lee A. Sheppard, Is 
Gingrich's Think Tank Too Partisan for Exemption?, 65 TAX NOTES 1173, 1173 (1994). 
269. Hill, supra note 233, at 249. As Hill notes, campaign finance reform may actually 
exacerbate "political overreaching" by educational foundations. "Congress has never found the 
political courage to enact a meaningful package of campaign finance reforms ... for determining 
whether § 501(c)(3) organizations are participating impermissibly in electoral politiCS." ld. at 238. 
Hill does an excellent job of elucidating the labyrinthine rules pertaining to charitable founda-
tions' political advocacy. In addition to the education-advocacy distinction, pertinent issues 
include whether the politicized foundation's work has conferred a benefit on a charitable class, 
whether it conferred an impermissible private benefit on Mr. Gingrich as a politician or on the 
Republican party, whether Gingrich received private inurement as a product of the arrangement, 
and whether the charitable organization functioned merely as a conduit for contributions to flow 
to Gingrich or other organizations affiliated with him. See also David Shenk, Nonprofiteers: How 
to Lobby Like a Corporation and Pay Taxes Like a Charity, WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 1991, at 35 
("Because the groups span the political spectrum, nonprofit reform isn't any party's plank, and 
cozy relations between established nonprofits and incumbent politicians mean that Congress isn't 
likely to press the IRS for tighter" overSight. H). 
270. Hill, supra note 233, at 238. 
271. Like the other foundations under discussion herein, PFF was recognized as a § 501(c)(3) 
educational foundation by the IRS. For discussion of the charitable purposes described in PFF's 
application for tax exemptions, see Sheppard, supra note 268, at 1173; more generally, see Glen 
R. Simpson, New Addition to Gingrich Family Tree: The ProgTess and Freedom Foundation, ROLL 
CALL, Sept; 12", 1994, at 1, and Glenn F. Bunting, Gingrich's Politics Got Boost from Nonprofits, 
L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1996, at A1 (describing the network of five nonprofit foundations associ-
ated with Mr. Gingrich). Of these several foundations, PFF and The Abraham Lincoln Opportu-
nity Foundation ("ALOF") were the most important to the fulfillment of Mr. Gingrich's larger 
political strategy. From 1990-1993, tax deductible contributions to ALOF funded nationally 
broadcast satellite television programs featuring Mr. Gingrich and his political message. In 1993, 
PFF largely took over this function. Aside from The American Opportunity Foundation, which 
was funded and run directly by Mr. Gingrich, these foundations were each organized and oper-
ated by persons affiliated with GOPAC, the political action committee that Mr. Gingrich chaired 
from 1986-1995. The"foundations typically shared GOPAC's officers, staff, office space, and 
telephone number. Some even took loans from GOPAC. ld.; see David E. Rosenbaum, Middle 
Ground on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1996, at A1. 
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Although Mr. Gin~ich was deeply connected to PFF ~d its work , 272 he 
shrewdly eschewed any official connection to the foundation.273 (Because 
the foundations are' i'ntended to be organized and operated exclusively to 
fulfill a charitable purpose, the absence of a formal tie between the politi, 
cian and the foundation helps to forestall (but does not preclude) charges of 
tax and campaign finance abuses.)274 PFF was established in 1993 by 
Jeffrey Eisenach, a close associate of Mr. Gingrich, who had served as exec, 
utive director of GOPAC from 1991' to 1993.275 Eisenach. is reported to 
have launched PFF from GOPAC's offices,276 where he had. spent "several 
272. In a 1993 PFF newsletter, Eisenach credited the idea for the establishment of PFF to "a 
series of conversations with my friend Newt Gingrich." Mary Beth Regan & Richard S. 
Dunham, A Think Tank with One Idea: The Newt World Order, Bus. WK., July 3, 1995, at 49; see 
also Jeanne Cummings, Gingrich Confidant; Eisenach: A Whit Behind the Scenes, ATLANTA J. & 
CoNST., July 25, 1995, at 4A [hereinafter Cummings, Gingrich Confidant] ("Although Gingrich 
and Eisenach do not see each other on a daily baSiS, Eisenach routinely communicates with the 
speaker's office by fax and refers to himself as a close adviser to Gingrich."). 
273. As Hill makes plain, such a formal connection is unnecessary to the advancement of the 
politician's platform. Hill, supra note 233, at 245-46 ("The officeholder or candidate may simply 
appear at organizational events or endorse the organization's positions on issues. Fund-raising 
solicitations mayor may not refer to the politiCian, but will prominently invoke his or her views. 
The § 501 (c)(3) organization commonly solicits contributions from the section 527 political orga~ 
nization's contributors. H). . 
274. See, e.g., American Campaign Finance Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C: 1053 (1989); 
see also United Cancer Council v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 162 (1993). The extraordinarily 
high-profile nature of Mr. Gingrich's politicized foundations, and their formal connection 'to 
GOP AC, ultimately resulted in Democratic representatives filing ethics charges. These charges 
lead to an investigation by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct (the "Ethics Committee") and the appointment of a special counsel, James M. Cole. 
On January 17, 1997, the subcommittee announced its determination that Mr. Gingrich had 
failed to conform to the House's standards of conduct in that he had failed to be appropr~ately 
attentive (in regard to seeking legal counsel, etc.) to whether his network of politicized charitable 
foundations conformed to tax law requirements. (It also concluded that he had failed to supply 
accurate, complete, and compr~hensive information to the panel.) On this basis, on the same 
day, the full Ethics Committee voted to reprimand the Speaker and to fine him $300,000; See 
Adam Clymer, Panel, Citing Pattern Clf Ethics Flaws, Seeks a Gingrich Reprimand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
18, 1997, at AI. (Mr. Gingrich had been reelected as Speaker of the House on January 7, 1997.) 
On January 21, 1997, the full House voted overwhelmingly in favor of the reprimand and the 
fine. See Adam Clymer, House, in a 395-28 Vote, Reprimands Gingrich, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
1997, at AI. Nevertheless, the Ethics Committee failed to reach a determination regarding 
whether Mr. Gingrich's network of politicized foundations constituted a violation of the tax laws. 
Thus, there still remain many fundamental, unresolved issues regarding the scope of permissible 
advocacy activities by educational foundations affiliated with individual politicians and political 
parties. 
275. See Cummings, Gingrich Confidant, supra note 272, at 4A. 
276. According to RoU <AU (a Capitol Hill newspaper), only the lower-level employees of PFF 
lacked any prior association with Gingrich. See Simpson, supra note 271. 
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months" organlZlng Mr. Gingrich's college course.277 The course, 
"Renewing American Civilization," was funded from charitable contribu-
tions made to PFF.27B Designed to foster a grass roots citizens' movement 
of conservative political activists, the course and Mr. Gingrich's cable tele-
vision show played a significant role in paving the way for him to assume 
the position of Speaker of a Republican-dominated House.279 Business 
Week magazine reported that "PFF appears to have almost single-mindedly 
promoted the Speaker. During its first twenty months, roughly forty-three 
percent of the group's $1.4 million budget 'went to funding Gingrich's 
televised, college lecture series ... and his cable television show. "280 
While other politicians have established affiliations with educational 
foundations, none have been as daring as Mr. Gingrich. Clearly, the activi-
ties of PFF, and the other educational foundations with which he has been 
associated, have tested the outer limits of what is "educational," as opposed 
to "political." According to one account, PFF's founders "readily admit 
that they are trying to convince people to become what might loosely be 
called 'conservatives,'" but the more trenchant question is "whether [PFF] 
is trying to make [the college] students into Republicans"-an objective 
inconsistent with its status as a § 501(c)(3) educational foundation. 281 
Clearly the distinction is an abstruse one, and there is no clear answer to 
whether PFF's and ALOF's activities resulted in Mr. Gingrich having re-
277. Regan & Dunham, supra note 272, at 49. Mr. Gingrich taught his course in 1993 at 
Kennesaw State College, and in 1994 and 1995 at private Reinhardt College, both in Georgia. 
It was broadcast around the country on cable television networks, and was available to tens of 
thousands of students. The central theme of the course was the need to replace the "welfare 
state" with the "opportunity society," which was also GOPAC's central message. See, e.g., 
Charles R. Babcock, Use of Tax-Exempt Groups Integral to Political Strategy, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 
1997, at A1. 
278. Contributors to PFF were able to earmark their contributions to go exclusively to 
Gingrich's course. Sheppard, supra note 268, at 1174. Mr. Gingrich came under special criti-
cism from Reinhardt College for including laudatory statements about large corporate contribu-
tors to GOPAC and PFF within the course's materials "with scant mention of their financial 
support." Id. at 1175. Furthermore, "contributors to the Foundation were expressly told that 
they could participate in the development of the Renewing American Civilization course for a 
$25,000 or $50,000 donation, according to an internal memo obtained by Roll Call." ld. 
279. In regard to the partisan nature of the course, "[m]emos promoting the course said it 
would train thousands of Republican activists." Ethics Panel Looks at Outside Counsel, 
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 8, 1995, at 4A. 
280. Regan & Dunham, supra note 272, at 49. For discussion of PFF projects that have been 
unrelated to Gingrich's course, see Sheppard, supra note 268, at 1174-75. 
281. Sheppard, supra note 268, at 1176. For an excellent discussion of the IRS' approach to 
distinguishing educational from partisan activities, as applied to PFF, see id. at 1175. 
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ceived an improper taxpayer subsidy.282 In addition, PFF and ALOF pro-
vided Mr. Gingrich (and the Republican party more generally) an opportu-
nity to benefit from corporate charitable contributions (as described 
immediately below)-contributions that would have been unlawful under 
FECA if made directly to him or to his political action committee; and thus 
important and unresolved campaign finance issues have also been raised by 
Mr. Gingrich's political affairs.283 
After the November 1994 election, PFF assumed a highly' visible role 
in public policy debates. Having become "a major source of research for 
the new Republican leadership's reform plans," the foundation afforded 
business contributors and wealthy individuals the potential to affect policy 
formation at the highest levels.284 The "darling think tank of the Repub-
lican Revolution," PFF released three policy papers during the summer of 
1995285 and has remained an important influence on congressional policy 
initiatives.286 The foundation underwent "explosive growth" during this 
period.28? PFF's staff reportedly included twenty-six full-time employees 
by the summer of 1995;288 and the foundation had projected revenues of 
$6 million for that year.289 Described by Business Week as "flush with 
corporate cash," PFF's success was subsidized in part by charitable contribu-
282. See Hill, supra note 233. Although ultimately unresolved, the issue of tax abuse was 
central to the Ethics Committee investigation. For an argument that Mr. Gingrich violated the 
tax laws and should be held financially liable, see Michael J. Graetz, What Gingrich Owes Us, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,1997, at A15. 
283. While the House subcommittee gave extensive consideration to the issue of tax abuse, it 
failed aqequately to address the campaign finance issues raised by Gingrich's partisan use of PFF 
and ALOF. See Text of 'Analysis and Conclusion,' from Report by House Ethics Counsel, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1997, at All .. 
284. See Cummings, Gingrich Confidant, supra note 272, at 4A; see cilio Regan &.. Dunham, 
supra note 272, at 49 (statement of American Enterprise Institute scholar J. Gregory Sidak, who 
worked as an adviser on PFF's FCC study: "We're getting the ear of people on Capitol Hill who 
really matter"). 
285. Regan &.. Dunham, supra note 272, at 49 ("Flush with corporate cash, its pumping out 
policy prescriptions for dumping the Federal Communications Commission, axing federal block 
grants, and privatizing safety and efficacy reviews of prescription drugs and medical devices. H). 
286. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Constnlatilles SpUt on How to Regulate the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 1995, at D4 (describing PFF as helping to "lead the push for a self-regulatory approach" 
to screening material from the Internet). 
287. Cummings, Gingrich Confidant, supra note 272. 
288. Id. 
289. Regan &.. Dunham, supra note 272, at 48 ("Since the election, times have been good. 
Revenues are expected to hit $6 million in 1995, putting PFF on the same financial footing as 
seasoned groups such as the libertarian-leaningCato Institute. For fiscal 1994, which ended Mar. 
31, 1995, PFF raised $2.2 million, up from $656,000 in 1993. And in the first three months of 
1995 alone, it took in $866,000 with $650,000 in contributions mostly from large corporate sponsors." 
(emphasis added». 
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tions from AT&T, Bell Atlantic, Bristol Myers Squibb, Coca Cola, Eli 
Lilly, and Marion Merrell Dow, among other business contributors.29O 
Because of PFF's charitable status, these contributions would generally have 
been deductible for their corporate donors under § 170, unlike sums ex· 
pended in traditional corporate lobbying efforts. In light of PFF's bold 
deregulatory initiat~ves in the pharmaceuticals and telecommunications 
areas and its continued favor in congressional Circles, such technically 
philanthropic contributions to PFF may prove to have been shrewd business 
investments. 
Notwithstanding the legal controversy that surrounded the activities of 
PFF, in April 1995 Robert Dole (then Senate Majority Leader and a presi· 
dential candidate) and Mr. Gingrich (then Speaker of the House and a 
potential presidential candidate) announced their creation of The Econ· 
omic Growth and Tax Reform Commission ("EGTRC").291 In June of 
1995, the group applied for status as an educational foundation under 
§ 501(c)(3).292 Dole and Gingrich appointed Jack Kemp (a former 
presidential candid:~.te, housing secretary, and congressman, and subsequent 
to EGTRC's creation, the Republican vice.presidential nominee for the 
1996 presidential campaign) to ,act as EGTRC's chairman. Dole and 
Gingrich also appointed the group's thirteen other members.293 Report. 
edly all Republicans,294 EGTRC's members-former politicians, govern· 
ment officials, business executives, and entrepreneurs295-have been 
charged with "studying" the subject of tax reform and designing "a 21st 
century tax code," in the words of Mr. Kemp.296 
290. Id. at 48 ("Donations overwhelmingly come from companies in telecommunications and 
medicine, areas where PFF is crafting bold deregulation plans.'); see also Sheppard, supra note 
268, at 1174 (noting that by December 1994 PFF had ,amassed $1.5 million in donations, with 
approximately half of the sum coming from other conservative foundations and the other half 
"about equally from corporations, indudin"g many telecommunications businesses, and wealthy 
individuals"). 
291. Barbara Kirchheimer, Kemp Tax Reform Commission Meets, Files for Tax.Exempt Status, 
67 TAX NOTES 1559, 1559 (1995). 
292. The group filed for § 501(c)(3) status as a charitable trust. Id. 
293. Barbara Kirchheimer, Flat Tax Enjoys Wide Support Among Members of Kemp 
Commission, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 108-4, June 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, Tax Library, TNT 
File. 
294. Bennett Minton, Kemp Commission to Meet in'Ways and Means Hearing Room, 95 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 125-5, June 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Tax Library, TNT File. 
295. A list of EGTRC's members appears in Kirchheimer, supra note 293. For the names of 
EGTRC's full time staff, see Kirchheimer, supra note 291, at 1559. 
296. Kirchheimer, supra note 291, at 1559. The text of the EGTRC's official charge is pre-
sented in National Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform, 'Charge' of National 
Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform Available at Commission Hearing, 95 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 190-41, Sept. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Tax Library, TNT file [hereinafter Charge of 
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As of January 1997, the IRS had still failed to reach a determination 
regarding EGTRC's charitable status.297 As described earlier, the lobby, 
ing limitations present under § 501(c)(3) would appear to prevent EGTRC 
from formulating specific legislative proposals to be enacted by Congress as 
part of tax reform. 298 Nevertheless, the ambiguities present within cer, 
tain Treasury regulations prescribing the scope of permissible legislative 
advocacy by charitable organizations299-particularly, the ability of chari, 
table organizations to provide "technical advice or assistance to a govern, 
ment body" in response to a written request therefrom3OO-may provide a 
basis for the group to issue "a report that will lead to changes" fundamental 
to federal tax policrol while maintaining its status as a charitable organi, 
zation. 
Tax experts agree that the issues raised by the creation of EGTRC are 
not addressed in the existing precedent.302 Some have wondered whether 
"the group's activities won't be inherently political, either in the form of 
lobbying or participating in a presidential campaign. "303 With Jack Kemp 
as its chairman, and Dole and Gingrich as its founders, .it is inevitable that 
EGTRC's work will be intimately tied to the development of these politi, 
cians' platforms as well as their political careers. And while Mr. Kemp has 
described the group as "like a think tank,"304 it has not pursued its educa, 
tional objectives in the ivory tower. During the summer of 1995, EGTRC 
held information· gathering sessions on the subject of tax reform, with spe, 
cial consideration regarding the implementation of a business,friendly "flat 
tax," in the House Ways and Means Committee hearing room.30S Thus, 
EGTRC has taken on many of the attributes of a congressionally sponsored 
National CommissionJ. The author of that report wryly noted that the group's creation has raised 
more tax policy questions than it has resolved. 
297. See Tax Reform, Kemp Commission Asking AU Donors for Permission to Release Names, 
Daily Rep. for Executives, Feb. 13, 1996, at 029 [hereinafter Asking AU DonorsJ. A search of the 
relevant records and databases failed to uncover such a ruling. 
298. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). 
299. See especiaUy Treas. Reg. § 56.491l-2(c)(1), (3) (1996). 
300. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(3). 
301. This is the group's stated objective, as set forth in its official charge. See Charge of 
National Commission, supra note 296. 
302. Kirchheimer, supra note 291, at 1560 (quoting Francis R. Hill and Greg Colvin). 
303. Kemp's Tax Reform Committee Redefines Irony, 65 TAX NOTES 1557, 1557 (1995). The 
issue was exacerbated by Jack Kemp's status as the O.O.P. vice'presidential nominee, of course. 
304. Kirchheimer, supra note 291, at 1559. 
305. Barbara Kirchheimer, Kemp Tax Commission Borrows Ways and Means Hearing, 68 TAX 
NOTEs 7, 7 (1995). This arrangement was regarded by commentators as highly unusual. 
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commission,306 except that its members are privately appointed, it is 
funded from private donations, and because of its (pending) charitable 
status, the identities of its contributors need not be diselosed.307 Thus, 
EGTRC appears to represent a radical experiment in privatizing congres~ 
sional policy formation through the nonprofit sector.308 
Both .PFF and EGTRC represent high-profile, ostensibly educational 
foundations that have contributed to the political ascendancy of current 
and· former members of Congress and the promotion of policies friendly to 
big business. And of course, PFF and EGTRC . are not the only examples of 
these extraordinary entities. By supporting candidate-identified, educa~ 
tional foundations through charitable contributions, corporations have con-
tributed to the ascendancy of particular policies and politicians, and have 
sought to ensure that their own political fortunes will remain ascendant. 
D. Contributions to Public Policy Institutes in General 
1. Policy Institutes of National Prominence 
As described above, PFF and EGTRC have been closely associated 
with the careers of particular politicians. But there are many policy insti-
tutes (or think tanks) u~affiliated with particular politicians that have sig-
nificantly influenced the general development of American politics and 
public policy. Important policy institutes that have § 501(c)(3) status in~ 
elude: The American Enterprise Institute, The Brookings Institute, The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Heritage Foundation, 
The Urban Institu!e, and more recently, The Progressive Policy . Institute 
306. ·In fact, EGTI~.c' s spokesperson, Ari Fleischer, referred to the organization as a "congres-
sionally sponspred commission" in speaking to the ·press. ld. Nevertheless,. Kemp and other 
commission members insisted that EOTRC is not an "official governmental commission." ld. 
307. If EGTRC qualifies as a charitable organization, it is under no legal obligation to dis-
close its contributors-in comparison to PACs, which are subject to stringent"disclosure require-
ments under FECA. (For a discussion of FECA's disclosure requirements, see supra notes 
257-263.) Soon after EGTRC's formation, Mr. Gingrich promised that information regarding 
EGTRC's contributors would be made public. Kirchheimer, supra note 291, at 1559. However, 
notwithstanding that at least $375,000 in donations have been received, no donor information 
appears to have been made public. Asking AU Donors, supra note 297, at G29. Representatives 
Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.) and John Dingell (D-Mich.) had written to EGTRC asking for this infor-
mation. ld. 
308. House'Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer (R-Tex.) described EGTRC 
as "the 'lever-pull' for whatever action Congress takes on tax reform." Kirchheimer, supra note 
305, at 7. 
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and The Cato Institute.309 Various studies have documented the flow of 
corporate funds to these and other policy institutes.3lO While there is no 
basis to conclude that such contributions have co--opted public policy de' 
bate at these institutions, they have undoubtedly helped to assure corporate 
America a seat at the negotiating table. 
The Cato Institute's recent rise to prominence provides an interesting 
example of the synergy between corporate charitable contributions and 
public policy initiatives.311 Cato's founder, Edward Harrison Crane III, 
has indicated that seventy percent of the foundation's annual budget of 
approximately $6 million is derived from individual contributions, but 
corporations have also been substantial contributors.312 According to the 
Los Angeles Times, corporate contributors have included oil companies such 
as Exxon, Shell Oil, and Tenneco Gas; tobacco and alcohol companies 
such as Joseph A. Seagram & Sons and Philip Morris Companies, Jnc.; and 
financial interests, including Prudential Securities and the Chase 
Manhattan Bank.313 The businesses that have contributed, which have 
also included Federal Express and Tele,Communications Inc., have had an 
309. These policy institutes are each described in the appendix to JAMES ALLEN SMITH, THE 
IDEA BROKERS, THINK TANKS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW POLICY ELITE (1991). See also Robin 
Toner, New, Old Think Tanks Compete faT Funds, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 17, 1986, at 17. 
310. The most explicit data is made available in the report on corporate public affairs giving 
published annually by The Capital Research Center ("CRC"), under the title "Patterns of 
Corporate Philanthropy." CRC relies on voluntary responses to surveys mailed to Forbes 250 
corporations as well as a review of corporate foundations' Form 990s. CRC's publications have 
argued that corporate public affairs giving reflects a persistent liberal bias. The CRC has esti-
mated total annual corporate public affairs giving at approximately $28 million in recent years. 
See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 186, at 11. 
311. The Cato Institute is a libertarian organization founded in the late 1970s by Edward 
Harrison Crane III. Cato has become extraordinarily prominent in recent years, especially since 
the November 1994 congressional elections. According to the Los Angeles Times, in one week in 
February of 1995, for example, Cato staffers made appearances on 7 radio and TV shows, had 8 
op-ed pieces in major papers, and had citations in 22 news stories. The Los Angeles Times also 
reported that "Cato's policy directors testified before congressional committees 20 times in the 
first month of the current seSSion"; and the institute has published a 358-page "Handbook for 
Congress." Nina J. Easton, Making America WOTk: Red, White and SmaU, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 
1995, (Magazine), at 14. 
312. Id. at 29. 
313. Id. 
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obvious interest in promoting the "less-regulation, lower-taxes" program 
that is at the heart 6f Cato's libertarian philosophy.314 
2. State-Level Conservative Think Tanks 
The political influence enjoyed by think tanks having national promi-
nence and headquarters in the nation's capital has recently led to growth, 
in terms of both influence and numbers, of conservative, state-level policy 
institutes.315 As the political climate has changed so that ideas relating 
to federalism and limited government have become more central to politi-
cal debate, conservative organizations have sought to use state level think 
tanks to influence state and local governments towards their free market, 
laissez-faire views.316 In February of 1995, The Washington Times reported 
on the recent establishment of thirty-two such conservative policy institutes 
(qualified as § 501(c)(3) educational organizations), describing their influ-
ence on state and local policy as "formidable. "317 The newspaper also 
described the work of the affiliated national organization, The State Policy 
Network, which reportedly conducts research on policy issues, helps to 
establish new state policy institutes, and advises them on "how to become 
influential forces in local policy-making. "318 In addition to the thirty-two 
organizations with which it was already affiliated, The State Policy 
314. Cato appears to have prevented itself from becoming a pawn of either big business or 
the Republican party. See, e.g., STEPHEN MOORE &- DEAN STANSEL, CATO INST., ENDING 
CORPORATE WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT (1995). 
315. For the factual basis of this section of the Article, I have relied on Joyce Price, 
Conservative Think Tanks Gain in NumbeT, Respect Nationwide; OTowing Influence Shows in State, 
Local Policy-Making, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at A4. 
316. Writing in The Washington Times, Byram Lamm, executive director of The State Policy 
Network, described his organization as endorsing "free-market solutions to public policy, with an 
emphasis on individual rights and fiscal responsibility." The newspaper also quoted Joe Dolan, 
former treasurer and finance committee chairman of The State Policy Network: "Behind a lot of 
the new ideas coming from governors these days are state policy think tanks." It also cited a 
letter from Michigan Governor John Engler to the Mackinac Center, describing the Center's 
work as "critical" to the progress his Republican administration had made in "putting govern-
ment in its proper place and liberating the entrepreneurial spirit." Id. 
317. ld. 
318. ld. 
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Network was described as being actively involved in establishing new con-
servative policy institutes in six additional states.319 This network of 
state-level policy institutes has afforded corporations the opportunity to use 
charitable contributions to influence the political environment at the level 
of state and local government. 
3. Affiliations Between § 501(c)(3) Educational Organizations 
and Politically Active § 501(c)(4) Organizations 
Both the candidate-identified foundations and the public policy insti-
tutes discussed above have relied principally on the educational purposes 
provision of § 501(c)(3) as the basis for their charitable status, and there-
fore, their eligibility to receive donor-deductible philanthropic dona-
tions.32o But despite its extraordinary malleability, the educational 
purposes provision of § 501(c)(3) is not sufficient to accommodate unlimited 
political advocacy by charitable organizations. Most significantly, when 
legislative lobbying is part of an organization's principal objectives, such an 
organization would be classified as an "action organization" and hence, 
ineligible for charitable status under § 501(c)(3).321 Alternatively, "social 
welfare" organizations, haVing tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), are 
unencumbered by any lobbying limitations, but the Code does not afford 
their contributors a tax deduction for such contributions. 
In response to this dilemma, organizations seeking to offer potential 
donors the financial incentive of tax deductibility,322 but wishing to avoid 
the lobbying limitations existing under § 501(c)(3), have adopted a strategy 
known as the "c3/c4 split."323 In this arrangement, politically ambitious 
groups splinter themselves into twin organizations, legally distinct but 
319. ld. 
320. Section 170 permits taxpayers a federal income tax deduction for their gifts to 
§ 501 (c)(3) charitable organizations. No such allowance exists for donations to § 501(c)(4) social 
welfare organizations (also referred to as "action organizations"), which are frequently committed 
to substantial lobbying as part of their charitable objectives. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (c)(4) (1994). 
321. Section 501(c)(3) requires that charitable organizations be "organized and operated" 
exclusively for charitable purposes. I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) (1994). An organization that is deemed an 
"action organization," by virtue of engaging in (or stating that it shall engage in) impermissible 
political advocacy; cannot qualify for tax exempt status under § 501(c)(3). For the attributes of 
action organizations, see Treas. Reg. § 501(c)(3)-I(c)(3)(ii), (iii) & (iv) (1996). 
322. The federal income tax deduction applying to charitable contributions is regarded as a 
crucial stimulus to charitable giving. 
323. Shenk, supra note 269. 
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ideologically and functionally entwined.324 One piece is constituted as 
a § 501(c)(3) organization-thus able to receive tax-deductible charitable 
contributions, but unable to engage in substantial lobbying. The other 
piece of the entity is qualified as a § 501(c)(4) tax-exempt social welfare 
organization-thus permitted to engage in unlimited lobbying, but ineligible 
to afford its donors a tax deduction for their donations. Such hybrid orga-
nizations were relatively uncommon until the late 1970s. Tax planners 
generally regarded the arrangement as overly clever.325 This changed 
with the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation.326 In reviewing a charitable organization's First 
Amendment challenge to § 501(c)(3)'s lobbying limitations, the Court 
noted that "[t]he constitutional defect that would inhere in § 501(c)(3) 
alone is avoided by § 501(c)(4)."327 In effect, the Supreme Court invited 
charitable organizations to establish affiliated § 501(c)(4) entities under 
their control,328 to administer any lobbying activities connected to the 
accomplishment of their charitable purposes. 
Accordingly, most prominent advocacy organizations have established 
an affiliated "research and education" entity, qualified under § 50 1 (c)(3) , 
through which they fund activities not directly connected to lobbying.329 
Section 501(c)(4) organizations have become extraordinarily prominent on 
324. The organizations commonly share headquarters, staff, mailing lists, etc. They also 
frequently combine their solicitation materials so that contributors may "check the box" to allo-
cate their contributions among the "c3" or the "c4" parts of the organization. As stated in the 
text, this system of organization was sanctioned in Regan II. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 
540,545 n.6 (1983): "The IRS apparently requires only that the two groups be separately incor-
porated and keep records adequate to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay 
for lobbying." See also Cummings, supra note 226, at A·38 ("[1lhese opinions suggest that the 
(c)(4) organization may be the 'alter ego' of the (c)(3) organization so long as records show that 
their finances are kept separate. "). 
325. Cummings, supra note 226, at A·38. 
326. Regan, 461 U.S. at 540; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 175 (1991). For further 
discussion of charitable organizations' use of "non·(c)(3)" affiliates, see Chisolm, supra note 226; 
Cummings, supra note 226, at A-37 to A-38. 
327. Regan, 461 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
328. ld. at 553 ("Should the IRS attempt to limit the control these organizations exercise 
over the lobbying of their § 501(c)(4) affiliates, the First Amendment problems would be insur-
mountable. It hardly answers one person's objection to a restriction on his speech that another 
person, outside his control, may speak for him. "). 
329. It is now relatively easy to ascertain whether a charitable organization has a related 
§ 501(c)(4) body. In January 1993, the IRS released a new Schedule A to accompany the Form 
990 Informational Return required of all public charities. The Schedule A requires presentation 
of information about affiliated § 501(c)(4) organizations and any other noncharitable affiliates. 
See 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 43-15, Jan. 1, 1993, allailable in, LEXIS, Tax Library, TNT File. 
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the domestic policy landscape. They include the National Rifle Associa, 
tion, the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, the 
American Conservative Union, the American Association of Retired Per' 
sons, People for the American Way, the NAACP, and the Sierra Club, for 
example.330 Each of the former organizations has established a comple, 
mentary § 501(c)(3} entity dedicated to disseminating its views and pro-
dUcing the analysis that forms the basis of its lobbying efforts.331 
Notwithstanding serious questions regarding whether these organizations in 
fact segregate their funds as legally required, and the limited capacity of the 
IRS to monitor potential abuses,m the principle behind these hybrid 
c3/c4 organizations is sound. From the perspective of this analysis, how, 
ever, the important observation is that the c3/c4 split has facilitated the 
politicization of the nonprofit sector, and hence has expanded the political 
uses of corporate charitable contributions. 
E. Corporate Donations to Corporate,Oriented PILFs 
Corporations have contributed to the politicized nonprofit organiza, 
tions described above in order to effect favorable electoral and legislative 
outcomes. In yet another form of philanthropic advocacy, corporations 
have used charitable contributions to pro-business legal defense funds, 
constituted as § 501(c)(3} organizations, to influence the development of 
the law. Professor Oliver Houck has written a comprehensive history of the 
development of public interest legal foundations ("PILFs") "created, funded 
and ... largely directed by leaders of American business corporations. "333 
These PILFs included, for example, the Pacific Legal Foundation (the fore' 
runner of the "business" PILFs), the Mountain States Legal Foundation, the 
Gulf and Great Plains Legal Foundation, the Mid,American Legal Founda, 
tion, the New England Legal Foundation, the Southeastern Legal Founda, 
tion, and the Capital Legal Foundation. 334 ' 
According to Houck, politically conservative, business,funded PILFs 
were established en masse after the mid,1970s, as a result of business lead, 
ers' perception that liberal PILFs (and especially pro-environmental PILFs) 
were leveraging their nonprofit advantages in ways that represented a threat 
330. These examples are drawn from Shenk, supra note 269. 
331. ld. at 37. 
332. 'Shenk accuses several organizations of lax oversight and loose control over separate 
accounts. He is also highly skeptical of the IRS' capacity to monitor this conduct, describing it 
as the "see no evil IRS. " Shenk, supra note 269, at 35. 
333. Oliver A. Houck, With Charity fOT AU, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1419 (1984). 
334. ld. at 1420. 
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to corporate interests.335 Donations to these corporate,funded PILFs have 
most commonly funded appearances as amicus curiae on behalf of prD' 
business positions in litigation involving commercial development and 
general environmental matters.336 Nevertheless, prD'business PILFs have 
also become active in advocating business,friendly legal reform outside of 
the litigation context.337 
Houck's research examined the existence and practices of business 
PILFs from the perspective of tax policy. In particular, his work analyzed 
whether these entities had violated prohibitions on private inurement, and 
whether their practice of law could be reconciled with the established 
definitions of charity under tax law and jurisprudence.338 From the per' 
spective of this analysis, the existence of business,funded legal foundations 
constituted as § 501(c)(3) charitable organizations demonstrates that corpD' 
rate charitable contributions have been used, both within and beyond the 
courtroom, to influence the law in the corporate interest.339 
F. A Critique of Politicized Corporate Philanthropy as Corporate Speech 
Corporate expenditures in support of political and cultural affairs have 
been recognized by the Supreme Court as speech entitled to protection 
under the First Amendment.34O . Yet the fact that such speech emanates 
335. Id. 
336. Id. at 1421. 
337. For example, the Washington Legal Foundation ("WLF") publishes a newsletter entitled 
The Legal Backgrounder. See, e.g., Jared G. Carter, Reduce Incentives That Encourage Activist 
Environmental Lawsuits, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 11, 1995; Daniel J. Popeo, It's Time to 
SCTUtini~e HUD Funding of Activist Groups, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, July 21, 1995; Lawrence 
Savell, Guidelines to Keep Advertisers out of Court, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Sept. I, 1995. During 
the summer of 1995, WLF joined with drug and medical device companies to limit FDA restric-
tions on "off-label" or unapproved uses of drugs. See Pharmaceutical Cos: ChaUenging Marketing 
Rules, HEALTH LINE, Aug. 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. WLF has 
also petitioned OSHA to adopt rules safeguarding employers' rights during inspections and inves-
tigations. See OSHA Should Honor Employer Rights During Inspection, WLF Recommends, 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY LETTER, Aug. 21,1995. 
338. Houck, supra note 333, at 1416. 
339. For further discussion of corporate advocacy in the area of legal reform, see, for example, 
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOR SALE: SHORTCHANGING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FOR 
PRIVATE GAIN (1993). 
340. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (application of 
FECA's campaign expenditure limitations to chamber of commerce held constitutional-
notwithstandi~ the recognition of the chamber's free speech interests-in light of state's interest in 
avoiding the potential for political corruption); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 
U.S. 238 (1986) (application of FECA's.campaign expenditure limits to nonprofit corporation 
created expressly to advance political and ideological views held unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) {Public 
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from a legal entity, rather than from the natural persons who compose it, 
means that corporate speech implicates multiple layers of associational and 
free speech interests-those of the corporate entity and those of its individ-
ual shareholders.341 Furthermore, both of these speech interests are at a 
zenith where the entity's speech obtains political dimensions,342 as it does 
in the politicized corporate charitable contributions discussed above. 
Therefore, the corporation's right to free participation in the marketplace 
of ideas must be reconciled with, or at least weighed alongside, the free 
speech and associational interests of corporate shareholders.343 
Notwithstanding the recognition of corporate-level speech rights, the 
judiciary has in a variety of contexts taken note of the unfairness resulting 
from forced subsidization of entity-level expression. Thus, the ratepayers of 
a publicly regulated utility, 344 persons governed by an agency shop arrange-
Service Commission's order prohibiting utility from including policy statements in monthly 
billing inserts held to abridge utility's First Amendment rights); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,435 
u.S. 765 (1978) (Massachusetts law limiting corporate spending on referenda held unconstitu-
tional under First Amendment). On the relation between spending and speech, see, for example, 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam): "Mirtually every means of communicating 
ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.". 
341. The protection of indi\liduals' rights of free speech and association, of course, predates 
the recognition of speech rights at the entity level. For a comprehensive consideration of the 
intersection of individuals' and entities' speech rights, see Brudney, Association, Ad\locacy, and the 
First Amendment, supra note 227. 
342. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (although First Amendment protections are not confined 
thereto, extraordinary solicitude is afforded speech concerning political, governmental, or civic 
matters). 
343. For discussion of the problems generated by corporate level political speech, see 
Brudney, Business Corporations, supra note 227, at 235; Michael ]. Garrison, Corporate Political 
Speech, Campaign Spending, and First Amendment Doctrine, 27 AM. Bus. L.]. 163 (1989). For a less 
troubled view of corporate political speech, see Ribstein, supra note 227. See also Meese, supra 
note 227. 
344. Cahill v. Public Servo Comm'n, 556 N.E.2d 133 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that commission's 
policy authorizing utilities to include cost of charitable contributions within rate payments 
impinges upon ratepayers' First Amendment rights). 
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ment,345 and members of an . integrated bar association346-with narrow 
exception347-cannot constitutionally be compelled to subsidize entity. 
level political speech with which they are in disagreement. Of course, the 
former contexts ~e distinguishable from involuntary shareholder funding of 
corporate charitable contrib4tions on the basis that state action is absent in 
the corporate context.348 For this re~on, the speech and associational 
interests of corporate shareh9lders, as they are affected by the speech. 
related acts. of the corporate entity, do not obtain federal constitutional pro-
portions.349 . 
Nevertheless, the dangers inherent in compelled speech have long 
been recognized-even outside the area of governmental coercion. When 
Thomas Jefferson declared that "to compel a man to furnish contributions 
345. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 4Ji U.S. 209 (1977) (holding that First Amendment 
prohibitS funds received illider agency shop arrangement from being used to support political or 
ideological affairs nongermane to collective bargaining against the will of the contributors). 
346: Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (mandatory bar membership dues may not be used 
to fund ideological activities unrelated to regulation of legal profession against contributors' ob-
jections); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961). For commentary on the bar association 
cases, see James B. Lake, Comment, Lawyers, Please Check Your First Amendment Rights at the Bar: 
The Problem of State-Mandated Bar Dues and CompeUed Speech, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1833 
(1993). 
347. The union and bar association cases illustrate the scope of the permissible curtailment of 
members' free speech interests, as required by the operation of compelling state interests. See, 
e.g., KeUer, 496 U.S. at 1 (state bar association expenditures of compulsory dues on matters neces-
sarily or reasonably related to the regulation of the legal profession held constitutional; whereas 
expenditure of compulsory fees on politil::al and ideological activities not thus related violated 
petitioners' First Amendment speech rights); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 
466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood, 431 U.S. at 209; Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 
225 (1956) (union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act held constitutional based on impor-
tance of collective bargaining and disruptive effect of free-riding employees, despite compromise 
of First Amendment principles). 
348. Business corporations-even those described as "public" on the basis that they have 
raised financing from the national securities markets-are regarded as private entities. 
349. State action is a predicate to the operation of federal constitutional guarantees. See, 
e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,936-37 (1982). 
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of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and 
tyrannical, "350 there is no reason to believe that he meant to confine his 
observation exclusively to governmentally imposed coercion. Shareholders 
have an interest in avoiding compelled subsidization of corporate level 
speech even if the interest is not cognizable under the United States Con' 
stitution. Although mainstream corporate speech jurisprudence has focused 
principally on entity level speech rights, shareholders' "negative speech 
interests" have been recognized in a variety of legal contexts. For example, 
FECA's limitations on corporate campaign spending are regarded as reflect' 
ing a concern for the free speech interests of dissenting shareholders351 in 
addition to other societal concerns. 352 Concern over, dissenting share, 
holders' speech interests in the presence of corporate level speech has also 
been expressed in the Supreme Court's corpus of free speech cases, and has 
gained some increased support in recent years.353 Furthermore, Victor 
Brudney, a noted corporate legal scholar whose treatment of shareholders' 
speech interests has been cited by the Court,354 has argued that a statu' 
350. ' For Jefferson's quotation and explication of the historical context, see IRVING BRANT, 
JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST, 1780-1787, at 354 (1948). Jefferson's statement is quoted 
in the majority opinion in Abood. See 431 U.S. at 235 n.3l. 
351. Extensive discussion of FECA's legislative history and the concerns underlying its enact-
ment appears in Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414-15 (1972) 
("The dominant concern in requiring that contributions be voluntary was, after all, to protect the 
dissenting stockholder or union member."). For further commentary on Congress' long-standing 
concern over compelled speech in the context of unions and corporations, see United States v. 
UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); Ash v. Cort, 350 F. 
Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd Iry 471 F. 2d 811 (3rd Cir. 1973). 
352. FECA is recognized as acknowledgment of the danger that corporate wealth (amassed 
with the cooperation of the state) might otherwise dominate the democratic process, swaying 
election outcomes in a manner inconsistent with the political views of individual persons. See, 
e.g., Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990) ("Regardless 
of whether this danger of 'financial quid pro quo' corruption may be sufficient to justify a restric-
tion on independent expenditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corruption in 
the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
public's support for the corporation's political ideas." (citation omitted». 
353. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260 (1986)(noting legiti-
macy of concern that corporations may use shareholders' money for political purposes not favored 
by such indiViduals). A strong defense of shareholders' (and union members') interests in avoid-
ing forced subsidization of entity level speech appears in Justice Brennan's concurrence in Austin, 
494 U.S. at 674-75 (Brennan, J., concurring). A similar concern for dissenting shareholders' 
"negative speech interests" was articulated by Justice White in his dissenting opinion in BeUotti. 
See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 818 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("Clearly the 
State has a strong interest in assuring that its citizens are not forced to choose between sup-
porting the propagation of views with which they disagree and passing up investment 
opportunities. "). 
354. Austin, 494 U.S. at 675 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Brudney, Business Corporations, 
supra note 227, at 247). 
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tory requirement of absolute shareholder consent for corporate level politil 
cal expenditures would be constitutionally sound, based on the state's interl 
est in protecting sharehold~rs' rights.355 
In contrast, other scholars have portrayed corporate political speech as 
merely an alternative form of profit maximization or, otherwise, as a public 
good (in the tradition of First National Bank v. Bellottf56) , and have thus 
been less solicitous of shareholders' speech interests.357 These scholars 
have argued that market mechanisms, the nature of the corporation as a 
"nexus of contracts,"358 and efficiency concerns (e.g., the problem of freel 
riding dissenters enjoying unpaidlfor financial benefits) either reduce the 
potential for coercion or otherwise mandate against imposing limitations on 
corporate political speech in the interest of protecting dissenting sharel 
holders. These divergent views of corporate speech and of the interests 
furthered thereby are not easily reconciled. . 
O. Shareholders' Negative Speech Rights and the Remedial 
Limits of Disclosure 
My contribution at this juncture, in this discussion of politicized corl 
porate charitable contributions, is the observation that theories of corporate 
speech-from the libertarian (and entitylfriendly) viewpoint advocated by 
Professor Ribstein, for example, to the more pr~regulatory (and thus 
shareholderlfriendly) one advocated by Professor Brudney-in each case 
depend on some notion of shareholder consent. Brudney's model conteml 
plates a requirement of consent in fact.359 Alternatively, scholars 
defending the status quo rely on the notion that shareholders consent to all 
profitlmaximizing acts, including corporate political speech, when they 
make their investment decision (or, secondarily, on the idea that sharel 
holders, at least theoretically, have the ability to alter charter terms to 
prescribe optimal standards of corporate conduct, and thus should be 
deemed to have consented to corporate speech). 
355. Brudney, Business Corporations, supra note 227. 
356. 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would 
suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable 
to decisiorunaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a cor-
poration rather than an individual. "). . 
357. Ribstein, supra note 227; Meese, supra note 227. 
358. For a critique of the nexus-of-conttacts model of the corporation, see Wolfe, supra note 
191, at 1676-83. See also BLAIR, supra note 14, at 17-93; Bratton, supra note 216; Henry N. 
Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON UNIV. L. REv. 99 (1989). 
359. Brudney, Business Corporations, supra note 227. 
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The problem is that each of these notions of shareholder consent 
depends on an assumption about the existence of adequate infor~ 
mation,360 and in the area of corporate charitable contributions, such 
information rarely has been made available to shareholders. The perval!ive 
inability of shareholders to acquire accurate and complete inform~tion 
regarding their firms' charitable contributions subverts the operation of any 
meaningful notion of shareholder ~onsent in regard thereto, thus delegiti~ 
mating corporate charitable contributions as a form of corporate political 
expression. Although Congress has given the SEC th~ authority to promul~ 
gate disclosure requirements in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors,361 the SEC has yet to acknowledge this facet of shareholders' 
rights or to protect them by requiring disclosure of corporate charitable 
contributions. 
This is not to suggest that disclosure of politicized charitable contribu~ 
tions will resolve the conflict between corporate and individual speech 
rights. On the contrary, initially, disclosure will serve merely to make the 
conflict visible. Of course, coercion cannot be addressed if it is not visible, 
and disclosure will at least allow dissenting shareholders to seek partial 
redress through advocacy or disengagement . (selling). Future legal and 
practical developments will have to address, and will reflect, the accomm~ 
dation that we as a society endorse between these potentially conflicting 
corporate~ and individual~level speech rights. 
VI. DoNATIONS BENEFITING TI-lE BUSINESS 
Both courts and corporate executives have described corporate charita~ 
ble contributions as a source of financial benefits for the firm.36z Such 
360. All metaphors based on freedom of contract depend on assumptions of adequate, or at 
least equal, information. This is readily apparent in the context of patient informed consent to 
medical procedures, for example. 
361. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994). 
362. As described supra in notes 62-64 and accompanying text, prior to the enaconent of 
the enabling statutes, courts upheld donations when they believed benefits would accrue to the 
firm as a result thereof. See, e.g., Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58, 58-59 
(W.D.N.Y. 1922) (describing the potential benefits accruing from donations supporting improved 
business education, as well as the value of the goodwill of influential citizens and patrons); 
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Grape Prod. Co., 290 P.2d 481, 483 (Cal. 1955) (describing the 
benefits potentially accruing to employees from more accessible and improved hospital facilities as 
the basis for finding that the president was within his authority to authorize the gifts); cf. Kahn v. 
Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 62 (Del. .1991) (though benefit to the firm was' not required, the court 
observed that public relations benefits were likely to arise from the company-funded museum). Of 
course, corporate managers have an incentive to describe contributions in terms of revenue en-
hancement, in order to insulate such contributions (and their decision-making'in regard' thereto) 
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profit-maximizing charitable contributions have included a broad spectrum 
of corporate conduct, some of it closely analogous to traditional marketing 
and advertising, with other contributions having a more attenuated connec-
tion to revenue creation or cost reduction.363 Donations made in the 
interest of benefiting the corporation are consistent with the traditional, 
commercial norms of corporate law. From the perspective of corporate law, 
profit-maximizing charitable contributions are uncontroversial. 
Part of the problem in this area is practical. Without systematic dis-
closure, shareholders have no ability to assess whether corporate managers 
have administered the firm's charitable contributions according to value-
maximizing criteria. Because managers may accomplish self-serving objec-
tives through their allocation of the firm's charitable contributions, as 
described above, some system of accountability is required. Additionally, 
the dearth of company-specific data in the area of corporate philanthropy 
has hindered the progress of empirical analysis.3M Systematic disclosure 
would provide economists and other analysts the data required to assess the 
profit-maximizing claims made in regard to corporate charitable contribu-
tions. 
There is also a deeper, conceptual problem inhering in the notion of 
profit-maximizing charitable contributions. Donations that are foreseeably 
profit maximizing should not rightly be considered philanthropic. Under 
both tax policy and the common understanding of "charity," the donor 
cannot anticipate a net gain from a charitable contribution.365 Thus, 
while profit-maximizing charitable contributions are uncontroversial from 
from scrutiny. 
363. For academic discussions of the strategic benefits that may arise from charitable contri-
butions, see, for example, Galaskiewicz, supra note 182, at 246-60; Haley, supra note 36, at 485-
504; Peter Navarro, Why Do CoTPorations Gille to Charity?, 61 J. Bus. 65-93 (1988). Within the 
tax literature, Nancy Knauer has described contributions as commercially driven (and has thus 
argued for the repeal of the corporate charitable deduction under § 170). Knauer, supra note 77, 
at 96. The empirical studies analyzing the connection between corporate charitable contribu-
tions and corporate profit maximization are summarized in Webb, supra note 54, at 77-132. And 
within the marketing-oriented and popular literature see, for example, STECKEL & SIMONS, supra 
note 183; Philip Maher, What CoTPorations Get Iry Giving, Bus. MARKETING, Dec. 1984, at 
80-89; Timothy S. Mescon & Donn J. Tilson, CoTPorate Philanthropy: A Strategic Approach to the 
Bottom-Une, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1987, at 49-61; Smith, supra note 47, at 105. 
364. See, e.g., Navarro, supra note 363, at 65 ("rrJhe empirical efforts have been hampered 
by the lack of firm-specific data."); Craig Smith, Desperately Seeking Data, 9 CORP. 
PHILANTHROPY REP. 10-11 (Oct. 1993); see also Maher, supra note 363, at 84 ("Despite the 
billions of dollars donated each year, there is a remarkable dearth of hard data on its use or, 
especially, its effectiveness. "). 
365. Knauer has confronted this analytic problem directly, arguing that the mercenary nature 
of these transfers should disqualify them from being deductible as charitable contributions. 
Knauer, supra note 77, at 96. 
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the perspective of corporate law, they are highly controversial as a general 
theoretical matter, and from the perspective of tax policy analysis. 
The transfers most readily observed to be profit maximizing, that is, 
those arising from cause-related marketing ("CRM") promotions and corpo-
rate special-event ("CSE") sponsorships, are most directly in conflict with 
the charitable paradigm operative under § 170.366 Because the expecta-
tion of a quid pro quo underlies these arrangements, such transfers fail to 
satisfy the "contribution or gift" requirement of § 170.367 On this basis, 
contributions arising from corporate marketing programs are increasingly 
being regarded as forms of business transfers distinguishable from charitable 
giving,368 ones more appropriately deducted as business expenses under 
§ 162 than as charitable contributions under § 170.369 And, indeed, 
contributions arising from CRM promotions and CSE sponsorships are not 
included in the annual aggregate corporate charitable contributions figures 
presented in Giving USA, and elsewhere.37o 
Alternatively, outside of CRM and CSE promotions, most charitable 
contributions by corporations have had only a tenuous connection to rev-
enue enhancement or cost reduction.371 The resulting "gossamer civic 
366. My analysis is consistent with the holding in Hernandez II. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 
691 (1989), which adopts a quid pro quo oriented analysis in relation to the "contribution or gift" 
requirement pertaining to charitable contributions. For commentary on the Hernandez decision, 
see Knauer, supra note 77, at 35-41. See also United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 
U.S. 105 (1986) (holding that no portion of individual taxpayers' premium payments constitutes a 
charitable contribution). 
367. Section 170(c) defines the term "charitable contribution." I.R.C. § 170 (1994). Of 
further relevance is Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1 (c)(5) (as amended in 1990). See supra note 7. 
368. See, e.g., STECKEL &. SIMONS, supra note 183, at 76 ("Cause-related marketing is just 
that: marketing. It happens to have a philanthropic result, but its primary purpose is sales."); P. 
Rajan Varadarajan &. Anil Menon, Cause-Related Marketing: A Coalignment of Marketing Strategy 
and Corporate Philanthropy, 52 J. MARKETING, July 1988, at 58-74, 59-60 (describing essential 
marketing thrust of CRM promotions); see also Knauer, supra note 77, at 11 ("In practice, cor-
porate managers and fundraisers agree that corporate transfers to charity represent a calculated 
purchase of advertising services or goodwill. "). 
369. From the perspective of the corporation, the classification of the transfer as charitable or 
as a business-related expense is generally not a substantial concern (outside of the context of 
lobbying). The transfers would be deductible under § 170 in the former case, or under § 162 in 
the latter case. However, where § 170 treatment is inapposite, the company's costs might have 
to be capitalized pursuant to § 263 in some instances, thus rendering the distinction between 
business related expenses and charitable contributions of greater practical relevance. See I.R.C. 
§ 263 (1994). 
370. See supra note 22. 
371. See supra note 364; see also Galaskiewicz, supra note 182, at 248 ("Research on the 
relationship between company giving and public opinion is scanty and inconclusive."). For a 
skeptical view of the touted strategic benefits accruing from charitable contributions, see USEEM, 
supra note 159, at 146-49; Haley, supra note 36, at 492: "Despite managerial claims, there are 
almost no corporate data to verify that contributions affect corporate profits." 
Corporate Philanthropy 665 
goodwill"372 has too readily supplied a justification for unlimited mana-
gerial discretion in the area of corporate philanthropy.373 Thus, 
systematic disclosure is required in order to provide an appropriate 
accommodation between shareholders' interest in accountability and 
managers' interest in flexibility, and to advance the study of corporate 
philanthropy. 
A. Contributions-Based Corporate Marketing 
There is considerable empirical evidence that charitable contributions 
have been assimilated into corporate marketing and advertising func-
tions,374 either as a complement to or as a substitute therefor.375 CRM 
and CSE promotions have allowed firms to publicize both their individual 
products and the corporation's "good image" generally.376 These highly 
372. Cahill v. Public Servo Comm'n, 556 N.E.2d 133, 137 (N.Y. 1990). 
We agree and understand that charitable contributions may enhance important quality of 
life aspects in selected spheres of the affected communities, thus benefiting in many 
intangible ways the utilities' employees, customers and boosters ..•. But the effects of 
this gossamer civic goodwill on the elementary provision of utility services are at best 
speculative .... 
373. Although a corporation is not required to demonstrate that financial benefits will result 
to it as a result of its contributions (as described in Part II), courts have uniformly responded 
favorably when the potential for a benefit has been alleged. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A,2d 
48, 62 (Del. 1991). On a related point, I would argue that the business judgment rule should 
apply to donations that are foreseeably profit-maximizing-but the dilemma is discerning which 
gifts should properly be so categorized. 
374. Economist~ regard advertising as an attempt to enhance revenues by manipulating the 
demand for the firm's product. For a summary of the literarure on commercial advertising, see 
David W. Schumann et aI., Corporate Advertising in America: A Review of Published Studies on Use, 
Measurement and Effectiveness, 20 J. ADVERTISING, Sept. 1991, at 35. The variables affecting a 
firm's propensity to advertise are discussed in Richard E. Caves & Peter J. Williamson, What Is 
Product Differentiation, Really?, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 113, 113-32 (1985). 
375. Empirical srudies finding a complementary relationship between advertising and contri-
butions are discussed in ROBERT S. BURT, CORPORATE PROFITS AND COoPTATION 197-221 
(1983) (presenting evidence that firms with greater consumer dependencies engage in higher 
levels of charitable contributions as support for the notion that contributions are part of corpo-
rate efforts to coopt consumers); CLOTFELTER, sUlJ'ra note 22, at 188-89 (assessing the existing 
empirical evidence and concluding that "there is good reason to believe that at least some por-
tion of a corporation's contributions have a profit-related motive attached to it, much of it serv-
ing to improve the company's public image"); Galaskiewicz, sUlJ'ra note 182, at 247-48; Navarro, 
sulJ'ra note 363, at 89 (collecting empirical evidence "lending support to the conclusion here that 
contributions are a form of advertising"-but noting the existence of contradictory evidence). 
For a more circumspect view of the correlation between contributions and advertising expendi-
rures, see Haley, sUlJ'ra note 36, at 488 ("Contradictory findings exist about relationships between 
contributions and advertising budgets. H). 
376. For a discussion of the marketing objectives that may be realized through CRM pro-
motions, see, for example, Varadarajan & Menon, S~lJ'ra note 368, at 60-64. 
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structured, contributions-based marketing programs achieved prominence 
during the 1980s,377 yet on an informal basis, corporations have for 
decades attempted to attract consumers by publicizing certain of their chari-
table contributions.378 
1. Cause-Related Marketing 
The distinguishing feature of a CRM program is that the firm's com-
mitment to transfer a percentage of the revenues earned from the promo-
tion to the specified charitable organizations is used as the basis of an 
appeal to consumers.379 The popularity of CRM from the corporate per-
spective has been based on its consumer appeapso and on the ability of 
corporations to adapt CRM promotions to their precise commercial 
needs.381 The principal variables in CRM promotions include the selec-
tion of the charitable beneficiaries, the duration of the promotion, the 
particular consumer· group targeted, and the breadth of the campaign (Le., 
local, national, or intemational).382 In addition, CRM promotions have 
often garnered attention from the news media, so the participating corpora-
tions (and charities) have frequently received favorable publicity indepen-
dent of their own advertising.383 
While CRM promotions have generally proved beneficial for the par-
ticipating charitable organizations,384 they are fundamentally regarded 
both by the business community and by nonprofit leaders as part of corpo-
rate marketing efforts. 385 The essential marketing thrust of CRM promo-
377. A comprehensive survey of the development of CRM and CSE promotions appears in 
Knauer, supra note 77, at 60-71. 
378. Perhaps the most famous example is Texaco's "Live at the Met" broadcasts, which 
commenced in 1940. Mescon &. Tilson, supra note 363, at 55. 
379. See Varadarajan &. Menon, supra note 368, at 60. 
380. See, e.g., STECKEL &. SIMONS, supra note 183, at 75-87. 
381. ld.; see also Varadarajan &. Menon, supra note 368, at 63-67. 
382. Varadarajan &. Menon, supra note 368, at 63-67. 
383. See STECKEL &. SIMONS, supra note 183, at 76-78 (describing media interest in Ameri-
can Express' CRM promotions). CRM promotions receive a great deal of publicity: ALexis-
Nexis search in the Current News file retrieved approximately 500 stories discussing corporate 
CRM promotions for the years 1993-1995. These press accounts rarely included any precise 
details about the terms of the promotions, however. 
384. STECKEL &. SIMONS, supra note 183, at 78 (describing large charities, such as Big Broth-
ers Big Sisters, the Special Olympics, the American Cancer Society, and the American Heart 
Association as having raised millions of dollars from corporations' CRM campaigns). 
385. See Knauer, supra note 77, at 53-60. 
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tions is illustrated, for instance, by the fact that contributions arising from 
CRM promotions are typically funded from advertising and marketing 
budgets, as opposed to corporate philanthropy budgets.386 Also signifi-
cant is the fact that corporate advertising and administration costs in CRM 
promotions, which frequently amount to millions of dollars, typically ex-
ceed the amount contributed to charities by a substantial sum.387 
As stated above, CRM promotions are a relatively recent innovation 
in contributions-based marketing. American Express launched the first 
national CRM promotion in 1983.388 The company committed itself to 
contributing one cent for each use of its charge card and one dollar for each 
new card to the Statue of Liberty/Ellis Island Foundation's restoration 
project throughout the duration of the campaign. 389 According to com-
pany officials, as a result thereof, card use increased by more than 20% and 
applications increased by 45% during the promotion.390 From a total cor-
porate marketing expenditure of $6 million, the restoration project received 
contributions from the company totalling $1. 7 million.391 In light of 
American Express' successes, many other companies have sought to imple-
ment CRM programs.392 Especially in industries where product differenti-
ation is difficult and rate competition severe (as in the case of credit card 
386. Varadarajan & Menon, supra note 368, at 59. 
387. Id. 
388. The most comprehensive discussion of American Express' 1983 CRM campaign in 
support of the Statue of LibertylEllis Island restoration appears in Mescon & Tilson, supra note 
363, at 57 (citing Wendy L. Wall, Companies Change the Ways They Make Charitable Donations, 
WALL ST. J., June 21, 1984, at 1). Similarly detailed descriptions of other early CRM promo-
tions appear in Maher, supra note 363. 
389. Varadarajan & Menon, supra note 368, at 59. 
390. Id. 
391. Id. 
392. For instance, more recently, Salant Corporation is reported to have ignited a trend in 
men's neckwear by incorporating designs and logos associated with the Save the Children organi-
zation on its neckties. Under the terms of Salant's CRM promotions (which subsequently ex-
panded to include additional charitable organizations), five percent of the revenues produced 
from the necktie sales were pledged to the charities. Other men's apparel firms have sought to 
duplicate Salant's successes. Randa Corp. entered into a licensing agreement with C.A.R.E. in 
1993 under which a portion of the neckties' sales proceeds were pledged to C.A.R.E. through a 
CRM promotion. And Wemco, Inc. has marketed a line of "Endangered Species" ties under 
CRM promotions benefiting a variety of environmental conservation organizations. Elena Hart, 
Tie Makers Still Sticking Their Necks out for Good Causes, DAILY NEWS REc., June 13, 1994, at 16, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
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companies,393 long distance telephone carriers, 394 and airlines395) busi-
nesses have increasingly relied on CRM promotions to attract and retain 
consumers. 
2. Corporate Special-Event Sponsorships 
Like CRM programs, CSE sponsorships represent strategic partnerships 
from which both the corporation and the nonprofit organization anticipate 
financial benefits. Corporate executives have described CSE sponsorships 
as even more efficient than traditional advertising in terms of the cost of 
publicity in comparison to the resultant media exposure.396 The typical 
arrangement in a CSE sponsorship is that the charity's special event will 
prominently display the corporation's name, logo, or products in exchange 
for the receipt of a substantial sponsorship payment.397 Because the IRS 
has defined "acknowledgments" very broadly, the charity can generally 
avoid having unrelated business income tax on the sponsorship pay-
ments.398 Thus, CSE sponsorships are essentially exchange transactions 
393. See, e.g., STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 183, at 80-81 (describing 1987 CRM cam-
paign by MasterCard that allowed consumers to select among a variety of charitable recipients); 
see also Valerie Block, Blockbuster and NationsBank Cobranding a Visa Card, AM. BANKER, Mar. 
22, 1995, at 1 (describing cobranded Visa card under which two companies cosponsored a CRM 
campaign to benefit the "End Hunger Network"); Robert Jennings, First USA Goes Angling for 
Outdoor Types with Cause-Tied Orvis Conservation Card, AM. BANKER, July 19, 1995, at 10; 
Robert Jennings, Fleet Joins Charity Marketing Race with a Card Tied to Specid Olympics, AM. 
BANKER, July 3, 1995, at 12. 
394. See, e.g., Shelby Gilie, Long-Distance Is Reaching Out to Left and Right, SEA1TLE TIMES, 
Aug. 9, 1995, at El, available in LEXIS, News library, CURNWS File; MCI Sponsors Kenny 
Loggins Tour, PR Newswire, July 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, News library, ARCNWS File (de-
scribing "MCI Friends and Family Tour" benefiting the National Park Foundation). 
395. See STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 183, at 84 (describing CRM campaign by Continen-
tal Airlines to benefit Colorado's homeless); Airline Partners with Others to Expand Its Giving, 51 
PR News: May 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, Market library, IACNWS File (describing CRM 
promotion sponsored by Northwest Airlines); Mescon & Tilson, supra note 363, at 57 (discussing 
American Airlines' CRM campaign to benefit Dallas Symphony). 
396. Companies "piggyback" on the news coverage aSSOciated with the event. Mescon & 
Tilson, supra note 363, at 54 (SCM executives estimated that $200,000 museum sponsorship 
payment produced publicity that would have cost $51 million per year for five years in advertising 
payments to reach equivalent customers). 
397. As Knauer has observed, CSE sponsorships invert the commercial relationship present 
in the CRM context .. In CRM promotions, the corporation pays the equivalent of a licensing fee 
(the "contributions") in order to tie the charity to the company's marketing campaign. In special 
event sponsorships, in contrast, the company lends its name to the charity's event. Knauer, supra 
note 77, at 67. 
398. In 1991 the IRS issued a technical advice memorandum addressing college bowl spon-
sorship payments in which the payments were classified as unrelated business income to the 
donee nonprofit organizations. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991). After an ex-
tensive lobbying campaign by nonprofit organizations, the IRS issued proposed regulations in 
Corporate Philanthropy 669 
in which the corporation receives substantial media exposure and favorable 
acknowledgements (if not "advertising") in exchange for the contributions 
it makes to the nonprofit organization hosting the event.399 Highly flexi-
ble arrangements, CSE promotions can be coordinated with CRM programs 
as well as traditional advertising campaigns in order to produce the maxi-
mum favorable publicity for the corporation.400 The most common event 
sponsorships, for obvious reasons, have been arts performances and amateur 
athletic events-the regular401 and Special Olympics402 and college bowl 
football games403 being the most salient examples of the latter. 
Because CRM campaigns and CSE sponsorships represent contexts in 
which corporate contributions have been closely assimilated to traditional 
corporate marketing efforts, the profit-maximizing claims made in regard 
thereto are highly credible. Accordingly, in light of their commercial 
nature, such contributions should not be deductible under § 170 as charita-
ble contributions. Transfers to charitable organizations arising from CRM 
campaigns appear to be the most ill-suited for treatment under § 170, be-
cause the existence of the contribution is directly tied to the occurrence of 
a revenue prodUcing transaction for the firm. There is little precedent 
addressing the tax treatment of CRM campaigns,404 but the IRS has con-
tinued to support the charitable framework supporting CSE sponsorships, 
perhaps as a result of extensive lobbying by charitable organizations.405 
Nevertheless, companies continue to derive a valuable package of services 
1993. These regulations adopted a significantly more liberal approach to CSE sponsorships. 
Most importantly, they focused on the nature of the services performed by the donee organization 
(as opposed to the corporate donor's motivation or resulting publicity), and prOVided that nontax-
able "acknowledgments" would be defined broadly. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-(e), 58 Fed. 
Reg. 5687, 5689 (1994); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4, 58 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1993). 
399. See Prop. Treasury Reg. § l.512(a)-(e); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4. For a transactional 
approach to CSE sponsorships, see Francis R. Hill, Corporate Sponsorships in Transactional 
Perspective: General Principles and Special Cases in the Law of Tax Exempt Organizations (un-
published manuscript, on file with author). 
400. See, e.g., STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 183, at 82 (describing linkages between CRM 
campaigns and CSE sponsorships). 
401. Marlis L. Carson, Corporate Sponsorship and the Olympics, 68 TAX NOTES 651, 651-52 
(1995). 
402. See Kate Fitzgerald, Special Olympics Wins oller Sponsors, ADVERTISINO AOE, Apr. 10, 
1995, at 2; Kirk Johnson, The SeUing of the Special Olympics, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1995, at Bl, 
B4 (describing sponsorship payments, largely from big corporations, as reaching $28 million in 
1995). 
403. See Nathan Wirtschafter, Fourth Quarter Choke: How the IRS Blew the Corporate 
Sponsorship Game, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1465 (1994). 
404. But see Sierra Club Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996). 
405. The 1993 proposed regulations are the latest official word from the IRS on CSE sponsor-
ships. See supra note 398. 
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from CRM promotions and CSE sponsorships (and tax experts continue to 
question the charitable nature of the arrangement}.406 In sum, there· is 
considerable consensus that CRM campaigns and CSE sponsorships are 
profit ·maximizing for the donor corporation, but for· this very reason the 
charitable nature of the payments arising therefrom is suspect. 
3. Advertising the Firm's Philanthropic Image to Influence Consumers 
Since the late 1970s, corporations have increasingly sought to adver, 
tise their contributions in order to improve the public's perception of the 
firm in general. 407 The most popular form of contributions,based, firm, 
level advertising is the mar~eting of the "socially responsible" corpora' 
tion.408 Corporations have frequently publicized their efforts to support 
environmental conservation,409 education,410 and women's and minori, 
406. Thus the law in this area is far from settled. See Hill, sutn'a note 399; Knauer, sutn'a 
note 77. 
407. For discussions of consumer interest in socially responsible products ~nd firms, see 
Varadarajan & Menon, sutn'a note 368, at 71-72. For a discussion of increasing corporate interest 
in strategic philanthropy, see, for example, Smith, sutn'a note 47, at 105-16; EdwardJ. Stendardi, 
Corporate Philanthropy: The Redefinition of Enlightened Self-Interest, 29 SOC. SCI. J. 21, 21-30. 
(1992). Recent developments of strategic partnerships of many varieties are described in 
ROSABETH Moss KANTER, WORLD CLASS: THRIVING LOCALLY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(1995). 
408. Of course, the socially responsible corporation is not the only persona marketed by 
business. Corporations have frequently advertised their affiliations with prestigious or avant garde 
performing arts organizations as a way of communicating a message to the public about the firm's 
sophistication, financial success, or savvy. See Smith, sutn'a note 47, at 109 (describing the 
AT&T Foundation's decision to support avant garde arts performances in ·order to communicate 
a message to the public about the state of the art nature of the company's goods and services). 
409. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. POOLE, HERITAGE FOUND., THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEX: 
PART III (Institution Analysis No.4, June 1982) (documenting proenvironmental work on the 
part of nonprofit organizations created with the help of corporate funds); Environmental Groups' 
Corporate Marketing Policies, GREEN MARKETALERT, March 1994, at 4 (describing nonprofit 
conservation groups'· policies and efforts to establish strategic partnerships with corporations); 
Jeffery D. Zbar, Firms GQ Green with Conservancy, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 16 (de-
scribing corporate donations to The Nature Conservancy); Corporate Environmental Philanthropy, 
GREEN MARKETALERT, October 1993, at 4 (describing substantial corporate contributions to 
major environmental groups); James T. Harris, Working with Environmental Groups, PUB. REL. J., 
May 1992, at 24 (same); Keith Schneider, Natural Foes BankroU Environmental Groups, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 23,1991, atA12 (same). 
410. Educational groups, defined very broadly, receive the greatest percentage (33.5%) of 
corporate charitable contributions. See GIVING USA 1996, sutn'a note 23, at 91. In fact, Exxon 
has a separate "Educational Foundation." See Smith, s$a note 47, at 107-08. Also notable 
was President Bush's plans for the "New American Schools Development Corporation"-
envisioned as a private think tank largely funded by business donations that would produce re-
search and recommendations for reVitalizing American education. See sutn'a note 210. 
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ties' rights,411 as well as other programs, through corporate charitable con# 
tributions. Surveys attest to considerable consumer support for socially re# 
sponsible products and firms, as do the resounding successes of consumer 
consciousness publications such as Shopping far a Better War[d412 and the 
establishment of socially conscious mutual funds.413 
The practice of touting the firm's contributions, along with any other 
socially#conscious expenditures, has become common in the consumer 
products area. For example, Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream and The Body Shop 
have aggressively sought to appeal to consumers on the basis of their su~ 
port for the environment and other progressive causes. From a different 
perspective, petroleum, chemical, and automotive manufacturers have used 
charitable contributions to pr~environmental causes, in combination with 
extensive advocacy advertising,414 to counter their negative images as 
polluters.415 Thus, while corporate social responsibility represents a dis# 
tinct explanation for corporate philanthropy, as discussed previously, 
contributions#based social#responsibility expenditures have also been used as 
part of corporate marketing efforts. Ironically, notwithstanding that firms 
have made substantial investments in these areas, the evidence regarding 
the ability of such expenditures to enhance revenues or reduce costs is 
conflicting and inconclusive.416 
B. Other Profit#Maximizing Strategies Involving Contributions 
1. Donating Products to Increase the Consumer Base 
Contributions might also contribute to revenue enhancement by secur# 
ing or enlarging the firm's consumer base. 417 Particularly prevalent has 
been the practice of computer and other technology firms contributing 
equipment and other products to schools. For example, IBM, Apple, and 
411. See NOLAN, supra note 186. 
412. See, e.g., SHOPPING FOR A BETTER WORLD (1994). 
413. See infra note 427. 
414. See S. PRAKASH SETHI, ADVOCACY ADVERTISING AND LARGE CORPORATIONS (1977); 
see also Anne Louise Page, We're Good Guys: Image Propaganda from Mobil Oil, Bus. & Soc. 
REv., Spring 1995, at 33. For a discussion of advocacy advertising in conjunction with charitable 
contributions, see Haley, supra note 36, at 501. 
415. For citations, see supra note 409. See also NEIHEISEL, supra note 32, at 60-61. 
416. See Smith, supra note 364; supra note 32. 
417. Galaskiewicz, supra note 182, at 247-48. 
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Hewlett Packard have annually made contributions of computer equipment 
to schools valued in the tens of millions of dollars.418 
2. Charitable Contributions and Research and Development 
Corporations have used charitable contributions to university science 
programs to "out-source" some of their research and development 
("R&D").419 Contributions to R&D conducted at universities may either 
substitute for research that would be too costly to fund internally or com-
plement intrafirm R&D.420 Contributions supporting university R&D 
may provide the donor-firms with access to research programs and faculty 
members' technical expertise. Corporations active in agriculture, pharma-
ceuticals, defense technology, and telecommunications (including computer 
technology) have been particularly apt to use contributions to university 
science departments in conjunction with intrafirm research and develop-
ment.421 In order for these contributions to be revenue enhancing for the 
donors, they must sow the seeds of the firms' future technological innova-
tions.422 
3. Donations That Benefit Employees 
Employee-matching grant programs confer obvious benefits on employ-
ees. The matching grant affords the employee the psychic gratification of 
augmenting the gift that he or she is responsible for making without in-
creasing the employee's personal expenditure. In addition, the employee 
can exercise his or her discretion to direct the gift to local charitable orga-
418. Section 170(e)(4) of the U.S. Code (enacted in 1981) created a special tax incentive for 
businesses to contribute property and equipment to educational instirutions for research purposes. 
I.R.C. § 170(e) (1994). For discussion of corporate donations of computer equipment, see, for 
example, Useem, supra note 158, at 341, which describes tens of millions of dollars worth of 
computer equipment donated by computer companies in the 1980s. See also Maher, supra note 
363, at 86 (describing IBM's practice of combining gifts of computer equipment with 
multimillion-dollar educational grants in the area of information technology). 
419. One commentator has described the program run out of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, in which "hundreds of corporations contribute tens of thousands of dollars annu-
ally,» as the "grandaddy" of all such corporate contributions-based research programs. STECKEL 
& SIMONS, supra note 183, at 24. 
420. See, e.g., Haley, supra note 36, at 488 ("[Clontributions may substirute for corporate 
R&D by funding basic innovation at research instirutions. More often, contributions may com-
plement corporate R&D by funding 'extensions of corporate projects. "). 
421. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 47. 
422. Haley, supra note 36, at 488. 
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nizations, such as hospitals, arts organizations, or community services orga-
nizations, from whose services the employee may benefit. For this reason, 
such matching programs are generally regarded as corporate efforts to im-
prove employee morale and loyalty to the firm. 
Of course, corporations may directly contribute to charitable orga-
nizations that benefit employees apart from employee-matching grant 
programs. Corporations have contributed to community day care and 
geriatric care, as well as to community hospital and health organizations, 
domestic violence programs, and specific local publidprivate partner-
ships.423 Corporate charitable contributions that improve community and 
educational services and other quality of life variables may affect employees' 
morale and productivity, as well as retention rates, and thus increase reve-
nues or reduce costS.424 The value resulting to firms from such expendi-
tures is, however, difficult or impossible to measure. 
4. Reinforcing the Economic Infrastructure 
Another, but even more attenuated commercial justification for corpo-
rate charitable contributions has been that such donations help sustain the 
educational and communal infrastructure necessary to support markets and 
profitable businesses.425 This rationale has most commonly been applied 
in the context of contributions to national charities or colleges and univer-
sities haVing national standing-situations where the gifts benefit popula-
tions in which the company's employees do not predominate. Because of 
the numerous variables involved, unlimited time horizons, and obvious free-
rider problems, it is impossible to document the existence of any firm-
specific benefits resulting from gifts of this nature. 426 
423. Smith, supra note 47, at 111. 
424. 'See, e.g., NEIHEISEL, supra note 32, at 34-35; Haley, supra note 36, at 498; Navarro, 
supra note 363, at 68. 
425. The connection between charitable contributions, the economic and social infrastruc-
ture, and corporate profitability is described, for example, in A.P. Smith Manufacturing. Co. v. 
Barlow,98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), and Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. 
1969). Nevertheless, the high degree of speculation required to support the connection is noted 
by Haley and others. Haley, supra note 36, at 489 ("No systematic evidence exists; yet, anec-
dotal data suggest that contributions which rebuild infrastructure may reduce corporate costs. "). 
426. See Galaskiewicz, supra note 182, at 250 ("Skeptics in the management literature cor-
rectly point out that it is impossible to measure the impact of responsible behavior on future sales 
and public opinion and that espousing the ethic of enlightened self interest is not rational from 
an economic point of view. H). 
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5. Attracting Investor Capital Through Social Responsibility 
Investors have become increasingly interested in monitoring corpora~ 
tions' social responsibility efforts, including their charitable contributions 
practices. The second half of this century has witnessed successive waves of 
investor social activism, especially in the areas of environmentalism, affir~ 
mative action, human rights, and product safety. Such interest has recently 
been institutionalized in the establishment of socially conscious mutual 
funds. 427 It is possible that these funds may facilitate capital formation 
for companies having an established record of charitable support, and thus 
reduce the costs of capital for such firms. However, the relative novelty of 
social~choice funds, as well as the relatively little amount of capital under 
their management, suggest that it is unlikely such entities will playa major 
role in affecting the cost of capital. 
C. Disclosure and the Question of Profit~ Maximizing Contributions 
As the above discussion indicates, obvious financial benefits accrue to 
firms as a result of CRM and CSE promotions. However, because of the 
quid pro quo nature of such arrangements, the contributions arising there~ 
from should not be considered part of corporate philanthropy. In contrast, 
any financial benefits that accrue to firms from the other charitable contri~ 
butions described in this section are far more elusive. The charitable status 
of such contributions is more secure precisely because their profit maximiz~ 
ing effects are less certain. 
Apart from CRM and CSE promotions, the ambiguous nature of the 
financial benefits claimed to arise from corporate charitable contributions 
complicates the project of defining the appropriate regulatory approach 
thereto. The absence of definitive empirical support for the value~ 
enhancing function of such expenditures does not mean they should neces~ 
sarily be considered a form of corporate waste. Alternatively, in light of the 
inconclusive empirical evidence and the vested interests that corporate 
managers, marketing executives, and fundraisers have in describing contri~ 
butions in terms of corporate profit maximization, it is equally inappropriate 
to regard charitable contributions (outside of CRM and CSE promotions) as 
427. For a discussion of the rapidly evolVing field of socially conscious investing, see, for 
example, PETER D. KINDER ET AL., INVESTING FOR GOOD (1993); Maria O'Brien Hylton, 
"SociaUy Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing WeU in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1 (1992), and W. Scott Klinger, Social Investing in a Changing World, BEST'S 
REv.-LIFEfHEALTH INSUR. ED., Feb. 1994, at 68. 
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being closely analogous to other traditional, value-maximizing forms of 
corporate conduct. Courts have too readily deferred to the statements of 
corporate managers in this area, or glossed over the problem by asserting 
the existence of goodwill benefits. As a matter of legal policy, a middle 
ground must be established between absolutely prohibiting corporate chari-
table contributions and absolutely allowing them without any meaningful 
system of accountability. 
Of course, the argument for disclosure to shareholders is weakest, and 
the argument in favor of deference to managers' business judgment is stron-
gest, where contributions give rise to increased value or reduced cost. 
(Indeed, shareholders do not bear the cost of profit-maximizing contribu-
tions because th~y involve no net reduction· in profits.) But absent disclo-
sure, it is impossible to assess whether the firm's philanthropic capital has 
been employed in the firm's commercial interest. Unlike the traditional 
costs of production, corporate contributions are acutely susceptible to being 
administered· without regard to the firm's commercial interests and in fur-
therance of the personal interests of corporate elites. As Louis Lowenstein 
has recently written, "You manage what you. measure."428 By failing to 
require that corporate charitable expenditures be reflected either in the 
narrative portion of corporate reports or in the financial statements accom-
pan:ying them, the SEC has contributed to mismanagement and unprofes-
sionalism in the administration of corporate charitable contributions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has analyzed corporate charitable contributions from the 
perspective of corporate legal norms and the interests of shareholders. The 
absence of any system ~f accountability in this area-that is, the absence of 
substantive regUlation un:der state corporation law, in combination with the 
abs~nce of a disclosure requirement un~er the federal securities .(or other) 
regulations-has created the· potential for abuse with respect to both share-
holde~s' property interests and in regard to their interests in avoiding com-
pelled subsidization of entity-level political expression. Furthermore, firms 
have prevented shareholders from having a meaningful voice in the formu-
lation ot corporate philanthropy policies by keeping charitable-
contributions information confidential. To the extent that corporate 
charitable contributions represent an expression of corPorate social respon-
sibility, this assertion of managerial prerogative is unju.stified, as managers 
·428. See LowensteiIl, su.pra note 179. 
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have no special expertise in matters of this nature. In regard to politicized 
philanthropy, furthermore, fundamental democratic principles also mandate 
in favor of required corporate contributions disclosure. 
In light of the rapid development of the charitable sector and the 
sophistication of corporate affairs generally, a precisely defined system of 
substantive regulation would be difficult and costly to design and to admin-
ister. In the alternative, a system of accountability based on required dis-
closure of corporate charitable contributions would represent a more fruitful 
and practicable accommodation between shareholders' interests in account-
ability and managers' interests in flexibility in the administration of corpo-
rate affairs. Congress has afforded the SEC the authority to promulgate 
rules in the public interest and for the protection of investors, and the SEC 
has responded by implementing an extensive system of required corporate 
disclosure. Disclosure of corporate charitable contributions information 
should now be made part of this regime. 
